Black gold, the scenic rim and the theory of the firm: implications of the exploration for coal and coal seam gas in the scenic rim of south east Queensland for the evolving theory of the firm by Maddox, Cecil W. E.
 
 
 
BLACK GOLD, THE SCENIC RIM AND THE THEORY OF THE 
FIRM 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPLORATION FOR COAL AND COAL 
SEAM GAS IN THE SCENIC RIM OF SOUTH EAST 
QUEENSLAND FOR THE EVOLVING THEORY OF THE FIRM 
 
 
A Thesis submitted by 
Cecil W E Maddox   B Bus 
 
For the award of  
 
Master of Business Research 
 
2016 
i 
 
BLACK GOLD, THE SCENIC RIM  
AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE  EXPLORATION FOR COAL AND COAL SEAM GAS IN THE SCENIC RIM OF 
SOUTH EAST QUEENSLAND FOR THE EVOLVING THEORY OF THE FIRM 
 
ABSTRACT 
The implicit social contract between Australian society, government and business 
does not provide an environment in which communities within the Scenic Rim of 
South East Queensland believe that their values and development desires are 
adequately protected. Consequently, the communities are insisting that their local 
values, particularly regarding the environment, good quality agricultural land and 
water, be recognised and respected by both governments and mining companies. 
This changing social contract has significant implications for: (i) the nature of the 
engagement between communities and mining companies that might result in a more 
equitable distribution of both the benefits and disadvantages of mining; and; (ii) the 
evolving theory of the firm. This change applies particularly to those theories that 
focus on the reasons for existence of corporations, their relationship with external 
stakeholders and the values placed on corporate resources. 
The thesis is based on qualitative research into the values and development desires of 
communities and companies active within the Scenic Rim of South East Queensland 
and draws heavily on archival material available from both Australian and 
Queensland government sources. A model for evaluating the utility of theories of the 
firm is developed and twelve existing groups of theory are analysed. Few of the 
theories meet many of the criteria proposed in the model (particularly regarding tests 
of their validity and reliability) and characteristics of an enhanced theory of the firm 
applicable to all companies are identified. 
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BLACK GOLD, THE SCENIC RIM AND THE  
THEORY OF THE FIRM 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This thesis presents the findings of research into the relationship between 
communities of the Scenic Rim of South East Queensland and companies exploring 
for coal and coal seam gas (CSG) within the region. It examines the conflict that 
exists between the two groups to highlight changes to the social contract between 
Australian society, government and mining companies that are occurring. It also 
draws implications for a constantly evolving theory of the firm that are applicable to 
all companies. 
                     
1.1. Objectives of this chapter 
 
The objectives of this chapter of the thesis are: 
 to present the background to the research problem and to identify the Research 
Question that arises from that problem; 
 to outline the structure of the thesis; 
 to identify the theoretical base behind the research undertaken; 
 to present an outline description of the research philosophy and of the 
methodology adopted; 
 to identify the contribution that this work will make to both theory and practice; 
 to summarize the principal findings of the research; and 
 to identify the research needed to expand this thesis into a PhD program. 
 
1.2. Structure of the chapter  
 
This chapter of the thesis is structured as follows: 
 Section 1.1 identifies the objectives of the chapter; 
 Section 1.2 presents the structure of the chapter;  
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 Section 1.3 describes the background to the research problem; 
 Section 1.4 identifies the Research Question behind the work undertaken; 
 Section 1.5 develops the structure of the thesis; 
 Section 1.6 describes the contribution to theory and practice that the findings 
make; 
 Section 1.7 provides a summary of the findings of the research; 
 Section 1.8 describes further research that is required; and 
 Section 1.9 summarizes the content of the chapter. 
 
1.3. Background to the research problem 
 
Conflict between mining companies and the communities in which they operate is 
not new.  What is different within the Scenic Rim is that although coal and CSG 
activity is mostly only at the exploratory stage, conflict is already well advanced.  
This thesis, therefore, examines community and mining company interaction in a 
region that is more noted for its residential, agricultural, environmental and tourism 
values than it is for mining. 
Three concepts form the base for the project.  They are: (i) the area identified as the 
Scenic Rim; (ii) the communities of the region; and (iii) the mining entities working 
within the region. For this thesis, the Scenic Rim comprises the area administered by 
the Scenic Rim Regional Council (SRRC), that part of the Logan City Council 
(LCC) to the west of the Mt Lindsay Highway, the entire area of the Ipswich City 
(ICC) and Lockyer Valley Regional Councils (LVRC) and that part of the Somerset 
Regional Council (SRC) south of Harlin. The two legal entities that can hold mining 
permits in Queensland are individual persons and companies (including government 
owned corporations): but this research only explores the activities of proprietary 
limited (private) and limited liability (public) companies (because they are the only 
organisations currently holding coal or CSG exploration permits within the Scenic 
Rim).  The project also considers communities on the basis of geographic location 
(i.e. the thirty plus cities, towns and villages of the region) rather than on a basis of 
common interest or structure and leadership. These communities hold values and 
development desires that reflect their residential, agricultural and tourism bases and 
that do not include mining (SRRC 2011a). 
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Coal mining in the region began in 1843 and it is estimated that reserves of thermal 
coal still exceed 2 500 million tonnes (Murray 2010). These reserves may also 
contain commercial volumes of CSG. The companies exploring for these carbon 
based minerals hold permits issued by the Queensland Government with access and 
exploration rights that bring them into conflict with environmental, residential and 
agricultural uses of the land.  This conflict is the base for the Research Question 
explored in this thesis. 
 
1.4. The Research Question 
 
The question explored in this thesis is What responsibilities do the companies 
exploring for coal and coal seam gas within the Scenic Rim have to the communities 
within the region that are additional to the responsibilities that they have towards 
their shareholders? 
 
1.5. Format of the thesis 
 
This remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: 
 Chapter 2 presents an overview of the geology and hydrology of the Scenic Rim 
and briefly examines the possibility that commercial reserves of carbon based 
minerals might be found within the region. 
 Chapter 3 presents the literature review on which the model and theory 
development described in Section 1.6 will be built. 
 Chapter 4 describes the research philosophy and methodology by which the work 
proceeds. 
 Chapter 5 identifies the three concepts on which the research project is based and 
presents a framework that binds them together. It also lays out three major causes 
for the conflict that already exists between the communities of the Scenic Rim 
and the companies exploring for coal and CSG within the region. 
 Chapter 6 briefly presents the findings of the research undertaken for the project. 
 Chapter 7 presents a detailed discussion of the research and draws implications 
for a base for an evolutionary theory of the firm. 
 Chapter 8 develops a response to the research question posed in Section 1.4. 
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 Chapter 9 suggests limitations to the research and the impact of these on the 
discussion and findings. 
 Chapter 10 contains suggestions for the future research that will advance the 
project to a PhD level. 
  Chapter 11 concludes the thesis with a summary of the research undertaken, the 
discussion and the findings. 
 
There are several appendices to this thesis. While they all provide additional data to 
support its general development, attention is drawn to Appendix 5 as it presents the 
analysis of existing theories of the firm (TOTF) that will later form the base for an 
enhanced theory.  
 
A diagrammatic representation of the above format is given in Figure 1.1. 
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FIGURE 1.1: A diagrammatic representation of the format of this thesis                 
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1.6. Contribution to theory and to practice 
 
The objectives of the research behind this thesis are twofold.  The first is to use the 
areas of theory recognised (resilient communities and their representation, a social 
contract, corporate ethics, stakeholder theory and sustainable development reporting, 
a social licence to operate and conflict resolution using free, prior and informed 
consent and theories of the firm) to develop an outline for a comprehensive 
enhancement of the  theory of the firm. The second is to develop principles for a 
model of interaction between mining companies and communities that could more 
equitably distribute the advantages and disadvantages of mining between the 
companies and their external stakeholders. These outcomes may later be used in a 
PhD program to develop such a model and an evolutionary theory of the firm that is 
applicable to all companies. 
 
1.7. Summary of the findings 
 
The principal findings arising from the research are: 
1. The responsibilities that the companies exploring for coal and CSG within the 
Scenic Rim have towards the communities of the region include: (i) establishing 
effective communication; (ii) the early passage of information about the nature 
and scope of their project; (iii) the building of trust; (iv) the creation of a 
mechanism by which community responses can be captured and incorporated 
into project planning and implementation; and (v) explaining how the benefits of 
the project will be shared and potentially adverse impacts modified. These 
responsibilities are in addition to the fiduciary responsibilities that the companies 
have to their shareholders and could be used, by the companies, as strategies for 
community engagement. 
2. The community based organisations (CBOs) now active within the region have 
been more effective in raising awareness in the wider society than in bringing 
about local community development desires. However, there may be a role for a 
different type of organisation to play in raising awareness of and in representing 
all community values (not just the anti-mining values) across the whole Scenic 
Rim. 
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3. The general social contract between society, government and business must be 
modified to include recognition of local values relating to the preservation of 
both a rural lifestyle and agricultural production and the protection of limited 
groundwater and surface water resources. 
4. Existing theories of the firm have limited utility in explaining the reasons for the 
existence of corporations exploring for coal or CSG within the Scenic Rim, their 
structure or the reasons that they behave the way that they do. 
 
1.8. Future research 
 
The research behind this thesis examines only the small number of companies 
exploring for coal or CSG within the Scenic Rim (30) and this number will need to 
be expanded if the findings of the proposed PhD program are to apply to all 
companies. The ASX 100 companies have been used by other researchers and may 
be a suitable base for the expanded research. The thesis is also based on archival 
material and this data may be out of date or not reflective of current company values, 
intentions or activities. The findings will need to be reviewed against data to be 
obtained from interviews with company executives, community members and 
officers of CBOs active within the region. This data will then be used to expand the 
understanding of the social contract that the communities now believe exists and to 
propose an enhancement to the theory of the firm that will better explain why 
corporations exist, are structured as they are and act the way that they do. 
 
1.9. Summary of the chapter 
  
This chapter identifies the Research Question that drives the work behind this thesis 
and lays out the structure by which the work proceeds. It provides a summary of the 
methodology used and the key findings and suggests an approach to future research. 
Section 1.3 of this chapter establishes the need for an understanding of the potential 
for mineral development to contribute to ongoing conflict. This potential is explored 
in Chapter 2.  
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2. BLACK GOLD, OTHER MINERALS AND THE SCENIC RIM 
 
2.1. Introduction to this chapter 
 
Whether or not the conflict between the communities of the Scenic Rim and 
companies exploring for commercial mineral deposits within the region endures and 
becomes more extensive will mainly depend on whether or not those deposits are of 
sufficient quality and quantity to warrant further development. This chapter reports 
on preliminary research into the extent of mineral deposits (but principally on carbon 
and basalt based materials) within the region and concludes that the known deposits 
of coal, CSG and basalt might warrant further exploration and subsequent 
development. This background research later helps identify theories that might 
explain the reasons that communities and companies act the way that they do. 
 
2.2. Objective of the chapter 
 
The objective of this chapter is to develop an understanding of the potential for 
commercial discoveries of both carbon and basalt based minerals within the Scenic 
Rim. Without such potential, exploration activities will eventually stop and future 
development (and the probable continuation of conflict) will not occur. 
 
2.3. Structure of the chapter 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: 
 Section 2.1 introduces the chapter; 
 Section 2.2 sets the objective for the chapter; 
 Section 2.3 develops the structure of the chapter; 
 Section 2.4 develops an overview of the geology and hydrology of the Scenic 
Rim; 
 Section 2.5 discusses the potential for commercial oil discoveries; 
 Section 2.6 outlines the potential for commercial coal discoveries; 
 Section 2.7 identifies the potential for commercial CSG discoveries; 
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 Section 2.8 raises the possibility of the discovery of commercial deposits of other 
minerals; 
 Section 2.9 discusses the ultimate ownership of existing carbon based 
exploration permits (EPCs) held within the Scenic Rim; and  
 Section 2.10 summarises the possibility of continuing carbon and basalt based 
mineral development within the Scenic Rim. 
 
2.4. An overview of the geology and hydrology of the Scenic Rim 
 
The principal geological component of the Scenic Rim is the Clarence-Moreton 
Basin (CMB) - a Late Triassic to Late Jurassic feature that covers some 26 000 
square kilometres of South East Queensland and Northern New South Wales. The 
sedimentary deposits of the CMB (sandstone, mudstone, shale and coal) are some    
2 000 metres thick and are recognised as lying in three discrete sub-basins (Cecil 
Plains, Laidley and Logan) (Geoscience Australia n.d. a). The Laidley and Logan 
sub-basins underlie much of the Scenic Rim while the Cecil Plains Sub-Basin is on 
the eastern edge of the Darling Downs. The Walloon Coal Measures (WCM) are the 
most economically important component of the CMB, but the overlying Main Range 
Volcanics are a source of road making and civil construction materials. Some areas 
of alluvium are exploited for clays and shales for brickmaking purposes – as are 
segments of the WCM. In many parts of the CMB, the WCM are being explored for 
coal and CSG (Raiber & Cox 2012, pp. 1–2).  
 
The CMB is the only part of the Great Artesian Basin in which the groundwater flow 
is to both the east and the south-west. The flow to the east commences under the 
basalts of the Main Range Volcanics – which also generate the main flows to the 
south-west. While the groundwater of the Gatton Sandstone, in the middle CMB, is 
mostly saline, that of the Woogaroo Sandstone (in the east) is predominantly fresh 
and is better suited for agricultural use (Raiber & Cox 2012, p. 4). The important 
alluvial aquifers of the CMB include the Lockyer Valley alluvium, the Bremer-
Warrill alluvium and the Logan-Albert River alluvium. These aquifers are mostly 
less than thirty five metres thick and are tapped by many shallow wells (Rassam et 
al. 2014, Section 1.1.4). 
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Surface water flows within the Scenic Rim are from the north-west and the south-
west to the east. The flows occur mainly in the Albert, Logan, Bremer and Brisbane 
Rivers and in their tributaries. There are dams, for agricultural purposes, on the 
Logan, Bremer and Brisbane systems and for town water on the Logan and Brisbane 
systems. 
 
2.5. The possibility of commercial oil discoveries 
 
The term ‘oil’ covers the full range of hydrocarbons – including crude oil and 
condensate (Geoscience Australia n.d. b). There is abundant oil prone organic matter 
in the WCM and proven reservoirs lie within the Woogaroo and Marburg sandstones 
– however, the Basin has been poorly explored and only about thirty petroleum wells 
have been drilled (Geoscience Australia n.d. b). A major study of the petroleum 
potential of the CMB was undertaken by Lockwood (1978) but it has proven 
impossible to recover a copy of the report from the (previous) Bureau of Mineral 
Resources in Canberra. 
 
Work undertaken by Gray (1990) identified nine petroleum exploration wells that 
had been drilled within the Scenic Rim. Three wells had been drilled around 
Beaudesert, a further three around Boonah, one near Lowood, one in the Brisbane 
area and one other at an unidentifiable location. The wells were drilled to depths of 
between thirty four and four hundred and eighty eight metres and were then plugged 
and abandoned. Six of the wells penetrated the carbon deposits of the CMB and two 
penetrated the deposits of both the CMB and the deeper Ipswich Basin. No oil shows 
were found within the Scenic Rim and the prospects for future discoveries were 
classified as ‘poor’ – due to the immaturity of the source rocks (Gray 1990, pp. 159–
163). 
 
There is, therefore, almost no possibility of commercial oil discovery within the 
Scenic Rim. 
 
Despite this gloomy prospect, successive Queensland Governments remained 
optimistic about the potential for producing oil (although they did change their 
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opinion about the possible source of such a product). The January 1977 issue of the 
Queensland Government Mining Journal contained the following comment: 
 
Our great hope is that Queensland’s virtually limitless reserves of coal can come to 
our rescue, or rather that science and technology will do so. With vast deposits 
suitable for conversion to oil, we might well be on the threshold of great expansion 
in this field … and everything possible must be done to encourage the development 
of plant for the extraction of oil from coal (Murray 2010, p. 308). 
 
Even Government optimism was not enough to quickly bring about private sector 
investment in such technology and it was to be several decades before the New Hope 
Corporation (NHC) built a pilot plant within the Scenic Rim. However, the 
investment did not lead to a commercial development and, in 2015, the company 
announced that it had terminated its coal to liquids development ‘due to lack of 
commercial applications’ (NHC September 2015, p. 1). 
 
2.6. The possibility of commercial coal discoveries  
 
Coal was first identified near Limestone Hills (Ipswich) between 1825 and 1828 
(Whitmore 1981). By 1843, the mineral was being mined near Redbank (Murray 
2010) and by 1997-98 approximately 4 000 000 tonnes per annum (Smith 1999, p. 5) 
were being extracted from deep lead and open cut mines in the Ipswich, Walloon and 
Rosewood areas. Coal has been extracted from the WCM at Nymboida in north-
eastern NSW (Guardian 9 February 2005) and is still being recovered at Acland on 
the eastern Darling Downs. There is still one working open cut coal mine at 
Jeebropilly (south of Ipswich) within the Scenic Rim and each year approximately 
800 000 tonnes of coal are despatched from this mine to overseas customers (NHC 
September 2014, p. 4). 
 
Walloon coals have proven to be of a high quality and to be excellent fuels for a 
wide range of industrial boilers (including those used for power generation) (Smith 
1999, pp. 5–6). 
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Murray (2010) suggested that reserves of thermal coal within the eastern WCM still 
approximate 2 500 million tonnes. Extensive exploratory drilling by Cuesta Coal 
Limited on its permit area south of Ipswich has indicated an inferred coal resource of 
5 100 000 tonnes and an exploration target of 40-60 million tonnes (Cuesta Coal 
Limited 2012). Together with work by Allegiance Coal Limited at its Mintovale site 
south of Boonah (Allegiance Coal Limited 29 July 2014), this data suggests a strong 
possibility of commercial deposits of coal being found within the Scenic Rim. 
 
All except one of the carbon based ATPs held within the Scenic Rim are either 
exploration permits (EPCs) or mineral development licences (MDLs) (Appendix1). 
This means that, for most proposals, there are still two development stages to go 
through before mining can start. A requirement of these stages is that environmental 
impact statements (EIS) must be prepared and approved before any environmental 
authorities are issued. There may also be a requirement for social impact 
management plans to be prepared and most of this will have to be done before a 
mining company can attempt to raise money for a new, greenfield, mine site. 
 
However, the possibility of any coal deposit being developed might also depend on 
the technology to be used. Underground gasification of coal (UGC) has long been 
proposed as a ‘safe’ and environmentally benign way of extracting the energy from 
coal without having to extract the coal from the ground. However, the Queensland 
government now proposes to ban the use of UGC technology and any exploration 
permit that depended on this technology may have no value (Queensland 
Government 18 April 2016). 
 
2.7. The possibility of commercial coal seam gas discoveries 
 
There have been many fires and explosions in deep lead coal mines in the Ipswich 
area that have been attributed to the presence of gas. Three of the more notable 
explosions were at Redbank in 1928 (three miners killed), at the Ebbw Vale Number 
3 mine, at Wood End, in 1943 (four miners killed) and at the Box Flat mine at 
Swanbank on 31 July 1972 (seventeen miners killed and ten injured) (ICC n.d.). 
Additionally, Gray (1990, p. 160) reported that, based on analyses of samples taken 
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from the Department of Resource Industries core library, ‘… carbonaceous shales in 
the Marburg Formation and the WCM may form source rocks for hydrocarbon 
generation’. Gray (1990, p. 160) also concluded that ‘some organic matter in shales 
has reached (the) thermal maturity (required) to produce gas’.  
 
Geoscience Australia has reported sub-economic flows of gas at several locations 
within the Logan Sub-Basin (Geoscience Australia n.d. b) and one of these locations 
(in the Clarence River sequence of the WCM) produced an initial gas flow of 10 000 
cubic metres per day (Gray 1990, p. 162). By 2012, Metgasco Limited had 
established the presence of sufficient CSG in this area to warrant preliminary 
planning for the supply of gas to industrial customers in the Northern Rivers area, for 
the construction of a gas fired power station near Casino and for a pipeline to carry 
gas through the SRRC area to Swanbank (near Ipswich) and then to Brisbane 
(Metgasco 2010, p. 1; Metgasco 2012). Gray (1990, p. 102) also reported that 
numerous oil and gas flows were recorded in wells drilled into the Ipswich Basin 
(underlying the WCM) but that the oil shows were unconfirmed and the gas rates 
were not measured. It was later suggested that ‘gas prospects, including coal bed 
methane, should be rated as fair to good’ Gray (1990, p. 102). 
 
Given that the WCM underlie most of the Scenic Rim, there would appear to be a 
reasonable chance of a commercial CSG discovery within the region. However, 
Arrow Energy is quite circumspect in discussing its discoveries in the region as is 
indicated below: 
 
The Clarence-Moreton has not been a strong focus for Arrow to date so we do not 
have the same knowledge as for the Surat and Bowen Basins. We also know enough 
to say that the coals in this area are not as good in production terms as those in the 
Surat and Bowen Basins, which is why there has not been a strong push to explore 
the area. However, there is gas here and it represents a valuable resource that we 
need to at least know is there, even if only for future reference (Arrow Energy 17 
September 2010, p. 15 Question 3). 
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2.8. The possibility of commercial discovery of other minerals 
 
Other minerals currently being exploited within the Scenic Rim include: 
 diatomaceous earth (near Gatton); 
 sandstone (around Helidon); 
 dolomite for agricultural purposes (near Peak Crossing/Harrisville); 
 basalt materials for road base (near Peak Crossing, Boonah and Beaudesert); and 
 basalt materials for construction purposes (Beaudesert and Mt Marrow). 
 
Applications for exploration permits and mining leases for these materials are made 
infrequently but, when they are made, they also incur objections from nearby 
communities. A proposal for a ‘mega quarry’ south of Beaudesert raised such a level 
of objection that a specific CBO (the Quarry Action Group) was created as a focus 
for community action (Scenic Rim Rate Payers Association Incorporated 2011). 
Similarly, a proposal to quarry basalt at Mt Walker (south of Rosewood), which was 
approved by the SRRC in 2014, has now raised strong objections in both the local 
area and in nearby Rosewood and has led to the formation of the No Mt Walker 
Quarry group. This group has held several public meetings and established a strong 
presence on Facebook (No Mount Walker Quarry group n.d.).      
 
There have been proposals for the establishment of an iron and steel industry at 
Ipswich. In February 1918, a deputation from the Ipswich Chamber of Commerce 
suggested to the Minister for Mines that such an industry could be established with 
its base in the coal deposits of the area and on ‘valuable’ iron ore deposits near Pine 
Mountain and Dundas (near Toogoolawah). A small, experimental, smelter was 
established at the railway workshops but nothing came from the suggestion 
(Brisbane Courier 23 February 1918, p. 6). 
 
2.9.    The ultimate ownership of existing carbon based exploration 
permits held within the Scenic Rim 
 
There have been thirty ATPs, Mineral Development Licences (MDL) and Petroleum 
Facility Licences (PFL) for coal or CSG granted over parts of the Scenic Rim during 
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the last twenty years and all but four are still current. Most of the SRRC area, 
considerable areas around the towns of Gatton and Laidley and a large part of the 
catchment of Wivenhoe Dam are still being actively explored for carbon based 
minerals. Appendix 1 gives details of these permit areas as well as identifying both 
the companies that have been granted the permits/licences and their ultimate 
ownership. 
 
These ATPs only allow the holder to: 
 
Undertake exploration activities including prospecting and surveying, sampling, 
drilling, ancillary environmental studies, conducting geophysical surveys and soil 
testing … Generally, exploration permits do not allow holders to carry out 
production activities or to make permanent changes to the landscape. At advanced 
exploration stage, production testing or bulk sampling may be permitted. Additional 
approvals will generally be required (Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
2014, p. 4). 
 
Many of the ATPs/MDLs are held by private companies and most of these 
companies are then owned by either other private companies or by public companies 
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). However, several of the ultimate 
owners are companies registered in China, Mauritius, Great Britain and the Virgin 
Islands and there is little easily accessible data available on the activities of these 
parent companies. Appendix 2 gives outlines of this complex ownership structure.  
 
The mining activities examined during the research are mostly at the exploratory 
stage and it may be many years (if ever) before they advance to production. 
Currently, less than one percent of exploration permits for coal and other minerals 
held in Queensland lead to economic discoveries that then lead to a mining lease 
(Department of Natural Resources and Mines 2014, p. 3).  If this general guide was 
to apply within the Scenic Rim, one mine might emerge from all the exploration 
activity identified in Appendix 1. 
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2.10. Summary of the chapter 
 
The data presented in Sections 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 indicates that there could be 
commercial deposits of coal, CSG and basalt materials found within the Scenic Rim. 
This likelihood suggests that there is a need to identify theories that could explain 
the relationship between companies and their external stakeholders (e.g. 
communities) and for a model of stakeholder engagement that could better distribute 
the benefits and disadvantages of mining between a company and its stakeholders. 
These theories are examined in Chapter 3. 
 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1. Introduction to this chapter 
 
The conflict identified in Chapter 1 and the (possibly) enduring nature of corporate 
interest in the development of mineral resources within the Scenic Rim outlined in 
Chapter 2 suggest that a wide theoretical base for any related research is needed. The 
recognised theories would then explain the nature of resilient communities and their 
representation, the development of a local social contract between communities and 
companies, corporate ethics, stakeholder engagement and sustainable development 
reporting, establishment of a social licence to operate and conflict resolution. Such 
an understanding could then lead toward theories of the firm that would identify 
reasons for the existence of companies, suggest why they are structured and behave 
the way that they do and why the boundaries between the company and their markets 
are located where they are. Thirteen groups of theories of the firm are recognised in 
Section 3.9 and the utility of twelve of these theories is explored in Appendix 5 and 
Chapter 7. 
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3.2. Objectives of the chapter 
 
The objectives of this chapter are: 
 to identify theories that could help understand the values and development 
desires of communities and companies exploring for coal and CSG within the 
Scenic Rim; 
 to identify the content of the social contract that communities within the Scenic 
Rim expect should exist between them and companies exploring for coal and 
CSG in the region; 
 to identify theories of the firm that might help understand the reasons for the 
existence of firms, their structure and mode of operation and why they react to 
external stakeholders the way that they do; and 
 to identify gaps in the literature that the research undertaken should address. 
 
3.3. The structure of the chapter 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: 
 Section 3.1 contains an introduction to the chapter; 
 Section 3.2 sets the objectives for the chapter; 
 Section 3.3 outlines the structure of the chapter; 
 Section 3.4 identifies theories relating to resilient communities and their 
representation; 
 Section 3.5 develops an understanding of a social contract within the Scenic 
Rim; 
 Section 3.6 identifies theories relating to corporate ethics, stakeholders and 
sustainable development reporting; 
 Section 3.7 identifies material relating to a social licence to operate (SLTO); 
 Section 3.8 identifies theories relating to conflict resolution; 
 Section 3.9 identifies theories of the firm; and  
 Section 3.10 develops a summary of gaps in the literature reviewed. 
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3.4. Resilient communities and their representation 
 
This section of the thesis explores the nature of resilient communities and the 
reasons that they might create community based organisations (CBOs) to assist in 
the representation of their values and in the achievement of their desired 
development outcomes. Each of these sub-sets is illustrated by examples identified 
by research within the Scenic Rim. The summary at the end of the chapter identifies 
gaps in the literature reviewed that ensuing research could address. 
 
3.4.1. Resilient communities 
 
There are more than thirty cities, towns and villages that provide the geographic base 
for the communities of the Scenic Rim.  For the purposes of this research project, the 
major community groupings are considered to be: 
 Scenic Rim Regional Council  Beaudesert and Boonah 
 Logan City Council   Jimboomba and Yarrabilba 
 Ipswich City Council   Ipswich and Rosewood 
 Lockyer Valley Regional Council Laidley and Gatton 
 Somerset Regional Council  Esk and Toogoolawah. 
 
Much has been written about individual and infrastructure resilience (Australian 
Institute for Professional Counsellors (AIPC) 2013; Carlson et al. 2012) but the 
concept of community resilience (in regard to mining) appears to be reasonably new.  
A resilient community could be described as one that is aware of its values and 
strategic requirements and that has prepared for an event (e.g. the commencement of 
mining) in a way that means that it will emerge after the event with its values and 
infrastructure intact. The endurance of community resilience is particularly important 
as coal and CSG development within the Scenic Rim (if it proceeds) could have an 
impact for thirty to fifty years (allowing for land rehabilitation to be completed). 
This timescale could require, at least, a second generation of community members 
and company managers to be involved in community/company engagement. 
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If we define a community as a group of people united by at least one common 
interest and living together in a wider society (Merriam-Webster n.d.) then it appears 
that there are many communities within the Scenic Rim.  This definition also leads 
towards the social ecology theory proposed by Bronfenbrenner (1994, pp. 37-43) 
(Table 3.1) and to question the application of his five subsystems of development to 
communities – as well as to children.  It is his macro system that is particularly 
applicable (with its references to belief systems, culture, bodies of knowledge, 
customs, lifestyles and material resources) to this research.  However, the exo 
system, with its emphasis on neighbourhood-community contexts, is also relevant.  
 
TABLE 3.1: Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model – environments as  
 contexts of development   
 
THE GENERAL ENVIRONMENT 
MICRO 
SYSTEMS 
MESO SYSTEMS EXO SYSTEMS MACRO 
SYSTEMS 
CHRONO 
SYSTEMS 
Activities, social 
roles and 
interpersonal 
relationships in 
face to face 
settings. 
The linkages and 
processes 
between two or 
more settings 
containing the 
developing 
person (e.g. home 
and the 
workplace). 
… workplaces, 
social networks 
and 
neighbourhood – 
community 
contexts. 
Belief systems, 
knowledge, 
material 
resources, 
customs, 
lifestyles, 
hazards, 
opportunity 
structures, and 
life course 
options. 
Changes over 
time in family 
structures, socio 
economic status, 
employment, 
place of 
residence.  
Source: Bronfenbrenner 1994, pp. 39 – 40. 
 
Lee (n.d.) considered a community to be an organised and interconnected system of 
social networks with a ‘leader’.  He also suggested that these leaders might not be at 
any particular location, that they might not be obvious to anyone outside the 
community and that they might only be a person with a small group of followers 
whom they could influence.  These leaders might be formal or informal but they 
would all exhibit a shared vision and have good communication skills. Walton, 
McCrea, Leonard and Williams (2013) developed a five dimension concept of 
resilience that extended the leadership, links and internal relationships described by 
Lee. These dimensions are strategic thinking, links within communities, effective use 
of resources, commitment and building meaningful relationships (Walton et al. 2013, 
Abstract).  Hannah, Avolio and Walumbwa (2011, p. 562) suggested that authentic 
leadership would, by soliciting views from the followers, lay out what each expects 
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from the relationship and make explicit what each is willing to contribute.  Building 
ongoing relationships appears to be a key component of leadership within a resilient 
community. 
 
The formal leadership of the communities within the Scenic Rim (the elected local 
government councillors) has been actively involved in encouraging the recognition 
of community values and development desires (for example, the SRRC (2011a) 
Community Plan 2011–2026, the LVRC (2011) Draft Community Plan 2011 and the 
SRC (2011) Somerset Futures 2010–2020). These community values and 
development desires (Appendix 3) meet the need for shared values and beliefs 
identified by McAsian (2011, pp. 9–10). The SRRC has also been active in 
supporting the anti-mining views of its residents through its ANTI COAL MINING 
AND CSG SUBMISSION to the Queensland Government (SRRC December 2011b). 
The LVRC has conducted (and lost) a legal campaign to prevent the construction of 
a gas fired power station close to Gatton (Gould 13 May 2014) and supported a 
public meeting to discuss the implications of CSG mining within its region early in 
November 2014 (Barry 23 October 2014). The SRC has a long standing moratorium 
on all exploration, mining and coal seam gas activities in its region and has said that 
it would support landowners threatened by CSG work on their property (Latimer 16 
January 2012).   In August 2015, the ICC (ICC 25 August 2015) adopted a broadly 
based policy towards coal and CSG exploration and development that: 
 recognised the economic contribution that the existing NHC mine at Jeebropilly 
was continuing to make to the city and its residents; 
 recognised the potential employment prospects that post mining land 
rehabilitation could offer to the city; 
 stressed Council belief that mining was in a ‘sunset phase’ in the city and that 
neither coal nor CSG developments had a role to play in its future development; 
and 
 offered to work with other levels of government to find appropriate economic 
development activities that better fitted into the future of the city. 
This approach by elected (formal) community leaders within the Scenic Rim reflects 
both the view of Lee (n.d.) about leaders possessing shared vision and good 
communication skills and the belief systems, customs, lifestyles and hazards 
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identified by Bronfenbrenner (1994, pp. 39-40) in the macro systems of his 
ecological model (Table 3.1). It also reflects the strategic thinking and building of 
meaningful relationships proposed by Walton et al. (2013) and the shared values and 
belief systems suggested by McAsian (2011, pp. 9-10). 
Aboriginal occupation and use of lands within the Scenic Rim has been sufficiently 
continuous for it to be accepted as a base for a Native Title claim (National Native 
Title Tribunal 10 November 2004). The value of traditional lands to the Aboriginal 
residents has also been recognised by an Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA) 
that has been negotiated between the ICC and the Jagera, Yuggera and Ugarapul 
peoples (ICC 30 January 2008). These values must be recognised in any social 
contract that may be proposed between the communities of the region and companies 
exploring for carbon based minerals. 
 
There have been no independent surveys of community opinions about CSG 
developments within the Scenic Rim and it is necessary to look at surveys in other 
areas to see what attitudes have been revealed there. In 2013, a survey into 
community attitudes to CSG was undertaken around Tara and Chinchilla 
(Queensland) and Murwillumbah, Lismore and Casino (NSW). The results of this 
survey showed that primary community concerns were about: (i) inadequate 
consultation; (ii) potential impacts on farmland; (iii) cumulative impacts on aquifers 
and future water supplies; and (iv) the claimed economic, social and environmental 
benefits. A common demand was that companies cease exploration and development 
until a better understanding of underground water system interconnectivity and the 
methane extraction and processing cycle was available (Lloyd, Luke & Boyd 2013, 
p. 144). 
 
A CSIRO survey of 400 residents in the Chinchilla, Dalby, Miles and Tara area 
similarly produced interesting results. There were mixed feelings towards CSG 
development – almost seventy percent of respondents said that they tolerated or 
accepted CSG developments, a minority of twenty two percent were prepared to 
approve or embrace such activities and a much smaller minority (nine percent) 
rejected the developments (Walton, McCrea & Leonard 2014, p. 1). Respondents to 
the survey recognised potential opportunities arising from CSG developments as 
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being increased employment and business, new services and new facilities and a 
more vibrant community. The associated challenges were seen to be water and land 
management, traffic conditions, safety and affordable housing. Almost fifty percent 
of the respondents felt that their community was struggling to adapt to the changes. 
Other results included that positive attitudes towards CSG were associated with 
perceptions of the community as being resilient, the environment being well 
managed, there being good employment and business opportunities arising from 
development activities and the resource companies, government and business 
working with residents to manage change (Walton, McCrea & Leonard 2014, p. 2).  
There is much in these surveys that formal and informal community leaders (as well 
as executives of mining companies) could use to build a constructive debate about 
possible mining developments within the Scenic Rim.  
 
Much of the above material addresses the potential impact of mineral development 
on the communities of the Scenic Rim. However, there is a more immediate and 
(mostly) unavoidable stress arising from population growth.  The South East 
Queensland Regional Plan 2011-2036 (Department of State Development, 
Infrastructure and Planning (DSDIP) 2009) estimated the total population of the 
SRRC, ICC, LVRC and SRC areas as being 228 700 people in 2006 and suggested a 
population of 601 000 in 2031 (a growth of more than two hundred and sixty percent 
in twenty five years). The population and growth of the LCC area within the Scenic 
Rim is more difficult to estimate but the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
estimated the population of the Jimboomba State Suburb as being 11 387 people in 
2006 (ABS 2013). The new suburb of Yarrabilba (now being built north of 
Jimboomba) is estimated to reach a population of 52 000 people within 25 years 
(RPS Australia 2010, pp. 22-23). This population growth will require the alienation 
of considerable areas of land from its current purpose, the construction of many 
thousands of new residences and the use of state and municipal funds for new roads 
and community infrastructure (schools, libraries, sports fields). The values and 
development desires of the communities of the Scenic Rim outlined in Appendix 3 
recognise the need to manage growth and to provide adequate employment 
opportunities; this is also in line with both the exo systems and chrono systems 
proposed by Bronfenbrenner (1994, pp. 39-40). 
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3.4.2 Community based organisations 
 
Within the Scenic Rim, there are thirteen CBOs that have provided some informal 
leadership and representation of community views regarding potential mining 
developments to the wider population. Although they have organised rallies and 
meetings, protest demonstrations and blockades of exploration activities, these 
organisations seldom appear to have directly approached the mining companies. 
There is also no positive link between their activities and the surrender of 
exploration permits previously held within the Scenic Rim. If the communities of the 
Scenic Rim have recognised and acknowledged their values and development desires 
and have formal leaders who reflect these values, why might they feel the need to 
create additional organisations to represent them when they face adverse impacts? 
An answer to this question might be that they feel the need to undertake collective 
action in order to influence key decision makers. If this is so, then there is a need to 
consider just how effective such groups are in bringing about the desires of their 
members.  
 
A study by Hornsey et al. (2006) of people attending a rally to protest against a 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Brisbane in 2001 established that 
the common concept of protest effectiveness given above might be too narrow and 
that there are four possible measures of effectiveness that should be considered. 
These are: 
 the extent to which policy and/or decision makers could be influenced by 
collective action; 
 the extent to which relevant third parties (e.g. the general community) could be 
influenced by collective action; 
 the extent to which collective action would be successful in building opposition 
to a proposal; and 
 the extent to which the collective action would be successful in expressing the 
values of participants (Hornsey et al. 2006, pp. 10–11). 
 
Findings from this study suggest that, for individual participants who were not 
involved with any organisation, their willingness to be involved could be based on 
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the effectiveness of the collective action in expressing their own values and in 
influencing the general public. For participants who were already involved with an 
organisation, their willingness to be further involved could be linked to the 
effectiveness of the activity in building an opposition to the activity against which 
the protest had been organised (Hornsey et al. 2006, p. 21). 
 
The thirteen CBOs that have played some role in representing community values and 
development desires within the Scenic Rim are: 
1. the Australian Conservation Foundation; 
2. the Beechmont Business and Enterprise Network; 
3. the Boonah Organisation for a Sustainable Shire; 
4. the Croftby Community Group; 
5. the Keep The Scenic Rim Scenic (KTSRS) group; 
6. the Logan and Albert Conservation Association;  
7. the Lock The Gate Alliance; 
8. the Mt Beppo Community Action Group; 
9. the No Mount Walker Quarry group; 
10. the Quarry Action Group (QAG); 
11. the Rosewood District Protection Organisation (RDPO);  
12. the Sustainable Scenic Rim organisation; and 
13. the Willowbank Action Group. 
 
The above list does not deny the value of the work of CBOs such as the churches, 
Lions, Rotary and Zonta but recognises the advocacy of organisations closely related 
to the conflict outlined in Chapter 1. 
 
There are five CBOs that were formed specifically to protest against coal and CSG 
developments within the Scenic Rim (the Croftby Community Group, Keep The 
Scenic Rim Scenic, the Mt Beppo Action Group, the Rosewood District Protection 
Organisation and the Willowbank Action Group) and two that were formed to protest 
against hard rock mining developments near Beaudesert (the Quarry Action Group) 
and Rosewood (the No Mount Walker Quarry group). 
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The above CBOs are those that presently exist; but there have been others (such as 
the Protest Against Urban Mining Association (PUMA) that was instrumental in 
having Queensland Government approval for Rylance Collieries and Brickworks Pty 
Ltd to mine for coal at Redbank Plains overturned in 1981 (Parliament of 
Queensland 12 March 1981). There have also been informal groupings of residents 
to protest against a proposed basalt quarry on the Sugarloaf south of Boonah 
(Boonah Organisation for a Sustainable Shire c2011) and the Stop the Trains 
movement that protested against the initial proposal for the Melbourne to Brisbane 
freight rail proposal that was to run from Rosewood to Kagaru (Australian Rail 
Track Corporation July 2010; Department of Transport and Main Roads 2010). 
 
The lessons to be learned from this material are: (i) that the communities within the 
Scenic Rim have not been reluctant to protest against proposed mining and other 
developments; and (ii) that they have become adept at forming CBOs to support their 
values and development desires. 
 
Walton et al. (2013, pp. 20-21) concluded that community groups could play a role 
in providing informal leadership within resilient communities. However, they also 
established that, mainly because these groups were often dependent on the interests, 
time and effort of volunteers, that the role that they could play may be limited and 
that there was a need for collaboration between these groups and other agencies. A 
finding of the research behind this thesis is that there is limited evidence to support 
any claim that the CBOs identified have played a major role in bringing about the 
suspension or cancellation of mining activities within the Scenic Rim. 
 
Arrow Energy Holdings Pty Ltd has surrendered one of the three exploration permits 
for CSG that it once held within the Scenic Rim (Kennedy, 18 September 2012) and 
the areas covered by the remaining two permits are now much smaller than they 
were in previous years. There have been protests against CSG exploration within the 
region (e.g. the October 2012 blockade of a site at Kerry where the Arrow Energy 
subsidiary BNG Pty Ltd had resumed drilling for CSG (KTSRS n.d. Highlights 
page)) and it is tempting to tie these protests to the surrender of permit areas or their 
reduction in size. However, Arrow Energy has given other reasons for its actions 
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(mostly the requirements of its exploration permits and lack of success in finding 
commercial deposits of CSG (Kennedy, 18 September 2012)). 
 
In June 2011, the (Quarry Action Group) QAG was formed to ‘object strenuously’ 
against plans to develop a very large quarry to the south of Beaudesert (QAG n.d., 
Home page). When the local council refused a development permit for the quarry, 
the QAG probably felt that its work was done and the group appeared to become 
inactive. However, in early 2013, the Queensland Government proposed five Key 
Resource Areas (KRA) in which the development of very large quarries would be 
considered (one of the areas was again to the south of Beaudesert) and the QAG was 
reactivated. One outcome of the revitalization of the group was the broadcast of an 
ABC 7.30 Queensland report ‘Storm clouds build over development planning in the 
Scenic Rim’ (ABC 7.30 Queensland 20 September 2013). It would appear that the 
initial success of the QAG (in stopping the development of a quarry on agricultural 
land) might be overturned by the actions of a higher level of government. 
 
There have been several surrenders of EPCs and MDLs within the Scenic Rim (e.g. 
EPC 1303 and MDL 138), but reports from the companies involved again suggest 
that these areas were relinquished for reasons other than actions by CBOs. However, 
there are two proposed mining developments where actions by CBOs appear to have 
been effective in preventing coal mining from starting. The first of these was the 
proposal by Rylance Collieries and Brickworks Pty Ltd to develop an open cut coal 
mine on Redbank Plains (ML 736) and the second was a proposal by OGL to resume 
mining at Ebenezer and then to develop the Bremer View/Mt Mort deposit. Actions 
by CBOs against both these proposals involved them (both the CBOs and the mining 
companies) in extensive legal proceedings and resulted in Queensland Government 
approval for the Redbank Plains development being overturned and, possibly, in 
OGL being unable to obtain finance for its proposed development.  
 
Although it can be claimed that the CBOs active within the Scenic Rim have had 
some success in representing the anti-mining values of their constituents to mining 
companies and in obtaining the outcome that the communities desire, that success 
has not been widespread. 
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3.4.3. Gaps in the literature 
 
Appendix 3 outlines the values and development desires of communities within the 
Scenic Rim and Section 3.4.1 suggests the pressures that urban 
development/population growth might place on those communities. The 
establishment of such values and development desires and the creation of a system of 
formal and informal leaders with good communication skills are characteristics of 
resilient communities (Lee n.d.; Walton et al. 2013) – as is the ability of these 
leaders to work together. However, the literature is silent on how existing 
communities might use their values and development desires to manage (and shape) 
future communities so that they also might be able to appreciate much the same 
lifestyle and environment. 
 
Section 3.4.2 recognises the contribution of CBOs towards the conflict between 
communities and mineral exploration companies and their informal leadership role 
within the communities. What the literature does not recognise is the role that such 
organisations could play in assessing and raising awareness of the contribution that 
mineral developments might make to the long term maintenance of community 
values and development desires (e.g. Could CSG development contribute to 
increasing water supplies that would support expanded agricultural output? (see 
Queensland Gas Company (QGC) 2014, Part 14.0 pp. 198-199)). 
 
An understanding of how these gaps in the literature might be addressed could guide 
the preparation of a response to the Research Question posed in Section 1.4. 
 
3.5. The content of a local social contract between the communities  
        of the Scenic Rim and mining companies 
  
In late 2014, the Queensland Resources Council (QRC) published a paper ‘Listening 
to the Community’. The research behind this paper involved QRC members and 
approximately 200 members of regional communities throughout Queensland (QRC 
2014, p. 2). The project developed five principles that the QRC believes underlie 
effective community/mining company engagement (QRC 2014, p. 8). These 
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principles are: (i) communication; (ii) integrity and transparency; (iii) follow 
through; (iv) understanding and awareness; and (v) respect. The QRC believes that 
the application of these principles would drive positive behaviour that would lead to 
acceptance and trust (QRC 2014, p. 8).  
 
It would seem, therefore, that the application of these principles should improve the 
understanding of the social contract between society and business and make it easier 
for mining companies to obtain and then maintain the SLTO that they believe that 
they have been granted. This does not appear to have happened, however, and the 
QRC State of the Sector Report for the December 2015 Quarter reports that ‘over the 
previous twelve months, (mining company CEOs’) sentiment towards the SLTO has 
worsened – which translates to an increased concern for social licence pressures over 
the coming twelve month period’ (QRC 2016. p. 6). The remainder of this section of 
the thesis explores the background to the social contract that exists between society 
and business and identifies changing community expectations that could underlie 
mining company CEO concerns – at least within the Scenic Rim. 
 
3.5.1. The general social contract  
 
The concepts behind an implied social contract were first expressed by the Greek 
philosopher Epictetus and were further developed by Thomas Hobbes in the early 
17
th
 century (Anshen 1970, p.8). From his understanding of the relationship between 
the state and individuals, Hobbes postulated a view of the consent of the citizens to a 
relationship based on reciprocal duties and obligations. In the next century, Rousseau 
expanded this view into an intellectual system in which each member of a society 
entered into an implicit contract with every other member and which defined the 
norms of human behaviour and the terms of exchanges and trade between individuals 
and organisations (Anshen 1970, p.8). He believed that the implied social contract 
stipulated that the minority would accept the decisions of the majority – and that 
dissent could be expressed through legitimate channels but would stop short of 
revolt. 
 
There are two major components of the social contract that make up a balance 
between the values and needs of society and the rights and privileges that might be 
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granted to a business. The privileges granted to a business mainly concentrate on a 
legal, corporate, personality (and, in the past, relative freedom from concerns about 
impacts on the environment and local communities) and limited liability for 
investors in the business. The needs of society previously centred on employment 
and general economic advancement. Society appeared to accept this balance, as long 
as the social benefits of business activity outweighed the social costs (Jeurissen 
2004, p. 89), but this acceptance can no longer be taken for granted. 
 
The terms of this implied social contract existed, almost unchanged, for more than 
one hundred years before John Kenneth Galbraith challenged the view that the 
contract defined the function and role of private enterprise in today’s (emphasis 
added) society and the reciprocal relationship between corporations, governments 
and citizens (Anshen 1970, p. 8). An assumption that appeared to underlie the 
implicit terms of the contract was that social progress was an outcome of economic 
progress and would be impossible to achieve without it (Anshen 1970, p. 9). 
Throughout the world (and certainly throughout Australia), there are now many 
pressures for a reformulation of the terms of this implicit contract as it affects 
traditional institutions – including the goals and responsibilities of both private 
business and public agencies (Anshen 1970, p. 7). 
 
On the other hand, Friedman strongly maintained the view that: 
 
… there is only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and 
engage in activities to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the 
game, which is to say, engages in free and open competition, without deception or 
fraud (Friedman 1962,  p. 133); 
and that:  
It is the responsibility of the rest of us to establish a framework of law such that the 
individual in pursuing his own interest is … ‘led by an invisible hand to promote an 
end which was not part of his intention’ (Friedman 1962, p. 133). 
 
One example of how ‘the rest of us establish a framework of law’ (or attempt to do 
so) can be drawn from a review of the Victorian Limited Liability Act in 1895 
(McQueen 1991). Some 173 new provisions were proposed – most of which were 
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aimed at increasing the responsibility of corporate controllers for financial 
mismanagement and at making fraudulent practices criminal offences (McQueen 
1991, p. 36). However, when the bill passed from the Legislative Assembly to the 
Legislative Council, that body attempted to remove many of the clauses. The Age 
newspaper described the reason for this obstruction as follows: 
 
The Council’s action in the Companies Bill is one dictated by the most direct of 
personal interests. It is a house of company directors, and it is determined to 
minimize the responsibility of directors towards shareholders (McQueen 1991, p. 
37). 
  
Anshen (1970) later articulated this self- interest driver a little differently when he 
wrote that management must participate actively in the redesign of the social 
contract because: 
    
There can be no greater danger than to permit the new rules to be formulated by 
either the small group of critics armed only with malevolence towards the existing 
system or the much larger group sincerely motivated by concern for ameliorating 
social ills but grossly handicapped by their ignorance of the techniques and 
dynamism of private enterprise (Anshen 1970, p. 12). 
 
 
Bishop (2008, p. 210) supported the view postulated by Friedman and wrote that: 
 
… corporations have the right to be autonomous, to engage in economic activities 
and to pursue private purposes. They have a responsibility to respect human freedom 
and rights, but they do not have pre-legal responsibilities to pursue any social goals; 
 
but Cho (2009, p. 35) maintained that: 
 
Society provides corporations with a legitimate status: thus an organisation’s quest 
for legitimacy is primarily defined by a social contract that is established between 
corporations and society … not merely with its shareholders. However, a breach of 
this contract (i.e. the failure to meet societal expectations) may lead to revocation of 
the contract itself. 
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As Anshen (1970, pp. 9-10) suggested, there are now mounting pressures for the 
reformulation of the social contract between society and business and such pressures 
may prove to be far reaching, powerful and inescapable. The social gains being 
delivered by modern businesses are no longer so great that there are no concerns 
about the costs of the system (e.g. environmental pollution and impacts on local 
communities) that are being thrown on society. It is now clear that quality of life will 
weigh equally with economic progress. This understanding can be translated directly 
to the conflict that exists between communities and mining companies within the 
Scenic Rim merely by recognising a basic tenet proposed by Johnsen (2009, pp. 33-
62) – all communities are free … to specify appropriate ethical norms for 
commercial conduct as the product of a microsocial contract based on constructive 
consent. He then expanded this understanding to include a base for the authenticity 
of such ethical norms: 
 
As long as they meet certain conditions, such as a substantial majority acceptance 
within the community and the option of community members to exit and exercise 
voice, these norms achieve the status of authenticity. 
 
Ferenbach and Pinney (2012, p. 11) also took issue with the proposition advanced by 
Friedman (1962, p. 132) and suggested that society is looking to business for 
leadership in creating a renewed social balance. They hypothesised that it might be 
necessary to bring philosophical and theological perspectives to bear on the dialogue 
about the social purpose and roles of corporations and markets and suggested that 
there was a need for a regulatory environment that would be conducive to long term 
value creation. This view is in accordance with that proposed by Porter and Kramer 
(2006, 2011) in their creation of a ‘shared value’ concept – an approach in which 
business encompasses societal outcomes without sacrificing long run financial 
returns to investors (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012, p. 12). 
 
Serafeim (2014, p. 3) contended that, as economic power has become concentrated 
in fewer organisations, their role in society has changed to serve broader interests 
and that, as a result, society, and not just shareholders, has become a principal in 
such organisations. This change, he suggested, placed the community in a position to 
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demand that corporations serve not just the owners or the managers, but all of the 
community.  He later suggested that: 
 
While in the early twentieth century there was a discussion of companies’ social 
responsibility, no mention was made of resource scarcity and planetary effects such 
as climate change. The combination of concerns (about these matters) further 
exacerbated pressure on large companies to serve the interests of society (Serafeim 
2014, p. 3). 
 
While the actions of governments are often seen as a replacement of society’s values 
by laws, it may be that those actions also serve to reinforce the implicit terms of the 
social contract between society, government and business. One example of such 
reinforcement can be found in a suggestion by a former Commonwealth Minister for 
the Environment that miners and coal seam gas companies recognise that the ‘moral’ 
right of farmers to determine what happens on their land overrides the companies’ 
legal right to explore or mine. This suggestion was followed by another that mining 
companies should acknowledge farmers’ right to ‘lock the gate’ (Taylor & Chan      
1 November 2015). 
 
It could be, as Anshen (1970, p. 7) has written, that our society is fast approaching 
(but, perhaps, fumbling with) a new definition of the role and responsibility of 
private enterprise. This new definition could have vast implications for the theory of 
the firm and such possible links are examined in Chapter 7. 
 
Perhaps an adequate summary of the social contract between a community and any 
company working within it can be taken from Freeman (n.d.): 
  
When the firm mismanages its relationship with the local community, it is in the 
same position as a citizen who commits a crime. It has violated the implicit social 
contract with the community and should expect to be distrusted and ostracized. It 
should not be surprised when punitive measures are invoked. 
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3.5.2. Scenic Rim input to the general social contract 
 
There are three sources of data relating to Scenic Rim community input to a ‘local’ 
social contract. The first source is LGA publications, the second is the material 
collected in the preparation of the Community Plans that contain the values and 
development intentions identified in Appendix 3 and the third is in material prepared 
by the CBOs listed in Section 3.4.2. 
 
Priorities expressed by the SRRC (SRRC December 2011a, p. 7) include: 
 understanding, protecting and enhancing those things our residents and visitors 
value about the character and heritage of our towns and villages; and 
 limiting development which detracts from our town and village centres and main 
streets. 
  
The values expressed by the communities of the Scenic Rim (Appendix 3) include; 
 the scenic rural landscape; 
 protecting the rural and natural heritage; 
 protecting the natural environment is paramount; 
 preserving rural character, lifestyle and liveability; 
 consultation and participation in decision making; 
 sustaining rural industry; 
 ecotourism opportunities; 
 economic opportunities building on regional environment and geography; and 
 ensuring that new businesses are compatible with lifestyle and environment. 
 
To the above list must be added the beliefs and values of Aboriginal clans that have 
found expression in the Native Title claim and in the ILUA mentioned in Section 
3.4.1. 
 
One of the more active CBOs, the KTSRS, is against ‘inappropriate development’ 
and suggested that exploration for coal and CSG in the region be suspended until: 
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 an independent study into the interconnectivity of the water systems/aquifers 
under the Scenic Rim has been undertaken by a mutually agreed party and the 
report made public, 
 all landowner water bores have been tested so that, if contamination or mining 
induced drawdown occurs, baseline studies will enable landowners to prove that 
their water supplies have been affected; and 
 genuine consultation takes place and includes public meetings where ‘people 
who know the issues’ are able to ask questions that others may not have 
identified (KTSRS n.d., Highlights page). 
 
That the issues raised by KTSRS are worthy of examination is confirmed by a study 
undertaken by Arrow Energy in the Walloon Coal Measures in its Surat Basin gas 
field: 
 
Direct impacts on the groundwater levels and flow directions in the Walloon Coal 
Measures during CSG production are unavoidable as CSG water extraction from this 
aquifer system is an intrinsic part of production. The extraction of groundwater has 
the potential to cause subsequent indirect impacts on groundwater levels in aquifer 
systems above and below the Walloon Coal Measures and subsidence and 
deformation of the land surface (Arrow Energy April 2012, p. 3). 
 
Arrow Energy also considered that the affected aquifers could take twenty years to 
recover significantly after depressurisation ceased (Arrow Energy December 2012, 
p. 5). 
 
All of the above points reflect strongly held views within the Scenic Rim and would 
need to be considered in preparing a local version of the social contract between 
society, government and business. As such, they would then form a base for 
negotiating an SLTO between those communities and companies proposing any 
mineral development activity within the region. The general approach to negotiating 
an SLTO is discussed in Section 3.7. 
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3.5.3. Gaps in the literature 
 
The material in Section 3.5.1 clearly outlines the nature of the general social contract 
between society, government and business and that in Section 3.5.2 identifies 
additions that would more closely relate the general social contract to needs within 
the Scenic Rim. Two elements missing from the literature are discussion on how 
local input is ratified and on how such a ‘local’ social contract is communicated to 
companies. These elements are particularly important when the companies do not 
appear interested in making contact with the communities. Similarly, the published 
literature contains little guidance on how a local social contract might be used as the 
base for negotiating an SLTO for any specific mining activity. 
 
The development of a local social contract along the lines suggested in Section 3.5.2 
would provide a base from which community representatives could approach 
companies in an attempt to negotiate development outcomes that build long term 
resilient communities. 
 
3.6. Corporate ethics, stakeholders and sustainable development  
       reporting 
 
Appendix 3 outlines the values and development desires of communities within the 
Scenic Rim and it is reasonable to expect that any company seeking to work within 
the region would wish to demonstrate that its ethics and development intentions are 
aligned with community values. This section of the thesis sets out to establish such 
company values and ethics from readily accessible public documents and to relate 
those values to stakeholder engagement. 
 
3.6.1. Corporate ethics 
 
The Applied Corporate Governance (n.d.) organisation defined business ethics as 
being the application of a moral code of conduct to the strategic and operational 
management of a business and suggested that the following elements needed to be 
considered: (i) the role of business in the national and international marketplace; (ii) 
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corporate social responsibility and ethical issues facing individual enterprises; and 
(iii) the behaviour and actions of individuals within the enterprise. El-Garaihy, 
Mobarak and Albahussain (2014, p. 110 – 111) examined these elements and 
recognised that one of the four aspects of corporate activity that could contribute to 
creating a socially responsible corporation was ethical standards. Duztas (2008, p. 
28) took this contribution by ethical standards further when he suggested that the 
owners of a business should ask, of their appointed agents (the senior executives), 
questions such as ‘How trustworthy are these executives?’ and ‘Do they put 
themselves or the firm first?’ 
 
Obtaining an answer to such questions requires a definition of corporate ethics – 
particularly as business ethics is one of the key factors influencing investment 
decisions (Sullivan & Shkolnikov 2006, p. 2) such as the development of coal and 
CSG exploration permits within the Scenic Rim. Sullivan and Shkolnikov (2006, p. 
1) described business ethics as ‘a set of principles and guides of business behaviour 
rather than a set of rigid rules’ and concluded their definition with the statement 
‘business ethics is not only an attempt to set a standard by which all of the 
employees of a firm can know what is expected, but it is also an attempt to 
encourage employees, managers and board members to think about and make 
decisions through the prism of a shared set of values’. Francis and Armstrong (2003, 
p. 375-6) extended the application of business ethics by suggesting that ‘there are 
compelling reasons to consider good ethical practice to be an essential part of … 
good risk management’ and described business ethics as being ‘… the moral 
philosophy, values and norms of behaviour that guide a corporation’s behaviour 
within society’. 
 
Newton (2014, p. v) summed up the potential contribution of business ethics as 
being ‘properly understood, the practice of business had a fine logical and ethical 
foundation, and enabled real improvement in the welfare and dignity of the 
individual and in the equality of society’. However, the Ethics Resource Centre 
(2011), in its National Business Ethics Survey, was less sanguine about the 
contribution of ethics to business outcomes when it concluded that: (i) the proportion 
of companies with weak ethical cultures had climbed to near record levels; (ii) the 
survey data showed that companies behaved differently during times of economic 
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difficulty; and that (iii) as the economy improved and companies and employees 
became more optimistic about their financial futures, misconduct would rise and 
standards of reporting would drop. 
 
Mackay suggested that, in business, ‘ethics may be incidental’, that the underlying 
problem was community standards and that when the survival of the company was at 
risk, ethics may be ‘suspended’ (Longstaff, 1991).  Perhaps this feeling was behind a 
question asked at a community workshop in Rosewood on 17 January 2012 
(personal notes taken by the author):  
Is it ethical for companies to persist with exploration and then mining developments in 
areas where they have no community support and where there are more attractive uses 
for the land – for example, where there are sustainable farming businesses that could 
have a long term life and regional output greater than that of any proposed mining? 
 
The availability of information on the values, ethics and codes of conduct of 
companies exploring for coal within the Scenic Rim is given in Table 3.2.  
 
TABLE 3.2: Documents published by the parent companies of private 
companies exploring for coal within the Scenic Rim 
 
 Parent Company Permit 
Number 
Readily available document 
Values 
Statement 
Code of Conduct Sustainability 
Report 
Carabella Resources 
Limited 
EPC 1149 
EPC 1249 
No Yes No 
Carbon Energy Limited EPC 1109 No Yes No 
Coalbank Limited EPC 1524 
EPC 2239 
No Yes No 
Cockatoo Coal Limited EPC 1509 No Yes No 
Cuesta Coal Limited EPC 2172 No Yes No 
Golden Cross 
Resources Limited 
EPC 2082 
EPC 2257 
No  Yes – and also a 
code of ethics 
No 
Hudson Investment 
Group Limited 
EPC 1271 
EPC 1273 
No Yes No 
 
New Hope Corporation 
Ltd 
PFL 17 Yes Yes Mentioned in 
annual report 
Source: The information in this table was compiled from both the 2014 Annual Report for each 
company and from their web site (usually from the section on Corporate Governance). 
 
Business ethics is about the norms that guide a corporation’s behaviour within a 
society (Francis & Armstrong 2003, p. 376) and this definition suggests that there 
could be a risk posed to a company if it does not follow these norms.  Risk 
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management can refer to management of stakeholders as well as to management of 
resources (Francis & Armstrong 2003, p. 376) and much of the management of 
stakeholders relies on the values and ethics that company directors and officers are 
required to observe. In 2000, Francis reported that a review of the annual reports of 
major Australian companies showed that few reported ‘adequately’ on ethics and 
that while some asserted a commitment to ethical behaviour ‘almost none gave 
details of ethical infrastructure, monitoring or training’ (Francis 2000, p. 14).  
Francis (2000, p. 5) suggested that ‘Codes of ethics need to be of a fixed quality.  It 
is not appropriate to have a series of codes of increasing leniency from which to 
select.’  This lack of fixedness was also warned against by Jackall (1988, p. 101): 
 
The moral ethos of managerial circles emerges directly out of the social context (of 
managers).  It is an ethos most notable for its lack of fixedness.  In the welter of 
practical affairs in the corporate world, morality does not emerge from some set of 
internally held convictions or principles, but rather from ongoing albeit changing 
relationships … 
 
Perhaps this is what the Corporate Governance Council of the ASX was trying to 
guard against when it introduced its best practice principles in March 2003.  In 
regard to the promotion of ethical and responsible decision making (Principle 3), a 
comprehensive code of conduct was recommended and in regard to the recognition 
of the legitimate rights of stakeholders (Principle 10), it was recommended that the 
code of conduct should ensure that stakeholders were ‘adequately informed’ and 
‘able to be involved in the company’s operations to an appropriate extent’.  The 
listing rules of the ASX were modified in November 2002 to require that listed 
companies that did not report against these principles each year be required to 
explain why they did not do so (ASX 2010). 
 
There is sufficient data available to suggest that companies exploring for coal within 
the Scenic Rim do have (at the parent company level) values and codes of conduct 
and this data is summarised in Table 3.2.  However, there is little in this literature to 
suggest how directors and officers of the mining companies might react to challenges 
to the sustainability of their company (i.e. Do they strengthen or abandon their ethics 
in difficult times?). Appendix 4 illustrates the extent to which the parent companies 
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of organisations exploring for coal and CSG within the Scenic Rim report on their 
obligations under the ASX listing rules. However, anyone attempting to use these 
reports to understand the values of the coal and CSG exploration companies active 
within the Scenic Rim would come up against the same difficulties Longstaff (2003) 
found with the ASX document as a whole: 
 
… the guidelines are entirely silent about the role of values and principles in decision 
making. Instead, the guidelines limit themselves to comments about the standards of 
ethical behaviour – which are further defined to apply in very limited areas included in 
suggestions for the content of a code of conduct being: conflicts of interest, corporate 
opportunities, confidentiality, fair dealing … compliance with laws and regulations …. . 
It is not that these areas of concern are unimportant. It’s just that these defined areas are 
a breathtakingly narrow sample of what a sound ethical framework should apply to a 
corporation …   (Longstaff 2003, p. 1). 
There are no published values, ethics and business principles that can be readily 
associated with Arrow CSG (Australia) Pty Ltd, BNG Pty Ltd or Arrow Energy 
Holdings Pty Ltd. However, these companies are subsidiaries of Royal Dutch Shell 
plc and the PetroChina Company Limited and Arrow Energy Holdings Pty Ltd (the 
immediate parent company) is a member of the Australian Petroleum Production and 
Exploration Association (APPEA). It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that the 
subsidiary companies will reflect the values, ethics and business principles of the 
holding companies – even though neither of the holding companies is the sole owner 
of any of the subsidiaries. Table 3.3 contains an outline of these values and codes. 
Were Arrow Energy and its subsidiary companies to reflect the values of its parent 
company (Shell) and of its industry association (APPEA), then, at the least, Arrow 
CSG (Australia) and BNG would display the following values in their interaction 
with communities within the Scenic Rim: 
 honesty, trust and  integrity; 
 concern for social performance and sustainable development;  
 give proper regard for the environment; and 
 seek to maintain a social licence to operate (SLTO). 
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A suitable summary to this section on corporate ethics can be drawn from Robins 
(2012, pp. 210-211) after his study of the rise and collapse of the (English) East 
India Company (1600-1874): 
 
… society gives companies the privilege of limited liability; such a privilege should 
have social responsibility associated with it. For this to happen, an ‘ethics gene’ 
needs to be inserted into company law. The first law of ethics is to ‘do no harm’. To 
realise this in the corporate context, company directors need to be given a legal duty 
of care to ensure that their actions do not damage society or the environment; 
investors equally need to have a parallel duty to ensure that their demand for 
financial returns does no harm. Generate a profit at all means, but this cannot be at 
the expense of others. 
 
TABLE 3.3: The values, ethics and codes of conduct of the parent companies 
and of the industry association to which Arrow Energy belongs 
 
Item Royal Dutch Shell plc APPEA PetroChina Company 
Ltd 
 
Core values Honesty,  integrity and 
respect for people 
 Credibility, innovation, 
performance, safety 
and harmony 
Code of ethics (COE) The COE governs how 
companies in the Shell 
group conduct business. 
 Applicable to all staff 
and to wholly owned 
subsidiaries. 
Code of conduct 
(Headings only) 
Applicable to every 
wholly owned company 
and in every joint 
venture under Shell 
control. 
 People and safety 
(environment, 
social performance 
and sustainable 
development) 
 Fighting corrupt 
practices 
 National and 
international trade 
 Safeguarding 
information and 
assets 
 Communications. 
APPEA members 
must comply with all 
laws and regulations 
but also meet the 
industry’s objective of 
maintaining an SLTO:  
 by striving to 
improve health, 
safety and 
environmental 
performance 
 by promoting and 
adhering to 
ethical  business 
practices; and 
 supporting social 
and economic 
development.  
 
Responsibility to 
society 
To conduct business as a 
responsible member of 
society, to comply with 
applicable laws and 
regulations, to support 
human rights in line with 
the legitimate role of 
business and to give 
proper regard to health, 
safety, security and the 
environment. 
  
Sources: Royal Dutch Shell – Code of Ethics, Code of Conduct and Shell General Business Principles 2014 
              APPEA – APPEA Principles of Conduct n.d.;  PetroChina – PetroChina Company Limited n.d. 
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A variable observance of these values and ethics can be found in Arrow Energy’s 
performance in the Surat–Dawson Basin as well as around Beaudesert. In June 2011, 
Arrow was fined $40 000 (the largest fine (to that date) against a CSG company in 
Queensland) for breaches of land access regulations and in regard to technical issues 
relating to a pipeline. The then Chief Executive Officer of Arrow Energy expressed 
regret over these breaches and stated that they were ‘unacceptable’ (Burke 22 June 
2011). In 2012, community groups protested against Arrow Energy’s drilling of a 
CSG exploration well at Kerry (south of Beaudesert) and police had to be called to 
calm the unrest. As the drilling rig was removed from the site, it drove over clothing 
that protesters had thrown in front of it and this further fuelled farmer and landholder 
distress (Coal Seam Gas News 21 January 2012). 
  
Such actions may not have been in accord with APPEA’s requirement for all actions 
to be directed towards developing trust between the parties and maintaining an 
SLTO. 
 
The gaps in this literature that might be addressed by the research behind this thesis 
are identified in Section 3.6.4. Suffice it is to say here that if the communities of the 
Scenic Rim were aware of and understood the values, ethics and development 
intentions of the companies exploring for coal and CSG within the region, it might 
help them to select a company with which to negotiate an SLTO.  
 
3.6.2. Stakeholder theory 
 
The fiduciary responsibility of directors to a company (and, hence, to its 
shareholders) is well established within the Australian Corporations Act 2001. What 
is less clear is what responsibilities, if any, the company and its directors have 
towards any other stakeholders associated with the enterprise. This section of the 
thesis sets out to establish guidelines as to how a company could recognise the 
various stakeholders who might be affected by its activities and then engage with 
them for a mutual benefit. 
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3.6.2.1. Stakeholder recognition and engagement 
 
Francis and Armstrong (2003. p.376) suggested that business ethics was a set of 
norms that guided a corporation’s behaviour within a society. However, they did not 
suggest who or what made up the society within which the corporation might wish to 
exist. However, this understanding had earlier been developed by Freeman (1984) 
and this section of the thesis opens with his definition of those who could be affected 
by a corporation’s actions as ‘stakeholders’. 
 
Freeman (1984, p. 46) described stakeholders as being ‘any group or individual who 
can affect or be affected by the achievement of an organisation’s objectives’ and 
Werhane (2011, pp. 115-6) gave models by which the stakeholders surrounding a 
firm could be assigned to primary and secondary categories. The primary group 
included communities (such as Beaudesert, Rosewood and Esk) and the secondary 
group included CBOs (such as KTSRS).  Wilburn and Wilburn (2011, pp 9-11) 
enlarged this understanding by dividing external stakeholders into vested and non-
vested categories.  Vested stakeholders (such as landowners) would have both a 
voice and a vote in proceedings but non-vested stakeholders (CBOs such as KTSRS) 
would only have a voice. However, Wilburn and Wilburn (2011) did recognise that 
this voice might be powerful and influential when amplified by the media and the 
internet. 
 
Other bases for stakeholder recognition exist and Xstrata Coal, in the Social Impact 
Management Plan for its Wandoan Project used an approach based on: (i) the level 
of impact that the project may have on the stakeholder; (ii) the level of influence that 
the stakeholder might be able to exert on the project; and (iii) the level of interest 
that the stakeholder might exhibit in the project.  Using these criteria, Xstrata was 
then able to recognise thirty-four sub-categories within its twelve initial stakeholder 
groups (Xstrata 2007, pp. 16-19).  It is worth noting that this approach presupposes 
that the company is the only group able to ‘recognise’ stakeholders and that external 
stakeholders have no ability to ‘identify’ themselves and to independently raise their 
interests and concerns. 
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The approach adopted by Xstrata could be used by other mining companies to 
identify potential stakeholders within the Scenic Rim. Table 3.4 is a listing of 
possible stakeholders that could be recognised using this approach. 
TABLE 3.4: Key coal and CSG project stakeholder groups within the Scenic 
Rim 
 
GROUP 1 
High, frequent level of impact, 
interest or interest in activities 
GROUP 2 
Medium/semi frequent level of 
impact, interest or influence 
GROUP 3 
Low/infrequent level of 
impact, interest or influence 
 directly affected landowners 
 neighbours 
 town/village residents and 
local businesses 
 community based 
organisations (e.g. KTSRS) 
 Yugera No2 people 
 SRRC/LCC/ICC/LVRC/SRC 
 Qld Government  
(Departments of State 
Development, Infrastructure 
and Planning; Local 
Government, Natural 
Resources and Mines and 
Environment and Heritage 
Protection) 
  (Cth) Department of 
Environment, Water, Heritage 
and the Arts 
 employees and contractors 
 Brisbane, Toowoomba 
and Northern Rivers 
district residents and local 
government authorities 
 Queensland MPs for 
Albert, Beaudesert, 
Bundamba, Lockyer, 
Logan, Ipswich and 
Ipswich West 
 Commonwealth MPs for 
Blair, Forde, Oxley and 
Rankin 
 Qld Dept of Health 
 Qld Dept of Education 
 company shareholders 
 Qld Ambulance Service 
 Qld Fire and Rescue 
Service 
 Qld Police Force 
 Qld Resources Council 
 environmental and 
conservation groups 
 academic and research 
groups 
Source: The format for this table is taken from Xstrata 2007, p. 18-19. 
This stakeholder base is viewed from a company centric point of view. The approach 
is adopted on the basis that it is the companies that initiate action (coal/CSG 
exploration) and that the external stakeholders react and seek to engage with the 
companies to obtain a better outcome.   
 
Once the stakeholders in a project have been recognised and some form of ranking 
applied to their values and needs, it becomes possible for a firm to apply a strategy 
towards the satisfaction of those needs.  Friedman and Miles (2006 p. 162) 
developed a ladder of stakeholder engagement and management that contains twelve 
levels of engagement that could be applied to mining company/community 
interaction within the Scenic Rim.  The levels of ‘management’ that they outline 
range from manipulation of stakeholders to stakeholder control of events. The 
degrees of power that they give to stakeholders range from non-participation (with 
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stakeholders just being the recipients of data) through some involvement (with 
stakeholders having some decision making capacity over specific events) to a high 
degree of stakeholder power over the overall project. The detail of this ladder of 
stakeholder engagement is given in Table 3.5.  
 
TABLE 3.5: A ladder of stakeholder engagement and management 
 
Degree of 
Power 
Stakeholder 
Management 
Approach 
Intention of 
Engagement 
Form of 
Engagement 
Level of 
Stakeholder 
Influence 
 
 
Some degree 
of stakeholder 
power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A degree of 
involvement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A degree of 
tokenism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-
participation 
12. Stakeholder 
control 
 
 
 
11. Delegated Power 
 
 
 
1. Partnership 
 
9. Collaboration 
 
 
 
8. Involvement 
 
7. Negotiation 
6. Consultation 
 
 
 
5. Placation 
 
 
 
4. Explaining 
3. Informing 
 
2. Therapy 
 
 
 
1. Manipulation 
Majority 
representation of 
stakeholders in 
decision making 
Minority 
representation of 
stakeholders in 
decision making 
Joint decision 
making over 
specific projects 
Some decision 
making power 
given to 
stakeholders over 
specific projects 
Stakeholders give 
conditional support 
 
Organisation has 
the right to decide 
but stakeholders 
can advise 
Appease the 
stakeholders but no 
assurance of being 
heeded 
Educate 
stakeholders 
Educate 
stakeholders 
 
‘Cure’ stakeholders 
of their ignorance 
and preconceived 
beliefs 
 
‘Misleading’ 
stakeholders, 
attempting to 
change stakeholder 
expectations 
Multi-party 
dialogue 
 
 
 
Multi-party 
dialogue- 
board 
representation 
 
 
Multi-party 
dialogue – joint 
ventures 
Multi-party 
dialogue –strategic 
alliances 
 
 
Constructive 
dialogue 
 
Reactive 
bargaining 
Two way dialogue 
– 
questionnaires, 
focus groups 
 
Advisory panels 
 
 
 
Workshops 
Verified corporate 
social reports 
Briefing sessions, 
leaflets, 
newsletters, 
magazines, 
corporate reports 
 
 
 
Forming or 
agreeing to 
decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
Having an 
influence on 
decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
Being heard 
before a 
decision is 
made 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge 
about a 
decision 
Source: Friedman and Miles 2006, p. 162 
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The approach to managing external stakeholders identified in Table 3.5 is centred on 
the business case that managing stakeholders successfully could give a firm a 
competitive advantage and so benefit its shareholders.  However Harrison, Bosse and 
Phillips (2010) introduced the concept of managing for stakeholders and proposed a 
model in which both the firm and its stakeholders would, based on mutual trust, 
disclose their ‘utility functions’ to each other in order to develop the firm and its 
activities for their mutual advantage. This paper revealed a seminal change in 
thinking. Another trend that became prominent after 2010 was that the greater 
involvement of stakeholders could lead to more sustainable development and so 
benefit a much wider ‘community’. Clifton and Amran (2011, p. 124) pointed out 
that there are two criteria by which a firm could be considered ‘sustainable’.  The 
first criteria is that its actions would enable it to continue as a going concern. The 
second is that it would make a significant contribution to sustainable world goals, 
wellbeing and justice. This approach recognised the values and desires of both 
internal and external stakeholders and, as Wu (2012, p. 160) later pointed out, ‘An 
enterprise should acknowledge the needs of its multiple stakeholders and collaborate 
with them to generate value that can benefit itself as well as its stakeholders’. 
 
Both the concept of managing for stakeholders proposed by Harrison, Bosse and 
Phillips (2010) and the link between stakeholders and sustainability proposed by 
Clifton and Amran (2011) are based on trust. This particularly applies to the trust 
extended by the stakeholders towards the corporation – and it could be suggested 
that the major base for trust is the good name (or reputation) of the company.  Tuck 
(2012) examined the bases on which stakeholder groups might assess the reputation 
of a company and so form an estimate of how trustworthy it is. Reputation was 
found to have three major components: (i) the estimate of reputation formed by 
individual stakeholder groups (e.g. farmers, community residents, suppliers), (ii) the 
network of associations by which individual stakeholder groups transmitted and 
compared their estimate of reputation and (iii) the general perception of the 
reputation of the industry (Tuck 2012). 
 
Tuck’s (2012) study was based on mining companies operating in Victoria, but the 
findings of the study offer a base for similar analysis within the Scenic Rim. The 
factors that were found to have a direct impact on reputation formation were: (i) 
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company impact on the community; (ii) activities at the local mine site; and (iii) the 
actions of managers and employees at the local mine site whereas general company 
performance and leadership and management were of limited importance. Those 
factors that had a less direct impact on reputation creation were: (i) performance at 
other mine sites; and (ii) change of company ownership. The impacts of company 
economic contribution to the community and/or region and salaries and wages paid 
within the region were only of limited importance in reputation formation (Tuck 
2012). 
Despite the weight of evidence that suggests a strong link between stakeholder 
engagement, competitive advantage and sustainable development, Sarker (2011) 
(after a study of corporate social responsibility in the Malaysian and Australian oil 
and gas industries) was still able to conclude that ‘A severe lack of stakeholder 
engagement is a major failing of the Australian mining industry especially when it 
comes to coal seam gas projects.’  He then suggested that regulation was not the 
answer and that there should be ‘a strategic stakeholder engagement model involving 
governments, the mining company, farmers and community groups on a continuous 
basis throughout the mining project’.  This conclusion supports the contribution to 
practice that this research project is expected to make (Section 1.6). 
An adequate summary of the relationship between companies and their external 
stakeholders (particularly between mining companies and communities within the 
Scenic Rim) comes from Freeman (n.d., p. 47) – ‘If a contract (such as an 
exploration permit for coal or CSG) between A (government) and B (companies 
holding ATPs for carbon based minerals) imposes a cost on C (communities), then C 
has the option to become a party to the contract and the terms are renegotiated.’. 
The gaps in stakeholder literature and their meaning for the research that is the 
background to this thesis are identified in Section 3.6.4. Suffice it is to say here that 
if communities felt included and empowered by a decision making role, they might 
be more inclined to enter into discussions with companies exploring for coal and 
CSG within the region.  
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3.6.2.2. Stakeholder engagement through corporate social responsibility 
 
Sprinkle and Maines (2010, pp. 445-453) suggest that there are six reasons that 
companies might engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. The first 
three reasons have an economic base (increase market share, reduce production cost 
and reduce costs of potential litigation and compliance investigations), another 
reason could be socio-economic in its base (help recruit, motivate and retain 
employees) and the other two reasons are ‘greenwash’ and altruism. A review of the 
CSR activities undertaken by the NHC gives three examples of altruism – albeit with 
a strong economic base. 
 
The first example is based on the NHC operations at Acland (north of Toowoomba). 
At this site, mined land is being rehabilitated, planted with pasture and returned to 
grazing. Tests carried out by staff of the University of Southern Queensland suggest, 
that at an early stage of rehabilitation, there is no difference in chemical properties 
between the soils on an unmined site and those on rehabilitated land. Other tests 
suggest that the growth rates of a trial herd of cattle on rehabilitated land matched or 
exceeded the growth of a control herd on nearby unmined land (NHC 17 April 
2015). It may be possible for NHC to reproduce such success at its Jeebropilly site 
when rehabilitation takes place there. 
 
NHC supports a Community Reference Group at Rosewood and the other two 
examples come from the work of this Group. At a public meeting in Rosewood, 
early in 2012, members of the Rosewood District Protection Organisation (RDPO) 
described how their engagement with NHC had led to vegetation that was once 
endemic to the Rosewood Vine Scrub of the area being used in rehabilitation of the 
New Oakleigh open cut mine (just to the north of the town) rather than the use of 
plant material more generally spread in the Scenic Rim (personal notes taken by 
CWE Maddox 17 January 2012). NHC  also gives examples of  financial support 
(more than $250 000) made available to the Rosewood and Ipswich communities 
over past years - organisations assisted  include the Rosewood State Primary and 
High Schools, the Rosewood Community Centre and the Cabanda aged care facility 
(Moreton and District News 25 January 2013).  Such activities would fit in well with 
NHC’s belief/value statement that ‘We work with our communities through effective 
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partnerships to achieve mutual benefit.’ (NHC n.d.). However, company views are 
not always shared by the intended recipients of their CSR activities and the Ipswich 
City Councillor for Division 10 (Rosewood and surrounding districts) offers a 
contrarian view when he asks ‘What legacy has mining left after 150 years? It is 
difficult to point to one physical piece of infrastructure that they have built for our 
community.’ (Pahlke 18 January 2013). 
  
Although Arrow Energy has yet to engage in any CSR activities within the Scenic 
Rim, it has an active CSR program in the Surat-Bowen Basin (where its CSG 
activities are far more advanced) (Arrow Energy n.d. (c2015-16)). Some of the 
components of this program are: 
 support for NAIDOC Week activities in Dalby and Moranbah; 
 the establishment of an Agricultural Scholarship program to assist the education 
of the next generation of farmers; 
 the support of Indigenous students studying at five Queensland universities; and 
 the provision of cardiac care in St George and Dalby by specialist doctors and a 
mobile clinic. 
 
Other mining companies active within the Scenic Rim also support community 
engagement and involvement activities in areas where they have more advanced 
mining activities. For example, Carabella Resources Limited (holder of EPC 1149 
and EPC 1249 in the SRRC area) has an active program to enlist and support local 
business in the supply of services for its Bluff open cut coal mine near Blackwater 
(Carabella Resources Limited  26 March 2014, Stanley 27 November 2013). 
Similarly, Golden Cross Resources Limited (holder of EPC 2082 and EPC 2257) has 
financially supported community activities at Molong (NSW) and Oodnadatta (SA) 
(Golden Cross Resources n.d). 
 
Although it is relatively easy to find some examples of mining company CSR 
activities within the Scenic Rim, it is not possible to establish a link between these 
activities and the sustainability of company operations. 
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3.6.3. Sustainable development reporting 
 
The discussion in Section 3.6.1 suggests that an important reason to involve all 
stakeholders in the activities of a corporation is that they could contribute to its long 
term sustainability (Harrison, Bosse & Phillips 2010; Clifton & Amran 2011). 
Sustainable development is also one of the values of communities within the Scenic 
Rim identified in (Appendix 3). It is, therefore, worthwhile examining the current 
state of corporate sustainable development reporting in Australia as any such reports 
by the public companies recognised in Appendix 2 might assist the communities of 
the Scenic Rim in assessing their value as partners in an SLTO.  
 
There are several definitions of sustainable development available but the one used 
in this thesis is that described in the Australian National Strategy for Ecologically 
Sustainable Development (NSESD) viz: 
Ecologically sustainable development is using, conserving and enhancing the 
community’s resources so that ecological processes, on which life depends, are 
maintained and the total quality of life, now and in the future, can be increased 
(Department of the Environment 1992, Part 1 – Introduction).  
Part 2 Chapter 5 of the NSESD is directly related to mining and contains three 
objectives that are relevant to such activities within the Scenic Rim: 
 Objective 5.3 – to improve community consultation and information, (to) improve 
performance in occupational health and safety and (to) achieve social equity objectives; 
 Objective 5.2 – to provide appropriate community returns for using mineral resources 
and achieve better environmental protection and management in the mining sector; and 
 Objective 5.1 – to ensure mine sites are rehabilitated to sound environmental and safety 
standards and to at least a level consistent with the condition of surrounding land 
(Department of the Environment 1992, Part 2 Sectoral Issues - Chapter 5). 
 
These objectives are presented in reverse order to that given in the NSESD for the 
reasons that: (i) improving community consultation and information is the most 
pressing current need for communities within the Scenic Rim; and (ii) the 
requirement for the rehabilitation of proposed mine sites within the Scenic Rim is 
(mostly) several decades in the future. 
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In June 2003, the Australian Department for the Environment and Heritage published 
Triple Bottom Line Reporting in Australia – A Guide to Reporting Against 
Environmental Indicators. Chapter 1 of the Guide states that ‘Triple Bottom Line 
reporting is becoming an accepted approach for organisations to demonstrate they 
have strategies for sustainable growth.’ (Department for the Environment and 
Heritage 2003, p. 3).  Fifty three organisations participated in the development of the 
Guide and, although eight of these organisations were involved with mining and 
energy (e.g. MIM Holdings and Origin Energy), only one of them (the Minerals 
Council of Australia) had any direct (or indirect) link with mining exploration within 
the Scenic Rim (Department for the Environment and Heritage 2003, p. 67) – so, 
perhaps, it is not surprising that the Guide contains no major segment on mining.  
Any mining company wishing to use the Guide in its reporting would have to search 
for relevant references under the Environmental Performance Indicators for Energy, 
Waste, Water, Waste – Solid and Hazardous, Emissions to Air, Land and Water and 
Biodiversity in Chapter 5 (Department for the Environment and Heritage 2003, pp. 
20–61).  For larger organisations, such as Shell (an ultimate owner of both BNG Pty 
Ltd and Arrow CSG (Australia) Pty Ltd), reporting against these indicators may 
provide some benefit, but for smaller organisations, such as Scorpion Energy Pty Ltd 
and Moreton Energy Pty Ltd, it is probably not worth the effort. 
 
In 2007, KPMG published Sustainability Reporting in Australia. This report 
analysed the sustainability reporting of the top 100 public companies and the top 100 
private companies in Australia (ranked according to revenue) (KPMG 2007, p. 5). 
The names of the companies were not disclosed but the following comment 
suggested that some mining companies were included – ‘The four industry sectors 
that dominate the ASX 300 (mining, property and business services, manufacturing 
and finance and insurance) are well represented in sustainability reporting.’ (KPMG 
2007, p. 2).  The report suggested that: 
 the incidence of corporate sustainability reporting in Australia continues to 
increase; 
 sustainability reporting in Australia continues to lag international levels; 
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 the extent of reporting varies significantly between industry sectors (mining 
companies make up 19% of the ASX 300 index and 24% of these companies 
publish sustainability reports); 
 levels of sustainability reporting among both the top 100 public and private 
companies are similar; and 
 most companies publish stand alone sustainability reports (KPMG 2007, pp. 6–
9). 
A further report by KPMG and SustainAbility Ltd (2008, pp. 2-3) stated that: 
 publishing a sustainability report has a strong positive impact on readers’ 
perception of the reporting company; 
 readers want to see a stronger role for stakeholders in reporting; 
 readers believe reporting companies are likely to omit failures from their 
sustainability reports; and 
 a majority of readers feel assurance is important, both on sustainability reports 
and on sustainability performance. 
 
Figure 4 of the report (KPMG et al. 2008, p. 9) contained the following reasons that 
readers use sustainability reports: 
 to understand the specific sustainability issues of the company; 
 to know how the company performs; 
 to establish the company’s accountability; and 
 to use it as a base for further decisions/actions in relation to the company. 
 
The above material suggests that published company reports may perform a valuable 
role in informing ‘the public’ (and, therefore, communities) about company 
intentions, standards and performance.  However, a review published in 2004 
suggested that these reports should be reviewed and used carefully as the published 
material may be an attempt to manipulate public perceptions. Yongvanich and 
Guthrie (2004) studied the descriptions of ‘non-economic performance’ contained in 
the financial year 2002 annual reports of seventeen mining companies listed on the 
ASX and being part of the ASX 100 index (Yongvanich & Guthrie 2004, p. 10) and 
concluded that:  
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… there were seven reporting elements of the environmental performance indicators 
that were rarely reported.  These reporting elements were: materials; water; 
biodiversity; suppliers; products and services; transport; and overall were rarely 
reported (Yongvanich & Guthrie 2004, p. 16). 
 
Although the report recognised that disclosure against the topic ‘community’ was 
high for almost all the sample companies, the authors concluded that  ‘The greater 
disclosure of community could be seen to represent the companies’ strategy of 
deflecting the attention of ‘relevant publics’ away from other issues by concentrating 
disclosure only on community.’ (Yongvanich & Guthrie 2004, p. 17).  Their overall 
conclusion was that: 
 
It may be concluded from this ex post examination of management’s choices of 
legitimation strategies that the strategy of changing the perception of the ‘relevant 
publics’ and the strategy of manipulating perception by deflecting attention from 
issues of concern were adopted to a similar extent and more so than the other two 
legitimation strategies. (Yongvanich & Guthrie 2004, p. 19). 
 
In July 2014, McKinsey and Company published their 2014 Global Survey on 
sustainability’s strategic value. The survey covered some 2 904 organisations – of 
which ninety four were classified as ‘extractive services’ (McKinsey & Company 
2014, p. 1). The three principal reasons that the surveyed organisations addressed 
sustainability were reported as being: 
 alignment with the company’s business goals, mission or values; 
 to build, maintain or improve corporate reputation; and 
 to improve operational efficiency and lower costs (McKinsey and Company 
2014, Exhibit 1). 
 
Executives of extractive services companies are reported as pursuing seven core 
sustainability issues with seventy five percent of the respondents saying that 
reputation management was one of these issues. Reputation building activities 
included: (i) local community investments; (ii) external reporting; and (iii) employee 
volunteering.  The activity that would maximise financial value is community 
investment (McKinsey and Company 2014, Exhibit 3). 
53 
 
Some of the external reporting of companies exploring for coal and CSG within the 
Scenic Rim is explored in Appendix 4. An understanding of the availability of this 
data is critical for communities within the Scenic Rim as it is unlikely that any of the 
companies directly involved in mining exploration within the region (Appendix 2) 
would fall within the definition of the top 100 private or public companies in 
Australia and so may not produce sustainability reports that the communities could 
use to assess their value as possible partners in an SLTO.  
 
Gaps in the literature relating to sustainable development reporting are identified in 
Section 3.6.4. 
 
3.6.4. Gaps in the literature 
 
The literature reviewed in Section 3.6 relates to corporate ethics, stakeholders and 
corporate development reporting. The literature is extensive but there are significant 
gaps in it. The gaps that are addressed by the research behind this thesis are as 
follows: 
 
3.6.4.1. Corporate ethics 
 
When the ASX published its best practice principles in 2003 and suggested that 
companies listed with it should report on performance against those principles (one 
of which was ethics) each year (FindLaw Australia 2003), Longstaff (2003) 
immediately protested that the guidelines were silent about the role of values and 
principles in decision making. The ASX principles only apply to public companies 
and no private company registered in Australia is required to produce similar reports. 
The literature reviewed gives many reasons as to why corporate values, ethics and 
codes of conduct are important, but it contains no guidance as to how communities 
might obtain information about corporate values and guidelines for behaviour if a 
company chooses not to publish such material. This shortcoming is important within 
the Scenic Rim as most of the corporations exploring for coal or CSG are private 
companies. 
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3.6.4.2. Stakeholder theory 
 
In 2011, Sarker found that ‘a severe lack of stakeholder engagement is a major 
failing of the Australian mining industry especially when it comes to coal seam gas 
projects’ (Sarker 2011) and a year later Wu (2012, p. 160) was still suggesting that 
companies should acknowledge the needs of their multiple stakeholders. Within the 
Scenic Rim, none of the companies exploring for coal or CSG has sought to engage 
with external stakeholders in any meaningful way and none of the literature reviewed 
suggests how communities might initiate consultation and engagement when the 
companies are not willing to do so. 
 
3.6.4.3. Sustainable development reporting 
 
In 1992, the Commonwealth Department of Environment, in publishing its NSESD 
(see Section 3.6.3), suggested that one reason that a company might publish a 
sustainability report was ‘to improve community consultation and information’ 
(Department of Environment (1992, Part 2 Chapter 5). More than a decade later, a 
survey by KPMG (2008, p. 9) suggested that the reasons that readers studied 
environmental reports included: (i) to understand the sustainability issues of a 
company; and (ii) to use it as a base for future decisions/actions in relation to a 
company. This tool for understanding company intentions is not available to 
communities with in the Scenic Rim as none of the companies exploring for coal or 
CSG in the region publishes such reports. The literature reviewed is silent on how 
communities might obtain such useful knowledge if companies do not release it. 
 
3.6.4.4 So what does it all mean? 
There have been very few exchanges of data between the communities of the region 
and the companies exploring for coal/CSG. It would not be surprising, therefore, if 
the communities object against those activities strongly. If the companies exploring 
for coal and CSG within the Scenic Rim have a genuine wish to obtain an SLTO for 
their proposed operation, they will need to recognise the implicit, local, social 
contract and provide data on their values and intentions in a timely manner and in a 
form that community members will understand. 
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3.7. A social licence to operate 
 
3.7.1 The social licence to operate defined 
 
CSIRO defined a social licence to operate as follows ‘An operation is said to have a 
social licence when it achieves ongoing acceptance or approval from the local 
community and other stakeholders who can affect its profitability.’ and claimed that 
‘Without a social licence it is very difficult for a mine to operate effectively or 
profitably.’ (CSIRO 10 September 2012 - updated 16 October 2012, p. 1). The 
Business for Social Responsibility group (BSR) added another dimension (that of 
legal issues) to the definition as follows – ‘Gaining a social licence to operate simply 
means gaining support for the project from concerned groups, or stakeholders, over 
and above meeting any legal requirements.’ (BSR n.d., p. 4).  Boutilier and 
Associates added other components to the concept as follows: 
However, at the level of individual projects, this acceptance is neither automatic nor 
unconditional.  Today, there is the need to gain and maintain the support of the 
people who live and work in the area of impact and influence of any given project – 
to have the social licence to operate. There is ample evidence that a failure to gain 
and maintain this Social Licence can lead to conflict, delays or cost for the 
proponents of a project (On Common Ground Consultants Inc & Boutilier and 
Associates n.d. p. 1). 
 
3.7.2. Understanding the concept of a social licence to operate 
 
There are several ‘peak’ membership based groups that represent the mining industry 
in Australia. However, representation of the coal exploration and mining industry 
was streamlined a little when the then Australian Coal Association and the Minerals 
Council of Australia combined to create the present Australian Coal Association on 
23 August 2013 (Australian Coal Association n.d. a, Home page).  As at 29 February 
2016, the Association claimed to have twenty-six members: only one of which (New 
Hope Corporation Ltd) is active within the Scenic Rim (Australian Coal Association 
n.d. a, Home page, Members).  The Association’s previous Home page made several 
claims about the industry’s SLTO that adequately frame this analysis of the theory 
surrounding the topic: 
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The Australian coal industry respects that its long term future relies on its ‘social 
licence to operate’. … While the concept of a social licence to operate is not new, it 
has come under increasing scrutiny in the last decade as the industry has expanded 
to meet global demands for Australia’s coal resources.  This expansion has brought 
about pressures on local infrastructure, some issues of competing land use and 
increased impacts on some communities. … The Australian coal industry places 
premium value on maintaining its social licence to operate.  In order to do so, the 
industry promotes the proactive steps that it is taking to address impacts on the 
environment and some local communities and works with those communities and 
governments to address concerns as they arise. … (Australian Coal Association n.d. 
b, Home page, Social Licence to Operate). 
Wilburn & Wilburn (2011, p. 3) wrote that ‘Some companies are adopting a model, 
the Social Licence to Operate, as part of their corporate social responsibility 
strategy.’ The relationship between stakeholders, corporate social responsibility and 
an SLTO is to be explored in another part of the overall research project and, for this 
thesis, it is assumed that CSR strategy is a path to gaining an SLTO. 
BSR, in developing a business case for an SLTO, maintained that the most 
immediate reason for a company to gain an SLTO was ‘so that it can get the mine 
permitted’ and claimed that: 
Even minor opposition can lead to work stoppages or delays that increase the cost of 
putting a mine into production.  Local opposition can lead to problems with 
regulatory or political authorities.  In turn, such problems can cause lack of investor 
confidence, affecting the viability of a project. … These reputational costs can linger 
for many years (BSR n.d. p. 5). 
None of the mining companies active within the Scenic rim has sought to negotiate 
an SLTO so far, but the question of whom they would approach arises. Table 3.4 
recognises a large array of stakeholders who would need to be engaged.  But even 
the high priority group (Group 1 in the table) still contains a very diverse set of 
stakeholders – there are more than thirty communities of very different sizes and 
composition spread over several hundreds of kilometres, thousands of landowners 
covering a wide range of agricultural, horticultural and pastoral activities and tens of 
government departments and local government authorities.  Boutilier and Associates 
(2012, What is a Social Licence?  page) suggested that any social licence would be 
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site specific and this could complicate matters for companies (such as Carabella 
Resources, Coalbank and Metro Mining) that hold several EPCs within the Scenic 
Rim (Appendix 1) even further.  Even if a ‘network of stakeholders’ was substituted 
for ‘community’ (Boutilier and Associates 2012, What is a Social Licence?  page), 
there is still the question of how any such group could legitimately represent the 
interests of the diverse groups identified in Table 3.4.  Boutilier and Associates 
(2012, What is a Social Licence?  page) raised the issue that communities and 
stakeholders need to be assured of the legitimacy and credibility of the project as part 
of trust building activities and it would surely be reasonable for a company to seek to 
be assured that its negotiating partners were equally legitimate and credible. 
Wilburn and Wilburn (2011, p. 5) quoted Asmus as believing that, quite apart from 
the lack of a leader or spokesperson with whom to start a dialogue, three key issues 
surrounded all attempts to negotiate an SLTO: viz  
1. How is the ‘community’ defined?  Is there a strict geographical limitation to the 
‘community’ and are elected officials given greater or equal status with local 
citizens? 
2. If there is a lack of consensus within the ‘community’, what process validates 
any decision making? and 
3. Absent a political process, what exactly represents an adequate level of consent? 
The On Common Ground group (2012, Measuring the Social Licence page) 
suggested that, if these difficulties could be overcome, activities against a social 
licence could be measured and evaluated and that, given that the level of approval 
granted to a project is likely to vary throughout its life, it should be measured 
regularly. They proposed a four level model of such a licence and this is outlined in 
Table 3.6.  As well as listing the levels of acceptance that may be found over the life 
of a project, the table identifies the indicators that might be used to assess just where 
a project is in terms of its SLTO. 
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TABLE 3.6: The levels of a social licence to operate and their indicators 
LEVEL OF SOCIAL 
LICENCE 
INDICATOR OF LEVEL 
Acceptance withheld or 
withdrawn 
Shutdowns, blockades, boycotts, violence, sabotage, legal 
challenges 
Acceptance/tolerance Lingering/recurring issues and threats, presence of non-local 
groups and watchful monitoring 
Approval/support Company seen as a good neighbour and pride in collaborative 
achievements 
Psychological identification Political support, co-management of projects, united front against 
critics 
Source: On Common Ground Consultants Inc and Boutilier and Associates 2012, Measuring the 
Social Licence to Operate page 
 
Within the Scenic Rim, there have been: (i) blockades against exploratory drilling 
for CSG organised by the KTSRS organisation (KTSRS n.d. Highlights page); (ii) a 
legal challenge against the validity of the Ebenezer mineral lease that OGL 
Resources proposed to buy (OGL Resources Limited 3 June 2013) and; (iii) marches 
protesting against the proposal by Coalbank Limited to explore for coal in the Esk - 
Harlin area (Foley 26 December 2013).  The communities and ‘networks of 
stakeholders’ of the area do not appear to be in a mood to even consider granting 
mining companies an SLTO. 
  
Arrow Energy has some experience in negotiating with stakeholders in the Surat 
Basin and, in 2011, lodged a Social Impact Assessment (SIA) and Social Impact 
Management Plan with the (Queensland) Co-ordinator General as part of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIS) associated with its Surat Basin Project.  
The ‘consultation report’ associated with the EIS covers 579 pages.  Despite this 
seemingly extensive consultation process, the authors of the report stated: 
The issues of concern have remained largely unchanged since the consultation process 
commenced in late 2009, (but) the community has become increasingly informed and 
aware of the CSG industry and the Arrow Surat Gas Project, through project 
consultation activities and through the media … Despite this increasing awareness, 
there remains a high level of confusion and misunderstanding amongst stakeholders 
(URS Australia 2011, p. 74). 
 
In a review of the EIS and accompanying documents, de Rijke (2013) commented 
that ‘In this context, the SIA and associated documents are notably silent on the 
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‘social licence to operate’ and whether the proponent is of the opinion that such a 
licence has ultimately been obtained.’ (de Rijke 2013, p. 17). 
Arrow Energy has attempted to communicate with its Scenic Rim stakeholders by 
way of public meetings (Arrow Energy 17 September 2010), ‘public update’ 
notifications (Arrow Energy January 2012) and the release of technical reports 
(Arrow Energy 5 December 2012) but has not been able to reduce the conflict 
between community desires and company intent.  This is not surprising, for, as 
Friedman and Miles (2006, p. 162) explained, such activities are directed at 
informing, explaining and placation, are at the lower end of the ladder of stakeholder 
management processes and are some distance from the consultation, negotiation, 
collaboration and partnership that may have had more impact with Scenic Rim 
communities. 
Arrow Energy officers may have been able to recognise community values from the 
work of the SRRC reported in Appendix 3, but the above material suggests that they 
have not recognised the interests of individual stakeholder groups or made any 
serious attempt to engage them.  Also, there are no public records of attempts at 
external stakeholder engagement by any of the coal exploration companies active 
within the Scenic Rim.  The closest attempt at such engagement is a statement from 
OGL that it would hold a public meeting ‘to explain its plans’ once a certain stage in 
its attempted buy out of the Ebenezer, Fraser View and Mt Mort coal deposits had 
been reached (OGL 3 June 2013). 
 
3.7.3 Gaps in the literature 
 
The literature reviewed contends strongly that an SLTO is important and details 
possible consequences of a failure to negotiate such an agreement with local 
communities. Despite several suggestions that discussions should begin early in the 
mine development cycle, the literature is silent as to how communities could initiate 
such discussions if the exploration companies are unwilling to do so. 
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3.8. Conflict resolution using free, prior and informed consent 
 
3.8.1. Approaches to resolving conflict 
 
It could be expected that communities ‘just’ become resilient over time and that they 
‘learn’ how to adjust to challenging circumstances and to emerge from those 
challenges with their values (and community) intact.  While this may be possible 
with homogeneous communities, the range of values expressed by the residents of 
the Scenic Rim (Appendix 3) and by the companies exploring for coal and CSG 
within the region suggests that it may be too difficult for this to ‘just happen’. These 
differing views and values may also make it very difficult for any company to 
recognise appropriate negotiating partners and to resolve conflict under any of the 
social process theories mentioned by Schellenberg (1996, p. 13) or under the 
bargaining, negotiation or distributive justice concepts proposed by Deutsch (1983). 
While it may be possible that the theories of games and economic behaviour outlined 
by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) could yield better results, it appears 
certain that an external agent will be needed to help resolve the existing conflict.  
This is because existing CBOs (such as the Australian Conservation Foundation, 
Keep The Scenic Rim Scenic and the Lock the Gate Alliance) have attempted to 
become stakeholders in their own right and cannot be seen to be value free and 
independent negotiators (the assisted negotiation of Schellenberg 1996). 
 
Realising that external influence might be needed, the Queensland Government 
developed a mandatory model for the resolution of land access disputes between 
mining companies and landowners (Department of Employment, Economic 
Development and Innovation (DEEDI) 2010).  The process relies on voluntary 
negotiation but does allow that ‘the (ATP) holder and landholder should each 
appoint a responsible person with good interpersonal skills to negotiate the 
agreement … ’ (DEEDI 2010).  This is one approach to conflict resolution. 
 
This same ‘responsible person’ might be required to bring the diverse communities 
of the Scenic Rim together and to develop an agreed position that could be presented 
to the exploration companies.  This process could be a complex and lengthy task and 
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would, undoubtedly, require that such a negotiator be adequately funded.  Given that 
negotiations between communities and companies are not imminent, there is no clear 
driving force that might cause the communities to take such action immediately. 
   
3.8.2. Free, prior and informed consent 
 
Any negotiating process requires a free flow of information and discussion between 
the parties involved before any outcome can be reached. For that outcome to be 
readily accepted by all parties, the process must also be free of pressure, the parties 
must each be fully informed and agreement reached before any action regarding the 
outcome of the negotiation is taken. 
 
Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) was developed as a ‘process for 
empowering indigenous people in less developed countries to manage the resources 
of their land and to negotiate with mining companies … to gain a fair share of the 
wealth …’ (United Nations 2006).  Neither the principles of, nor the process for 
applying, FPIC suggest any reason that it could not be applied within the Scenic 
Rim. In this context, FPIC should be seen as a process for resolving conflict and for 
obtaining an SLTO and not as a substitute for that approach. 
  
The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) (ACF 2011, Policy Statement No 
75) views the ‘free’ component of FPIC as meaning ‘the absence of coercion and 
outside pressure, including monetary inducements (unless they are agreed to) and 
‘divide and conquer’ tactics …’.  It also includes the absence of any threats or 
implied retaliation if the result of the decision is to say ‘no’.  This is a challenging 
position for the ACF to adopt as the mining law, in Queensland, does not give 
communities any decision making role in the award of mining leases.  This role is 
held by the state only and is generally exercised through the Petroleum Act 1923, the 
Mineral Resources Act 1989 and the State Development and Public Works 
Organisation Act 1971.  An example of this lack of freedom can be found in the 
inability of a landowner to grant or refuse to grant a right to explore for coal on land 
that that person owns. Only the State has that right (Parliament of Queensland 1989, 
Mineral Resources Act 1989 sec 8 and sec 9). 
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Herz, Vina and Sohn (2007, pp. 12-15) argued that a business case for obtaining 
community consent for a project could be built on the principles of information, 
inclusiveness, dialogue, legal recognition, monitoring and evaluation and corporate 
buy-in.  In regard to inclusiveness, they postulated that ‘all interested community 
members should be allowed and encouraged to take part in the FPIC process’ and 
this is a challenging variation on the vested stakeholders only position of Wilburn 
and Wilburn (2011, pp. 9-11). They also suggested that dialogue should continue 
throughout the life of a project and that project proponents should view FPIC as an 
inherent and necessary cost of a project. 
 
The BSR group suggested that the FPIC process should: 
 not be unilaterally imposed; 
 not be time bound; 
 be thoroughly documented and agreed to by all parties; 
 incorporate traditional or customary decision making processes; 
 build capacity within the (indigenous) community to understand international 
and national standards and frameworks; 
 provide technical assistance to (indigenous) groups in language and modes of 
communication that ensure a complete understanding of the project development 
phases and processes; and 
 encourage (indigenous people) communities to use external, third party advice 
(BSR September 2012, p. 15). 
  
Szablowski (2010, p. 126) considered that the data given to stakeholders should 
include basic information such as the purpose, nature, size, pace and reversibility of 
the project, preliminary assessments of its likely economic, social, cultural and 
environmental impacts, details about benefit sharing and details of personnel likely 
to be involved.  Critical aspects of the giving and understanding of data are the 
credibility of the data presented and how the assembly, distribution and 
understanding of the data (including any advice requested by the stakeholders) are to 
occur.  Szablowski (2010, p. 125) claimed that it is the questions of access to 
resources and payment for them that raise ‘the stark imbalance of power among the 
participants’ and claimed that ‘Extractive industry firms have vastly superior 
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economic resources, very often they enjoy the active support of host country 
governments eager to promote investment and they have access to advanced 
technical and legal advice.’. 
 
3.8.3. Gaps in the literature 
 
Szablowski (2010, p. 127) further suggested that ‘while direct corporate and 
community engagement has become an established practice in the field of 
extractives, there is no consensus on the adoption of FPIC as the guiding standard for 
engagement’.  The research behind this thesis addresses this gap in the literature by 
exploring the contribution that FPIC could make to the resolution of conflict 
between mining companies and communities within the Scenic Rim. This work will 
then be included in a PhD program that will seek to develop a model for 
community/company interaction that could more equitably distribute both the 
benefits and disadvantages of mining developments between companies and their 
external stakeholders. 
 
3.9. Theories of the firm 
 
The basic shareholder theory of the firm (TOTF) originated in the economic analyses 
of Adam Smith (Pfarrer 2010, p. 86) in the mid 18
th
 century. From this base, the 
range of theories has proliferated and can now be suggested as having bases in law, 
principal/agency arrangements, transaction costs, resource dependency, evolutionary 
theory (Frederick 2004) and in new institutional theories (Powell & Dimaggio 1991). 
This section of the thesis explores these bases for theory as well as proposing a new 
model for the evaluation of such TOTF. This work also concentrates on incorporated 
business entities (corporations) and does not consider unincorporated entities such as 
sole traders and partnerships. 
 
3.9.1. Reasons for the existence of corporations 
 
If we draw on the work of Friedman (1962), it could be assumed that corporations 
exist to make a profit and not for social purposes. However, it only takes a little 
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research to discover that there could be many more reasons behind the creation of a 
corporation. These reasons include: 
 credibility of the business activity; 
 ease in raising capital; 
 flexibility of ownership including ease of ownership transfer; 
 limited liability for shareholders; 
 a recognised legal structure and management responsibilities; 
 a credit rating that is separate from that of its owners; 
 taxation advantages (including deductibility of a wider range of expenses); 
 asset protection; and 
 perpetual existence. 
 
The above reasons (or, probably more correctly, characteristics) have either an 
economic or legal basis but, although they adequately represent the advantages of a 
formal corporation (as against business activity undertaken by a sole trader or a 
partnership), they do not easily lead to an understanding of the corporation as a 
social entity with rights and responsibilities or to the boundaries that might limit 
corporate activities in the marketplace. Section 3.9.3 of this thesis examines existing 
theories of the firm that might give a wider understanding than does just a 
consideration of the characteristics above. 
 
3.9.2. Models for evaluating theories of the firm 
 
Before advancing an investigation into theories of the firm, it is worthwhile 
considering how the utility of such theories as are found might be evaluated. Several 
evaluation techniques can be easily recognised and they range from the generality of 
what can be found on Wikipedia to the more specific approach suggested by Radin. 
 
An undated review of TOTF found on Wikipedia (n.d.) suggests the following bases 
for analysis: 
 Existence – why do firms emerge? 
 Boundaries – why is the boundary between firms and the market, in relation to 
output and size, located where it is? 
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 Organization – why are firms structured in a specific way? 
 Uniformity of actions/performance – what drives the different actions and 
performance of firms? 
 Evidence – what tests are there for the different theories of the firm? 
 
If we compare the characteristics of corporations identified in Section 3.9.1 with the 
criteria identified above, it can be seen that most of the reasons given for the 
formation of a corporation fit against the existence and organisation bases identified 
in Wikipedia but that they do not address the questions of boundaries and 
performance. Foss, Lando and Thomsen (2000, p. 632) suggested that there was a 
need for a theory that would address: (i) the reasons for existence of a firm; (ii) the 
boundaries of the firm relative to markets; and (iii) the internal organisation of the 
firm.  Radin (2004, p. 291) later suggested different bases for evaluation as follows: 
 What drives business strategy? 
 What generates business productivity? 
 What shapes the business organisation? 
 What motivates firm behaviour? 
 What determines the firm’s moral posture? 
 
There are several other bases on which TOTF might be evaluated and one that 
appears to fit the Wikipedia – Radin continuum quite well is that proposed by 
Lozano, Carpenter and Huisingh (2015). These researchers suggested three elements 
for evaluation as follows: (i) boundaries (which sets the limits to the application of 
the theory); (ii) falsifiability (which determines whether or not an empirical 
refutation is possible); and (iii) utility (which refers to the usefulness of the theory) 
(Lozano et al. 2015, pp. 43–2). Lozano et al. also suggested a further three factors 
that could be considered: 
 entity or personality – which addresses the firm in a legal context; 
 nature of the firm – why the firm exists and how it relates to stakeholders; and 
 obligations – the firm’s obligations to shareholders and other social and non-
social groups (Lozano et al. 2015, p. 432). 
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It can easily be seen that several of the bases suggested by Foss et al. (2000) and 
Radin (2004) match (even if relatively loosely) those within Wikipedia (e.g. 
existence, organisation, boundaries and actions/performance) but that each proposed 
several other criteria. The work of Lozano et al. (2015) and Radin (2004) do not 
appear to match all that well (even though both approaches use some of the same 
words) but the entity/personality of Lozano et al. (2015) can be matched to the 
existence of Wikipedia (and Foss et al. (2000)) and their nature of the firm can be 
matched to Radin’s (2004) shaping, motivation and (to some extent) moral posture. 
For the purposes of the analysis and discussion in Chapter 7 and Appendix 5 of this 
thesis, the following criteria will be used to evaluate the utility of theories of the firm 
recognised in Section 3.9.3: 
 existence (why does the firm exist?); 
 obligations of the firm to its stakeholders/what drives business strategy? 
 what generates business productivity/profitability? 
 what shapes the business organisation? 
 what motivates firm behaviour?  
 what determines the firm’s moral posture? and 
 evidence/tests for the validity of the theory. 
 
These seven criteria for the evaluation of TOTF will be collectively referred to as the 
Maddox Model and are used in the analysis of utility undertaken in Appendix 5. 
 
Radin (2004) suggested that it may be possible to overcome the ‘isolation thesis’ 
between complementary TOTF and that a single theory of the firm could answer 
many questions.  While the above review suggests that such an outcome may not be 
possible, it could be that the ‘evolutionary firm substrate’ identified by Frederick 
(2004, pp. 145–176) might be a base for developing an evolutionary TOTF. 
 
3.9.3. Theories of the firm 
3.9.3.1. A background to theories of the firm 
 
There are several definitions of the TOTF, but the one adopted throughout this thesis 
is that proposed by Investopedia. The theory of the firm is: 
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A microeconomic concept founded in neoclassical economics that states that firms 
(corporations) exist and make decisions in order to maximize profits. Businesses 
interact with the market to determine pricing and demand and then allocate 
resources according to models that maximize profits (Investopedia 2008). 
 
The TOTF groups identified in this section of the paper are: (i) the Neoclassical 
economic approach initially outlined by Adam Smith (Pfarrer 2010 p. 86); (ii) 
Corporate Entity theory; (iii) Managerial theory; (iv) Transaction Cost theory; (v) 
Contract theory; (vi) Principal Agency theory; (vii) Resource Based theory; (viii) 
Natural Resource Based theory; (ix) Behavioural theory; (x) Stakeholder theory; (xi) 
Evolutionary theory; (xii) Corporate Sustainability theory; and (xiii) New 
Institutional theory. Lozano et al. (2015, p. 437) suggested that the social contract 
described in Section 3.5 of this thesis is one of the current TOTF. This view is 
respected but, for this thesis, the social contract is regarded as an implicit and 
evolving understanding that forms the background to all modern theories of the firm 
and so is much larger and wider in scope than any individual theory (see Section 
3.5). 
 
Several researchers have tried to group these theories together so as to make analysis 
and comparison easier. For example, Foss et al. (2000, pp. 631–658) suggested that 
most of the theories (except for the work of Smith) could be grouped as either 
principal/agency contracts or incomplete contracting approaches and Crossan (n.d.) 
attempted to group them as profit maximization, managerial theories and behavioural 
theories. Lozano et al. (2015) produced a far more extensive grouping under the 
headings of corporate entity theories, corporate nature theories and corporate 
obligation theories and it is this grouping that is used as the base for discussion in 
Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
 
An interesting conclusion to this section of the thesis, particularly in regard to 
mining exploration companies working within the Scenic Rim, can be found in the 
work of McQueen (1991, p. 26) – who suggested that, even from very early years in 
many Australian colonies, mining was one of the three prominent industries in which 
the corporate form was thought to be an appropriate organisational structure. 
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3.9.3.2.The neoclassical theory of the firm 
 
 As Investopedia (2008) suggests, the firm is a microeconomic concept and its 
functions can be described in economic terms. Although Adam Smith (1723-1790) 
thought that there were some advantages to joint stock companies, Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge (2003 p. 34) claim that he was more worried that hired managers would 
not bring the same “anxious vigilance” to their firms’ interests as would owner-
managers. Marshall (1890) later wrote about firm structure and markets in terms of 
the activities of representative firms and their profit maximizing output function and 
this remains the prevailing view (Friedman 1962). Kantarelis (2007, p. 42) agreed 
that the ultimate objective of a business firm was to maximize profit subject to given 
information but recognised that ‘some economists maintain that the pursuit of profit 
maximization is not realistic due to complexity and objectives other than profit’ (at 
least in the short term if not in the long term). However, he suggested that, for an un-
regulated company, the short run maximum profit would occur when the marginal 
cost of production equalled the marginal revenue from a unit of production sold 
(Kantarelis 2007, p. 45).  This understanding of the features of the neoclassical firm 
is depicted in Figure 3.1. 
 
This understanding of the firm is difficult to relate to most of the companies 
exploring for coal or CSG within the Scenic Rim – not least because the 
understanding is based on the generation of a ‘profit’ that arises from the difference 
between the cost of producing an additional unit of product and the revenue gained 
from selling that unit of production. Few of the private exploration companies active 
within the Scenic Rim either produce or sell anything. However, the public 
companies (Appendix 2) that explore for coal within the Scenic Rim, either in their 
own name or through fully owned subsidiaries, can be easily fitted against 
Kantarelis’ model of the neo-classical firm as they all produce and sell some product 
or service (e.g. Carabella Resources, Coalbank, Cockatoo Coal, Cuesta Coal and 
Metro Mining all currently produce and sell coal, Carbon Energy markets its 
proprietary underground coal gasification technology, NHC produces and sells coal, 
oil and gas (as well as port facilities), Golden Cross Resources produces and sells 
copper and gold and Hudson Investment Group builds, leases and manages shopping 
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centres and parking stations). Of the private companies exploring for coal or CSG 
within the Scenic Rim only Arrow Energy engages in any commercial activities. 
 
FIGURE 3.1: The features of the neoclassical firm 
 
  
IMPUT 
MARKET 
INFORMATION 
 
OUTPUT MARKET 
INFORMATION 
 
GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION 
 
 
   
   
THE BLACK BOX 
(THE FIRM’S PRODUCTION FUNCTION) 
(AND/OR THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  THAT GIVES 
THE FIRM A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE) 
   
  
PRODUCTS AND 
SERVICES (THE 
FIRM’S REVENUE 
FUNCTION) 
 
 
PROFIT 
(N.B. FOR AN 
UNREGULATED 
FIRM, THE SHORT 
RUN MAXIMUM 
PROFIT IS WHERE 
MARGINAL COST 
EQUALS MARGINAL 
REVENUE) 
 
Sources: Crossan n.d., p.1;  Kantarelis 2007, p. 45 
  
3.9.3.3. Corporate entity theory 
 
Corporate entity theory seeks to establish how a corporation has been established 
legally and the influence that the method of establishment exercises over its relations 
with government. Lozano et al. (2015, p. 433) suggested that the three subsets of this 
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theory that need to be considered are: (i) artificial entity theory; (ii) aggregate entity 
theory; and (iii) real entity theory. 
 
Under the artificial entity theory, a business was granted the right to exist by a 
sovereign power and was seen to be an extension of the state rather than being a 
corporate citizen (Lozano et al. 2015, p. 433). Examples of this form of entity are 
The Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies 
(the (English) East India Company) formed by Royal Charter in 1600 (Robins 2012, 
p. xvi), the Dutch East India Company (similarly formed in 1602), The Governor 
and Company of Adventurers of England trading into Hudson Bay (the Hudson Bay 
Company (formed by Royal Charter in 1670)), the Royal African Company (formed 
by Royal Charter in 1672) and the New Zealand Company (formed by Royal Charter 
in 1841). All of these companies were established with agreed objectives (although 
that of the Royal African Company was to co-ordinate the English slave trade in 
Africa – a now illegal activity) and at least one of them was formed to further a 
government policy (the New Zealand Company was formed to facilitate settlement 
in New Zealand). The companies also had defined membership, a paid up capital and 
a management structure that was an agent for those who subscribed money to form 
the company (Robins 2012, pp.23-24). Not all the companies enjoyed a perpetual 
existence – the Hudson Bay Company still exists but the Royal African Company 
went out of business after only fifty nine years and the English East India Company 
after two hundred and seventy five years (Robins 2012, pp. xi-xviii). 
 
The modern version of the artificial entity corporation is the government owned 
corporation (GOC). In Queensland, these entities are formed under the Government 
Owned Corporations Act 1993 (Parliament of Queensland 1993).  and have 
ownership and management functions that are very similar to those of companies 
formed by royal charter  A Queensland GOC could hold mining permits and leases 
but none does so within the Scenic Rim. 
 
The aggregate entity theory states that: (i) the corporation is created by the 
association of people who agree to undertake an enterprise; and (ii) the company’s 
property is not the possession of any person or group of persons within the company 
but is at the use of the managers. Thus the company can be considered to be the sum 
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of its human and non-human components (Machen 1911). It can be deduced from 
this base that the company is an extension of its shareholders and not (as suggested 
by the artificial entity t heory) an extension of the state. Based on this approach, the 
company is separated from society and the environment, labour is expendable (in 
that a skilled worker can be replaced by an unskilled worker and technology) and, as 
a general rule, the company is a profit generating activity for the benefit of its 
shareholders (Crossan n.d., p.2). Although the directors and managers of such a 
company have influence and the power to make changes, they are, ultimately, bound 
by the shareholders’ wishes. 
 
Whereas the above two corporate entity theories see companies being created as 
either extensions of the state or of their shareholders, the real entity theory sees a 
company as being ‘a new real person, a real corporate animal … It is endowed with a 
will and with senses.’ (Machen 1911, p. 256). Under this theory, the company: 
 is an actual being; 
 must be incorporated within the legal and civic laws of a particular state; 
 is integrated within the fabric of society; 
 acts through agents (its employees, managers and appointed agents); 
 can be accused of certain crimes and be judged at law; and 
 has the responsibility to ensure that its employees comply with the law of the 
land (Lozano et al. 2015, p. 433). 
 
This latter approach suggests that such a corporate entity might have a responsibility 
towards its external stakeholders. 
 
3.9.3.4. Managerial theory 
 
Under the Australian Corporations Act 2001, the ownership of most companies 
(shareholders) is separated from the management of the companies and the owners 
appoint agents (the senior managers) to carry out the business of the company on 
their behalf. This separation of ownership and management immediately raises the 
question as to whether or not it is wise for the owners to assume that the managers 
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will always act in their interest (Crossan n.d., p. 2). This is the quandary that 
underlies managerial theories of the firm. 
 
Many researchers see managerial theory as a convenient description for a group of 
related approaches. Crossan (n.d.p. 2-3) suggested that this group contained: (i) a 
revenue maximization hypothesis (Baumol 1959); (ii) a managerial discretion model 
(Williamson 1964); and (iii) a growth maximization model (Marris 1964). This 
grouping is used as the base for analysis in this sub-section of the thesis. 
 
The revenue maximization hypothesis (originally advanced by Baumol (1959)) 
suggested that, after the minimum acceptable level of profit (acceptable to the 
shareholders) has been attained, the managers of firms operating in an oligopolistic 
market will act so as to maximize revenue and not profit (Crossan n.d., p. 3). The 
reasons for this action can be: (i) decreasing sales revenue could paint a poor picture 
of the firm and so make it difficult to raise money for expansion or to sell the firm; 
and (ii) managers’ pay and benefits are often tied to revenue (rather than to profit). 
The question of the timing of sales maximization is only poorly addressed by this 
hypothesis and it could be that the action of the managers is aimed at increasing 
short term sales so as to maximize market share and so maximize long run profits 
(Crossan n.d., p. 3). Baumol (1959) suggested that managers aiming at revenue 
maximization would advertise, at least, to the same extent as profit maximizing firms 
as additional money spent this way could increase sales (revenue). 
 
The managerial discretion model (Williamson 1964) was developed from the 
neoclassical model described in Section 3.9.3.2 in that both price and the level of 
output would be determined from the marginal revenue equals marginal cost model. 
However,  Williamson (1964) hypothesised that managers would gain benefits (e.g. 
power, status and salary) for themselves by increasing expenditure on special 
projects, increasing support staff and spending on other activities that would 
decrease the profits that could otherwise be paid to shareholders. 
 
The managerial capitalism model suggests that managers are concerned with 
maximizing the rate of growth of sales subject only to maintaining the capital value 
of the firm and to retaining funds to finance continued growth (Mariss 1964). This 
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latter aspect is important because, if the market value of the company falls below the 
value of the firm’s assets, the company could be subject to a takeover bid and the 
managers might lose their jobs (and associated benefits) (Crossan n.d., p. 4). 
  
3.9.3.5.   Transaction cost theory 
 
The concept of transaction costs was introduced in Ronald Coase’s (1937) paper 
‘The Nature of the Firm’. His definition of the term was not precise and merely 
alluded to the concept as being ‘the cost of using the price mechanism’. Because of 
this loose definition, many recent researchers have claimed that the concept includes 
‘any cost that is convenient and elusive enough to avoid critical examination’ (Allen 
2000, p. 893). Coase’s argument was that, in the neoclassical theory of the firm, 
there was no room for direction or co-ordination and yet, in all observable examples 
of the company, there was a function (management) whose job it was to direct and to 
co-ordinate. His solution to this puzzle was to suggest that there were costs of using 
the price mechanism and that these costs included those associated with establishing 
what prices existed in the market place, negotiating and closing contracts and then 
those costs associated with enforcing contracts. His argument became simply that 
transaction costs were both a necessary and sufficient explanation for the existence 
of the firm (Allen 2000, p. 895).  
 
Many researchers have taken this argument further by claiming that some transaction 
costs can be seen as contributing to the discussion on property rights. An example of 
this can be found in the development and protection of intellectual property – where 
the legal costs of establishing the ownership of intellectual property (such as the 
patents, trademarks and proprietary processes that might be found within the firm’s 
‘black box’) can be high but are essential if a business is to prevent others from using 
its proprietary research and development (Allen 2000, p. 893) and so eroding the 
firm’s competitive advantage. 
 
Following on from this argument, it can be seen that corporations exist because the 
internal costs of doing business (organisational shape, technology, management, 
marketing and legal services) are lower than would be the costs associated with 
obtaining the same support, by contract, in the market place. 
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The Coase Theorem can be summarized as ‘In the absence of transaction costs, the 
allocation of resources (within an enterprise) is independent of property rights’ 
(Allen 2000, p. 897). 
 
3.9.3.6.    Contract theory 
  
By drawing on the transaction cost theory outlined above, it can be seen that many 
activities of a corporation are based on contracts between parties (be they internal 
parties such as managers and other employees or external parties such as suppliers 
and customers). The firm is thus a nexus of contracts in which various constituents 
agree to carry out directions for an agreed remuneration (Lozano et al. 2015, p. 435). 
The contracts may be seen as a means of maximizing profits for shareholders. 
 
Criticisms of contract theory include that: 
 contracts are usually bilateral; 
 contracts are often incompletely specified and so run the risk of being vague, 
general and omitting the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders; 
 contracts between management and organised labour may lead to unforeseen 
outcomes for one or other of the parties; 
 the firm, markets and governments (regulatory agencies) may treat the contract 
differently; 
 there may be hidden or unrepresented social costs (e.g. ineffective addressing of 
corporate impacts on the environment); 
 the firm is treated as a black box that is supposed to meet marginal conditions 
with respect to inputs and outputs while maximizing profits; 
 technological and organisational aspects of production may be neglected; and 
 large corporations may use their size to negotiate unfair contracts (Lozano et al. 
2015, p. 435). 
 
3.9.3.7.    Principal/agency theory 
 
The classical understanding of a firm (company/corporation) is that of a business 
entity in which ownership (e.g. the shareholders) is separated from the direct 
75 
 
management of resources and restricted to receiving the profit (or nett excess of 
revenue over expenses) from the trading activities of the managers.  Such a view 
places the shareholders as the principals of the organisation and regards the 
managers as agents (Kantarelis 2007, p. 185). This understanding immediately raises 
questions such as: 
 How do the principals transfer their values and expectations to their agents? 
 How do the principals ensure that their agents faithfully implement these values 
and expectations and act in their (the principals’) best interests? and 
 How can the principals monitor the performance of their agents in a cost 
effective manner (particularly if the agents have an information advantage over 
the principals)? 
 
One of the major defects in this linear relationship is that the agent may look for 
short term benefits for the principals and neglect the possibility of better long term 
benefits (Lozano et al. 2015, p. 435). Baumol (1959) had earlier developed this 
approach as his ‘Revenue Maximization Hypothesis’ in which he suggested that, 
after minimum (or agreed) profits had been reached, managers might maximize sales 
(rather than profits) as increasing the size of the firm could give them increased 
benefits and status. 
 
3.9.3.8.   Resource based theory 
 
Resource based theory suggests that a corporation is a collection of productive 
resources that are innate to the corporation and that are either (i) tangible (plant, 
equipment, natural resources, finished goods and waste products; or (ii) human 
(skilled and unskilled labour, financial, technical and managerial staff) – intangible 
resources such as team skills and capabilities are also applicable (Lozano et al. 2015, 
p. 435). The bases of this view are that one corporation can then produce goods or 
offer services better than can another, that the emphasis is on reducing costs and that 
the company needs to develop its internal resources (including the transfer of 
knowledge between individuals) in order to create a competitive advantage. This 
resource based view considers the social and time dimensions of resource 
development but, in its original concept, did not consider environmental impacts. 
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The resources of a company that may lead to a competitive advantage (or, and 
perhaps more importantly, to competitive survival) can be described as being: (a) 
valuable; (b) rare; (c) inimitable; and (d) non-substitutable (Barney 1991, pp. 106-7). 
It is hard to use these adjectives to describe the coal and CSG resources of 
companies exploring within the Scenic Rim (particularly as those resources are not 
rare, their value is, as yet, unproven and they may, even in the intermediate term, be 
subject to substitution by other energy types). Therefore we need to look at the non-
physical assets of those companies to see if they have other resources that meet the 
attributes listed above. Based on the work of Baxt (2002), two possibly unique assets 
of any company could be its board of directors and their approach to corporate 
governance: for, as Duztas (2008, p. 18) stated ‘a good corporate governance 
structure is a working system for principled goal setting, effective decision making 
and appropriate monitoring of compliance and performance’. Udayasankar (2008, 
pp. 164-172) developed this thought further by suggesting that ‘boards of directors 
can be a key source of various resources based on human capital and social capital’. 
These resources are said to include advice and expertise, legitimacy and links to 
other organisations. Udayasankar (2008, pp. 164-172) also claimed that ‘The 
relationship between board capital and firm performance is well documented, 
thereby making the resource dependence view a key theory in corporate 
governance.’ Duztas (2008, pp. 39–40) extended this relationship further by quoting 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) ‘when an organisation appoints an individual to a board, 
it expects the individual will come to support the organisation, will concern himself 
with its problems, will favourably present it to others and will try to aid it’. Such 
assistance could improve organisational performance and increase returns to 
shareholders.  
 
Increasing the variety of people who serve on boards could be important as it would 
offer the opportunity to tap into a rich pool of talented candidates, help to add depth 
to existing skills and ideas and could bring the board closer to properly representing 
its stakeholders (Al-Jarah 2012, pp. 11-12). One source of variety at board level can 
be found in gender diversity and a Conference Board of Canada study suggested that 
‘those (corporations) with two or more women on the board were far more likely to 
be industry leaders in revenues and profits’ (Al-Jarah 2012, p. 12). Al-Jarah (2012, p. 
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15) also summarized other research findings (e.g. Burgess & Fallon (2003); Huse & 
Solberg (2006); and Ourcommunity.com.au (2007)) as suggesting: 
 
Many people believe that there are a range of qualities that only women can bring to 
a boardroom – things like better communication and consultation skills, a more 
‘caring’ attitude towards the organisation they are governing, a better knowledge of 
community issues and so on. 
 
Having women on the board also makes a strong statement about the organisation’s 
willingness to seek out and take into account the views of all of its stakeholders. 
 
 A summary of the human resources of the boards of companies exploring for coal or 
CSG within the Scenic Rim is given in Appendix 2. 
 
3.9.3.9.    Natural resource based theory 
 
In 1995, Hart proposed a variation of the Resource Based Theory that has become 
known as the Natural Resource Based Theory (View) of the firm – he claimed that 
such a view was necessary because traditional management theory ignored the 
constraints imposed on a firm by its natural environment (Hart 1995, p. 986). This 
theory gives a view of the firm that attributes its competitive advantage to its 
relationship with the natural environment. It also suggests that there are three 
interconnected strategies (pollution prevention, product stewardship and sustainable 
development) that underlie sustained competitive advantage (Hart 1995, p. 986). 
 
The initial competitive advantage of the companies that hold coal exploration 
permits (natural resource based) within the Scenic Rim is based on three very 
important premises as follows: 
 the coal has a proven potential for generating electricity (Smith 1999); 
 the existing, government granted, permits are exclusive and, while the companies 
hold onto their permits, no competitor can enter the market place; and 
 transport distances from the potential West Moreton mine sites to an existing 
coal export port are much less than are those in other potential Queensland and 
New South Wales mine sites (OGL 31 October 2012). 
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The extension of this initial competitive advantage into sustained competitive 
advantage will require that mining firms working within the Scenic Rim recognize 
and work very hard to implement a proposition advanced by Hart: sustainable 
development is dependent upon a firm’s capability in pollution prevention and 
product stewardship (Hart 1995, p 1006). A track record in either pollution 
prevention or product stewardship would be impossible to demonstrate within the 
Scenic Rim (given that all existing permits are merely for resource exploration) and 
the firms may have to demonstrate that their mining activities in other areas (other 
parts of Queensland, in other states or internationally) meet these criteria. 
 
Table 3.7 summarizes the components of Hart’s Natural Resource Based Theory and 
links them to issues that could lead to a sustained competitive advantage. 
 
TABLE 3.7: A natural resource based view of the firm 
 
 Strategic 
Capability 
Environmental     
Driving Force       
Key Resource Competitive Advantage 
Pollution 
prevention 
Minimize emissions, 
effluent and wastes 
Continuous 
improvement 
Lower costs 
Product 
stewardship 
Minimize life-cycle 
costs of products 
Stakeholder 
integration 
Pre-empt competitors 
Sustainable 
development 
Minimize 
environmental burden 
on firm growth and 
development 
Shared vision Future position 
Source: Hart 1995, p. 992 
  
3.9.3.10. Behavioural theory 
 
Most of the economics based TOTF identified above have profit maximization, 
perfect knowledge or a lack of internal resource allocation problems as a base. They 
also appear to exclude uncertainty from their consideration.  Simon (1955) and, 
much later, Cyert and March (1992) considered these bases for a TOTF inadequate 
and proposed a model that attempted to predict firm behaviour in respect to price, 
output and resource allocation. Their work became the base for behavioural theories 
of the firm. 
 
Many corporations (such as the public (and larger private) companies exploring for 
coal, CSG or other minerals within the Scenic Rim) are coalitions of individuals 
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and/or groups that include shareholders, managers, other employees, suppliers, 
customers and external stakeholders such as governments, communities and 
environmental protection groups. Many of these groups have differing values and 
expectations of a company and there is often conflict between stakeholder groups as 
to how the company should react in any given circumstance. Just as a company will 
have to develop (and defend) an order of priority amongst its stakeholders, it will be 
unable to satisfy all demands made upon it and both the company and its managers 
will have to develop goals that are compromises between the demands of its 
stakeholders (Ahuja 2007, p. 942). That is, a firm will attempt to satisfy all its 
stakeholders rather that maximize the returns to any particular group.  
 
Hornby (1995) found that almost fifty two percent of firms could be classed as 
satisfiers – that is once an objective had been achieved, there were no drivers to 
improve on this. Shipley (1981) had reached a similar finding over a decade earlier 
and also found that the firms in his study neither specified their targets nor the time 
over which they were achieved. 
 
Although the strategic goals of a company may be set by its shareholders (directors) 
and senior managers, those goals will be implemented (mostly) by secondary 
management levels and these managers will require guidance through financial and 
improvement (e.g. the health of the organisation) standards. However, the 
preparation of these standards and the monitoring of performance against them 
require the use of resources that might otherwise be directed towards the satisfaction 
of stakeholder (certainly shareholder) goals (Ahuja 2007, p. 942). Cyert and March 
(1992, p. 353) suggested that these costs would lead to a certain amount of 
‘organisational slack’ – such as payments that were higher than necessary (or prices 
that were lower than would otherwise be the case) in order to keep stakeholders 
(shareholders, managers, other employees and customers) involved with the firm. 
 
The behavioural theory of the firm thus contained four major components: (i) a 
coalition of groups; (ii) satisfying behaviour on the part of the firm and its senior 
managers; (iii) a value weighted decision making process; and (iv) a degree of 
organisational slack. It gives reasonable insights into goal formation, decision 
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making and resource allocation within a firm, but many critics question its value as a 
means of predicting the behaviour of firms (Ahuja 2007, p. 944). 
 
3.9.3.11. Stakeholder theory (including Stockholder theory) 
 
Stakeholder theory can be described as being a conceptual framework of business 
ethics and organizational management that addresses moral and ethical values in the 
management of business or other organizations (BusinessDictionary.com n.d.). The 
theory suggests that the purpose of a business is to create as much value as possible 
for all stakeholders. In order to succeed and be successful over time, executives must 
keep the interests of customers, suppliers, employees, communities and other 
stakeholders aligned and going in the same direction (Financial Times Lexicon n.d.). 
 
There are two major components of stakeholder theory. The first relates to the largest 
group of internal stakeholders (shareholders) (and is often treated as a separate 
theory) and the second mostly relates to external stakeholders (such as communities 
and environmental protection groups). Pfarrer (2010, p. 86) described these 
components as follows: 
 
… shareholder theory emanates from an economic perspective, focussing on the 
firm’s purpose of creating wealth for its owners while minimising the importance of 
the firm’s interaction with its other constituents and its role in society. … 
stakeholder theory broadens the first perspective, recognising the importance of 
wealth creation as well as the firm’s relationship with multiple constituent groups – 
shareholders, creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, regulators and local 
communities – and impact on society at large. 
 
Hartman (2011, p. 89) attempted to combine both theory sets (shareholder and 
stakeholder) when he suggested that ‘most would say that business ought to be an 
engine of general prosperity, though they would also agree that managers should not 
make every attempt with an eye to improving general prosperity’. 
 
Freeman (1984, p. 46) described stakeholders as being ‘any group or individual who 
can affect or be affected by the achievement of an organisation’s objectives’ and 
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Werhane (2011, pp. 115-6) developed a model by which the stakeholders 
surrounding a firm could be assigned to primary and secondary categories. The 
primary group included communities (such as Beaudesert and Croftby) and the 
secondary group included community based groups (such as KTSRS).  Wilburn and 
Wilburn (2011, pp 9-11) enlarged this understanding by dividing external 
stakeholders into vested and non-vested categories.  Vested stakeholders (such as 
landowners) would have both a voice and a vote in proceedings but non-vested 
stakeholders (community based organisation such as KTSRS) would only have a 
voice. (However, Wilburn and Wilburn (2011) do recognise that this voice may be 
powerful and influential when amplified by the media and the internet.). Other bases 
for stakeholder recognition exist and Xstrata Coal, in the Social Impact Management 
Plan for its Wandoan Project used an approach based on: (i) the level of impact that 
the project may have on the stakeholder; (ii) the level of influence that the 
stakeholder might be able to exert on the project; and (iii) the level of interest that 
the stakeholder might exhibit in the project (Xstrata 2007, pp. 16-19).  
 
It is worth noting that these approaches presuppose that the company is the only 
entity able to ‘recognise’ stakeholders and that external stakeholders have no ability 
to ‘identify’ themselves and to independently raise their interests and concerns. Once 
the stakeholders in a project have been recognised and some form of ranking applied 
to their values and needs, it becomes possible for a firm to apply a strategy towards 
the satisfaction of those needs.  Friedman and Miles (2006 p. 162) developed a 
ladder of stakeholder engagement and management that contains twelve levels of 
engagement that could be applied to mining company/community interaction within 
the Scenic Rim.  The levels of ‘management’ that they outline range from 
manipulation of stakeholders to stakeholder control of events. The degrees of power 
that they give to stakeholders range from non-participation (with stakeholders just 
being the recipients of data) through some involvement (with stakeholders having 
some decision making capacity over specific events) to a high degree of stakeholder 
power over the overall project.   
 
For the purposes of this thesis, stakeholder theory is held to be an all inclusive term 
and to include both major sub-sets outlined above. 
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Freeman (n.d., p. 47) later suggested that there may need to be changes made to 
corporate legislation so as to ensure that the rights of all stakeholders were 
recognised and protected. He suggested that such changes could be based on three 
principles as follows: 
 the stakeholder enabling principle – Corporations shall be managed in the 
interests of all stakeholders, defined as employees, financiers, customers and 
communities. 
 the principle of director responsibility – Directors of the corporation shall have a 
duty of care to use reasonable judgement to define and direct the affairs of the 
corporation in accordance with the stakeholder enabling principle. 
 the principle of stakeholder recourse – Stakeholders may bring an action against 
the directors for failure to perform the required duty of care. 
 
The Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Parliament of Australia 2001) currently does 
not reflect these principles: but it could be claimed that it does not prevent the first 
principle (and, therefore, possibly the second) being acted upon.  
 
Stakeholder theory is not without its critics and Weiss (n.d., p. 1) suggested that 
there are serious questions that can be raised concerning the utility and validity of 
any moral conclusions or prescriptions that it offers. He suggested ‘cracks’ in the 
theory (Weiss n.d., pp. 1-7) that call its validity and utility into doubt: viz 
 conceptual confounds - The terms enterprise and corporation are used 
interchangeably when they are two different concepts. A business enterprise 
could be (and in most cases is) a sole trader activity where the owner is in 
complete control of the business and both moral and legal responsibility lie with 
that owner. On the other hand, a corporation is an artificial entity whereby a 
group of people own the business and, although the corporation is a legal entity, 
it is not a natural person and cannot hold any moral responsibility in its own 
right. 
 the idea of a social contract for business – If there is a social contract for business 
in a capitalist society, it lies in the provision of rights and institutional 
arrangements that support the creation of enterprises and in that the owners who 
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have created the business have an exclusive moral claim on the benefits produced 
by that business. 
 the general applicability of Stakeholder Theory – Because Stakeholder Theory 
does not make a clear distinction between enterprises and corporations, it 
dramatically overstates the separation of ownership and control and generalizes 
from corporations to enterprises. 
 ownership and property rights – Stakeholder Theory requires arguing that the 
claims of all stakeholders surrounding an enterprise are legitimate in that they 
have a comparable status to the claims of owners which are based on property 
rights. Stakeholder Theory argues that the property rights of owners are eroding 
and that there are multiple legitimate claims on the business – none of which 
have priority over any other. 
 
3.9.3.12. Evolutionary firm theory 
 
The Evolutionary Theory considers the firm to be motivated by profit but differs 
from neo-classical theory in that the firm is not assumed to be profit maximizing. 
Rather, the theory suggests that the evolutionary (and profitable) corporation will 
drive less profitable competitors out of business (Lozano et al. 2015, p. 435). 
Proponents of the theory further suggest that this ‘survival of the fittest’ approach 
does not mean that the firm that does survive is the most ruthless, corrupt or 
unethical or that the long term survival of any firm is guaranteed (Lozano et al. 2015, 
p. 435). According to Holzl (2005) this theory can help to understand industrial 
dynamics (e.g. routines and behaviour) and the cognitive nature of the firm (e.g. 
knowledge development, processing and storage). 
 
Frederick (2004, pp. 147–149) described the evolutionary firm as follows: 
  
The firm has organic and non-organic parts but is not itself organic or genic. The 
firm’s organic core is a coalition – an alliance, a collective, a team – of biological 
agents (i.e. people) who act collectively and symbolically as an adaptive unit, 
displaying a suite of organic behaviours and interacting with the environment as do 
all organisms. 
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Frederick (2004) identified the five core functions of the evolutionary firm as being: 
(i) motivator/driver; (ii) innovator/generator; (iii) organiser/co-ordinator; (iv) 
enabler/strategizer; and (v) moralizer/valuator. He then suggested that a careful 
examination and delineation of these functions offers a framework for enquiry into 
the moral behaviour of firms. 
 
There is one company exploring for and developing coal within the Scenic Rim that 
could be categorised as being evolutionary and that is the New Hope Corporation 
Limited (NHC). NHC began as an underground coal miner in the Bundamba section 
of the West Moreton Coal Field and became a horizontally integrated miner when it 
expanded into open cut mining at Jeebropilly. Downstream vertical integration began 
when the company acquired a bulk coal export terminal on the Brisbane River and 
the evolutionary growth of NHC began when it realized that the bulk loading facility 
was of interest to others and expanded its capacity. This learning and growth in 
different directions continued when NHC acquired a significant interest in Arrow 
Energy NL – a major player in the then embryonic CSG industry in Queensland. The 
evolution of NHC into a diversified energy company continued when it bought the 
Bridgeport Energy Group  - and so entered into oil exploration and production. 
Innovation gained pace when NHC invested in coal to liquids research and started to 
build a pilot conversion plant at its Jeebropilly site. Innovation also continued when 
NHC began a project to demonstrate that rehabilitated land at its Acland mine (north 
of Toowoomba) could produce cattle at least as profitably as could nearby unmined 
land. NHC has always held a major crossholding of shares in its own major 
shareholder (Washington H Soul Pattison) and annually receives a significant cash 
flow from this and other investments. Not all of these diversifications have been long 
lasting or successful (and this is always a risk for evolutionary companies). NHC 
sold out of Arrow Energy when that company was bought by Royal Dutch Shell plc 
and PetroChina Ltd and closed its CTL pilot plant when no commercial application 
could be found for the research (NHC 2015). 
 
The NHC 2015 Annual Report showed that its net profit for the year resulted from 
significant income from its investments, a small profit on its coal sales and handling 
activities and a loss on its oil based operations (NHC 2015 Annual Report and 
Financial Statements). While many of its competitors have ceased operation, NHC 
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continues to trade profitably (even if at a declining rate of profit) and so is an 
reasonable example of the characteristics of an evolutionary firm identified by 
Lozano et al. (2015) and Frederick (2004). 
3.9.3.13.  Corporate sustainability theory 
  
As described in Section 3.5 of this thesis, the social contract between society, 
government and business is evolutionary in nature and responds fairly rapidly to 
changing values within communities. It is not surprising, therefore, that researchers 
should look for similar, or at least complementary, changes within the TOTF. 
Lozano et al. (2015) set out to explore the relationship between existing TOTF and 
the concept of corporate sustainability (including both economic and environmental 
sustainability) and rapidly concluded that, although existing theories covered 
sustainability in part, they did not provide an extensive coverage of corporate 
response to such issues. Accordingly, they proposed a new Sustainability Oriented 
Theory of the Firm as follows: 
 
The firm is a profit generating entity in a state of constant evolution. This entity is a 
system comprised of resources and networks of relationships with stakeholders. The 
firm’s employees are responsible to represent the firm, manage its resources and 
empower its stakeholders so that the firm complies with laws, maintains its ‘licence 
to operate’, increases its competitive advantage and better contributes to foster the 
evolution of more sustainable societies by holistically addressing the economic, 
social and time dimensions (Lozano et al. 2015, p. 440). 
  
This new theory has an advantage in that it builds on the profit oriented thinking of 
Friedman (1962) (rather than either ignoring it or trying to set it aside) and sets out 
to integrate agency theory, transaction cost theory, resource based theory, 
stakeholder theory and the evolutionary approach postulated by Frederick (2004)  as 
well as recent changes in social contract thinking. An evaluation of this new 
approach is undertaken in Appendix 5 of this paper. 
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3.9.3.14. New Institutional theory 
 
Institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social 
structures. It considers structure, rules and routines and does not concentrate on just 
stability and order but examines conflict and change (Scott 2004, p. 408-414). A 
knowledge of the theory could, therefore, contribute to a greater understanding of the 
resilient community concept outlined in Section 3.4 and to the evolutionary firm 
approach of Frederick (2004) outlined in Section 3.9.3.12.  
 
Powell and DiMaggio (1991) suggested that ‘new institutionalism’ had quickly 
moved away from the economics base of the neo-classical theory of the firm (Figure 
3.1) (and, hence of its derivatives) and was looking for cognitive and cultural 
explanations of organisational phenomena. In particular, they suggested that ‘new 
institutionalism’ set out to examine matters that could not be claimed to be the direct 
consequences of the attributes or motives of individuals within the ‘institution’. This 
places ‘new institutionalism’ some distance from the Contract and Natural Resource 
Based theories outlined in Sections 3.9.3.6 and  3.9.3.9 respectively, but not that far 
from the Managerial (Section 3.9.3.4), Principal/Agency (Section 3.9.3.7) and 
Behavioural (Section 3.9.3.10) theories. The reasoning behind this claim is that 
although many of the actions attributed to principals and managers are based on the 
motives of those individuals, the theories do have a base in organisational culture. 
 
Scott (2004) also claimed that organisations must conform to the rules and beliefs 
prevailing in the environment and this equates to companies needing to be aware of 
changes that are occurring in the local social contract (see Section 3.5). 
 
Because New Institutional theory relates closely to other theories, as outlined above, 
it is not considered in the analysis undertaken in Appendix 5. It may, however be re-
examined as input to the PhD program to be undertaken later. 
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3.10 Gaps in the literature 
 
Each of the TOTF identified in Section 3.9 contains gaps in its coverage of the 
reasons for the existence of corporations, in the understanding of why such 
organisations act the way that they do that it presents and about why a firm is 
structured the way that it is. These gaps are not detailed here, but emerge fully in the 
analysis of the TOTF given in Appendix 5 and in the discussion in Chapter 7. An 
understanding of these gaps is critical to developing the enhanced TOTF suggested 
as an objective in Section 1.6. 
 
3.11 Summary of the chapter 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to identify and examine theories that could lead 
to a better understanding of the issues behind the problem identified in Section 1.4 
and so lead to a response to the Research Question posed in Section 1.6.  The 
theoretical background to resilient communities and their representation, the social 
contract between society, government and business and corporate ethics, governance 
and sustainability reporting has been examined in some depth: as have theories 
relating to a social licence to operate and conflict resolution. This work has created a 
background against which theories of the firm have also been reviewed. Several gaps 
in the current literature have been identified and this has established a base on which 
a research philosophy and methodology can be built. This is explored in Chapter 4. 
 
 
4. RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Introduction to this chapter 
 
The scenario behind this thesis is one of reality (certainty) and uncertainty. The 
existence of coal and CSG deposits is real (Sections 2.6 and 2.7), but their 
commercial value, at this stage, is uncertain. The likely impacts of exploration and 
mining on the communities of the Scenic Rim and their agricultural base are also 
uncertain – but could be large and long lasting. Similarly, the ability of small 
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communities to have officers of mining companies (who are faced with balancing the 
expenditure of shareholders’ funds against uncertain returns from possible coal/CSG 
developments) consider their values and development desires (as against those 
officers’ fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders) is equally uncertain. It is these 
questions of reality (certainty) and uncertainty (Zikmund 1997, p. 36) that shape the 
philosophy, methodology and strategies that drive the research behind this thesis. 
 
Exploratory research against the problem outlined in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3) 
recognised that a considerable array of data relating to community values and 
development desires, mining exploration permits and company ethics, governance 
and development intentions was already available in the public realm. The existence 
of this documentary, secondary, data (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009, pp. 258-
259; Zikmund 1997, pp. 46-47, 50-51) suggests that qualitative analysis is an 
appropriate approach and this technique forms the base for the analysis and 
discussion undertaken in Chapter 7. The use of qualitative data requires the 
development of a conceptual model to underpin any analysis (Saunders et al. 2009, 
p. 482) and such a model is formulated in Chapter 5. 
 
4.2. Objectives of the chapter 
 
The objectives of this chapter are: 
 to identify  the philosophy, methodology and strategies appropriate to the 
research undertaken against the Research Question identified in Section 1.4; and 
 to identify the data collection and analytical techniques to be used to produce 
meaningful findings against the contributions to theory and practice outlined in 
Section 1.6. 
 
4.3. Structure of the chapter 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: 
 Section 4.1 provides an introduction to the chapter; 
 Section 4.2 develops the objectives for the chapter; 
 Section 4.3 outlines the structure of the chapter; 
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 Section 4.4 develops the philosophy behind the research approach; 
 Section 4.5 outlines the strategies and techniques of the research methodology; 
 Section 4.6 identifies the databases used in archival research; 
 Section 4.7 outlines the approach to data collection, analysis and presentation:  
 Section 4.8 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
4.4. Research philosophy 
 
The research project is based on realities – the natural environment, the mineral 
deposits, human habitation, indigenous culture and the present uses of land exist 
independently of any person’s thoughts or beliefs. What is interpreted, through social 
conditioning, is the value placed on each of these items that might cause an 
individual (or a company) to value one more highly than any other. This suggests 
that realism, with a touch of interpretivism, might be an appropriate philosophy on 
which to develop a research design (Saunders et al. 2009, p. 119). The present 
conflict between communities and companies suggests that there can only be a ‘win-
lose’ outcome. However, that expectation may be based on a set of world views and 
upbringing (Saunders et al. 2009, p.119) that, if changed, could give a different 
result. It is possible that something closer to a ‘win-win’ outcome is achievable and 
such a statement of axiology is in keeping with the realism paradigm. The focus of 
the research behind this thesis has been on observing phenomena that provide 
credible data and facts – always realising that the observed phenomena could be 
open to different interpretations (Saunders et al. 2009, p. 119). 
 
There are different ways of describing philosophical paradigms and Healy and Perry 
(2000, pp. 118-126) suggested one that used positivism, critical theory, 
constructivism and realism as bases for a research philosophy. Their description of 
the ontology of realism – ‘realism is “real” but only imperfectly and probabilistically 
apprehensible’ – fits the research project behind this thesis well. The conflict 
recognised in Chapter 1 is real and it poses a research problem that deals with 
‘complex social science phenomena involving reflective people’ (Healy & Perry 
2000, p. 122). As such, it forms a perfect base for research undertaken within the 
realism paradigm. 
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4.5. Research methodology (strategies and techniques) 
 
The strategies and techniques used in the research that underlies this thesis are 
consistent with the philosophy described in Section 4.4 and are also dependent on 
the Research Question (Section 1.4) and its objectives. These objectives are 
described in Table 4.1. 
 
TABLE 4.1: The Research Question, its objectives, data sources and       
associated strategies and techniques 
 
The Research 
Question 
Objectives and Data 
Sources 
Methodology  
(Strategies and techniques) 
What 
responsibilities do 
companies 
exploring for coal 
and coal seam gas 
within the Scenic 
Rim of South East 
Queensland have 
to the 
communities of 
the region that are 
in addition to 
those 
responsibilities 
that they have 
towards their 
shareholders? 
1. To identify the communities 
of the region and their values 
and development desires. 
The data required was mainly 
obtained from documents    
produced by relevant Local    
Government Authorities 
(LGAs). 
The strategy used was archival 
research using LGA maps and 
Community Plans to identify 
locations, values and development 
desires. These details were 
triangulated against material from 
newspapers and industry journals. 
1. 2. To identify the companies  
2. exploring for coal or CSG 
within the region and their 
values and development 
intentions. 
The data required was obtained  
from Queensland Government,  
ASIC and ASX reports and 
from individual company 
reports and web sites. 
The strategy used was archival 
research using Queensland 
Government mining reports, ASIC 
reports on corporate registrations, 
ASX reports on listed companies 
and company annual and quarterly 
reports and web sites. The data 
obtained was triangulated against 
material contained in newspapers 
and industry journals.  
3. 3. To identify the nature and  
4. sources of the conflict that 
exists between the 
communities and the 
companies. 
The data required was obtained  
from LGA Community Plans  
and web sites, newspaper 
reports and from publications 
issued by CSIRO and several 
universities (SCU and UCQ).  
The strategy used was archival 
research using LGA documents and 
web sites and CSIRO and 
university publications. The data 
obtained was verified by personal 
contact with relevant officers and 
by triangulation against newspaper 
and other news media reports. 
4. To identify the community 
based organisations that have   
represented community values   
and development desires to   
mining companies and to the  
wider community and to assess  
the effectiveness of their 
actions. 
The strategy proposed was to 
compare names and activity lists 
obtained from respondents during 
field testing of questionnaires now 
to be submitted to the USQ Ethics 
Committee. This data was then to 
be triangulated against media 
reports and organisational web 
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The Research 
Question 
Objectives and Data 
Sources 
Methodology  
(Strategies and techniques) 
The data required was obtained    
from media reports, industry  
journals and organisational 
web sites. 
sites. 
The questionnaire was abandoned 
as the test respondents showed 
almost no knowledge of CBO 
activities. 
 
5. If the community based 
organisations identified are not 
effective in bringing about the 
development of the 
communities that they 
represent, to establish the 
characteristics of an 
organisation that might be able 
to achieve such outcomes. 
The data required was sourced 
from organisational web sites, 
company reports (regarding the 
surrender of ATPs), media 
reports and trial interviews. 
Claims of success in limiting or 
overturning company decisions 
regarding continued exploration of 
ATPs held within the Scenic Rim 
were compared with relevant 
statements in company reports and 
government documents.  
Literature relating to resilient 
communities and the effectiveness 
of community based organisations 
was reviewed to establish the 
characteristics of an organisation 
that might be more effective in 
achieving desired community 
outcomes than are the present 
groups. 
6. To identify the theories of 
the firm that might describe the 
reasons for the existence, 
structure and operation of the 
corporations identified against 
Objective 2 and, if existing 
theories do not assist the 
development of such an 
understanding, to recognise the 
principles that might drive the 
development on an enhanced 
theory that might lead to such 
an understanding. 
The theoretical background 
was drawn from books, 
published articles and papers 
obtained from the CSIRO, 
USQ and other university 
libraries as well as from 
academic papers downloaded 
through a web search engine 
(Google).  
The strategy used was based on a 
key word search of published texts 
and journals. A list of TOTF was 
created and the characteristics of 
each identified. Each TOTF was 
then assessed for its utility in 
explaining company actions within 
the Scenic Rim and shortcomings 
recognised. 
From these shortcomings, the 
characteristics of an enhanced 
TOTF are proposed and a 
recommendation for further work 
developed. 
Google was used to recover copies 
of papers recognised from other 
sources as it was frequently quicker 
to use this method than to rely on 
obtaining copies through the USQ 
Library. 
 
 
4.6. Archival sources used in data collection 
  
The archival research behind this thesis accessed and manually perused the 
following databases: 
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 The Department of Natural Resources and Mines Local Area Mining Permit 
Report – All resources for each of the local government authority areas relevant 
to the project was used to identify mining tenement types and numbers. This 
database was compared with a map of Scenic Rim coal and coal seam gas 
permits extracted from the Department of Natural Resources and Mining’s 
Interactive Resource and Tenure Map database. 
 The location of the mining tenements was confirmed from maps of 
Environmentally Sensitive Areas – Mining Activities from the Queensland 
Department of Environment and Heritage Protection’s data base. 
 The identity of the permit holder and details of permit conditions were obtained 
from the Exploration Permit Public Enquiry Report for each mining tenure from 
the Department of Natural Resources and Mines. 
 Details of private companies identified in the Exploration Permit Public Enquiry 
Reports were extracted from the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) database Current and Historical Company Extracts. 
 Details of public companies identified in the Exploration Permit Public Enquiry 
Reports and in the ASIC searches were downloaded from the ASX database 
Company Research and Company Information. 
 Details of individual company quarterly, half yearly and annual reports were 
obtained from the ASX databases given above and supported by additional data 
(e.g. presentations to investors) obtained from individual company websites (e.g. 
Carabella Resources Limited – http://www.carabellaresources.com.au).). 
 Details of community locations, values and development desires were extracted 
from Local Government Authority web sites. 
 The identity of community based and representative organisations was 
established through a review of newspaper databases (particularly those of the 
Courier-Mail, The Australian, the Australian Financial Review, the Fassifern 
Guardian and the Queensland Times.  The relevance of each organisation to 
community/mining company interaction within the Scenic Rim was confirmed 
by a search of relevant websites (e.g. the Keep The Scenic Rim Scenic site 
http://www.keepthescenicrimscenic.com and the Quarry Action Group website 
http://www.quarryactiongroup.org.au).         
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4.7.  Data collection, analysis and presentation 
 
The above archival sources and academic papers (for the theoretical background) 
were obtained in either hard copy or electronic form (over a period of three years) 
and each was manually inspected for material that contributed to an understanding of 
the Objectives set out in Table 4.1. Relevant material was then assembled (in precis 
form) in a searchable data base using Microsoft Word and Excel. Material from this 
database was accessed by key word searches as required. Where Queensland 
Government, ASX and company reports were available on a quarterly, half yearly or 
yearly basis, they were accessed each time they were published. The index of each 
issue of relevant journals (e.g. Journal of Economic and Social Policy and Strategic 
Management Journal) was manually searched for relevant key words and articles 
were obtained electronically (or in hard copy from the USQ Library) as required. 
 
The above data was manually compared with (and its usefulness assessed against) 
material obtained from an ongoing search of newspapers circulating within the 
Scenic Rim and from industry journals (e.g. the Queensland Government Mining 
Journal and Mining Australia). 
 
Research into the social contract between society, government and companies and 
into theories of the firm was undertaken in two stages. The first stage was based on 
an extensive literature review relating to the nature of the social contract that might 
exist within the broader community (but particularly within the Scenic Rim). The 
second stage was based on a similarly extensive review of the literature relating to 
TOTF and concluded with the development of a model for evaluating the utility of 
the theories identified. 
 
Summaries of data relevant to mining tenements and companies exploring for coal or 
CSG within the Scenic Rim are presented in Appendices 1 and 2 and data about the 
values and ethics of these companies is presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Data 
concerning the values and development desires of the communities recognised in 
Section 1.3 is detailed in Appendix 3. Thirteen groups of TOTF are reviewed in 
Section 3.9 and a model for evaluating their utility is prepared in Section 6.11. The 
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theories are analysed against this model in Appendix 5 and a summary of this 
analysis is presented in Section 7.10.  From this analysis, a proposal to develop an 
enhanced theory of the firm is presented in Chapter 10. 
 
4.8. Summary of the chapter 
  
The research paradigm most relevant to this thesis is realism with a touch of 
interpretivism (Section 4.4). The data readily available is documentary and archival 
in nature and this suggests a qualitative approach to data analysis (Section 4.1) - 
which fits comfortably within the realism paradigm. As the data available comes 
from several sources (Section 4.6) triangulation (such as the comparison of material 
from media sources with that from CSIRO and company reports) is used to develop 
a consistent narrative. Much of the data can be succinctly presented in tabular form 
and this approach is used extensively in the text and the appendices.  This qualitative 
approach requires a conceptual base and such a model is developed in Chapter 5. 
 
Software such as Nvivo can be used to enhance data presentation. However, the need 
in this thesis is for a tabular form of compilation and presentation and software that 
could give a pictorial representation is not used. 
 
The conceptual model that arises from this methodology is explained in Chapter 5. 
 
5. THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
5.1. Introduction to this chapter 
 
The qualitative approach that underlies this thesis requires the formulation of a 
model that describes the relationships between the components of the problem 
described in Section 1.3. These components are (i) the region described as the Scenic 
Rim; (ii) the companies that are exploring for carbon based minerals within the 
Scenic Rim; and (iii) the communities of the region.  
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5.2. Objectives of the chapter 
 
The objectives of this chapter are: 
 to identify the major components of the problem described in Section 1.3; 
 to locate the interaction between the parties to the conflict; and  
 to present a model that describes the relationship between the parties to the 
conflict. 
 
5.3. Structure of the chapter 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: 
 Section 5.1 provides an introduction to the chapter; 
 Section 5.2 develops the objectives of the chapter; 
 Section 5.3 outlines the structure of the chapter; 
 Section 5.4 defines the region referred to as the Scenic Rim; 
 Section 5.5 describes the companies exploring for coal or CSG within the Scenic 
Rim and provides a base for Appendices 1 and 2; 
 Section 5.6 describes the base from which the communities within the Scenic 
Rim are identified; 
 Section 5.7 identifies the bases for conflict between the communities (Section 
5.6) and the companies exploring for carbon based minerals (Section 5.5); 
 Section 5.8 develops the conceptual model against which qualitative research 
was undertaken; and 
 Section 5.9 presents a summary of the chapter. 
 
5.4. The Scenic Rim 
 
There are two descriptions of the Scenic Rim that could form the base for this thesis: 
but neither encompasses the geographic area described in Section 1.1. The first 
description is that of the area administered by the Scenic Rim Regional Council – an 
area that covers less than one third of the region being considered. The second 
description is – ‘… South East Queensland’s chain of mountains, plateaux and peaks 
to the west and south of Brisbane’ (visitscenicrim.com.au n.d.)  and this region 
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includes all the local government areas mentioned in Section 1.1 except for that part 
of the Somerset Regional Council south of Harlin. The concept of the Scenic Rim 
used in this work is thus much larger than is encompassed by either of the two 
descriptions above and also allows inclusion of the whole area of the A for coal and 
CSG that are held within the more narrowly defined SRRC area. 
 
The Scenic Rim is more than just the geographic area in which the research has been 
undertaken. It also helps to identify the corporate ethics being applied and the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities being undertaken by several of the 
companies identified in Appendix 1. All of the public companies identified in this 
appendix operate on a national or international scale and their approaches to 
community consultation and engagement in their other areas of operation are 
different to their approaches within the Scenic Rim. 
  
5.5. The companies exploring for coal, CSG or other minerals 
 
In Queensland, both individuals and companies can hold exploration permits 
(Business Queensland n.d.; Department of Natural Resources and Mines 2014, p. 2). 
Because: (i) all coal and petroleum exploration permits held within the Scenic Rim 
are held by companies; and (ii) an objective of this thesis is to examine the 
implications of the conflict between communities and companies for an evolving 
TOTF, any additional conflict that could exist between communities and individuals 
is ignored. The types of companies that could hold exploration permits include 
limited liability (public) companies, proprietary limited (private) companies, no 
liability companies and government owned corporations. Although coal and 
petroleum exploration permits held within the Scenic Rim are only held by public 
and private companies, the discussion in Chapter 7 will draw implications for all 
forms of companies. 
 
5.6. The communities of the region 
 
Many meanings can be given to the term ‘community’. Examples taken from the 
Merriam-Webster (n.d.) online dictionary include: 
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 social activity (fellowship); 
 a group of people who have the same interest (a community of interest); 
 a group linked by common policy; 
 a group of nations; 
 society at large; 
 an interacting population of various kinds of individuals in a common location; 
and 
 a group of people with a common characteristic or interest living together within 
a larger society. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, a community is considered to be a group of people 
with a common characteristic or interest living together within a larger society. This 
definition allows easy recognition and description of the more than thirty cities, 
towns, villages and neighbourhoods that form the bases for residential, business, 
farming and environmental activity within the Scenic Rim. This definition is more 
descriptive than that of the ‘Statistical Areas’ used by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) (ABS July 2001, p.1) and is also in line with a University of 
Queensland web site (aboutqueenslandplaces.com.au) that uses the terms cities, 
towns and villages (University of Queensland n.d.). 
 
5.7. Conflict between communities and exploration companies 
 
The conflict between the communities and the companies arises because: 
(i) The companies, individual residents and the communities hold legal rights to 
the occupation and use of the same land for purposes that could be mutually 
exclusive. 
(ii) The values and development desires of the communities and individual 
residents are often quite different from the values and development intentions 
of the companies. 
(iii) Various Queensland political parties have made promises regarding 
resolution of the conflict but, once in office, have not delivered against those 
promises. 
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5.8. A conceptual framework for the research project 
These concepts and the conflict that has arisen from the interaction between them are 
illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
 
FIGURE 5.1: A conceptual framework for the research project 
              
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.9. Summary of the chapter 
This chapter has: (i) described the major parties to the conflict over mineral 
exploration that exists within the Scenic Rim; and (ii) identified the sources of that 
conflict. It also presents a conceptual framework on which analysis and discussion 
could take place. 
 
Findings from the research based on this conceptual model are summarized in 
Chapter 6. 
 
 
The Scenic Rim 
(see Section 5.4) 
  Exploration 
   Companies  
(see Section 5.5) 
Communities 
and their  
representatives 
(see Section 5.6) 
      Conflict recognised from: 
• an implicit social contract; 
• a social licence to operate; 
• stakeholder theory; 
• corporate ethics/corporate social responsibility; 
• resilient communities. 
(see Section 5.7) 
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6. FINDINGS 
 
6.1.  Introduction to this chapter 
 
Chapter 1 identifies the problem that drives the Research Question behind this thesis 
and Chapter 2 outlines the possibility that commercial discoveries of carbon based 
minerals might be made within the Scenic Rim. Chapter 3 then identifies the 
theoretical base for the research undertaken and recognises gaps in the literature that 
the research addresses. This chapter summarises the findings of the work undertaken  
against the Research Question and thus acts as the base for the contributions to 
theory and practice that a proposed PhD program will make. 
 
The major findings to emerge from the discussion in Chapter 7 are: 
1. The responsibilities that the companies exploring for coal and CSG within the 
Scenic Rim have towards the communities of the region include: (i) establishing 
effective communication; (ii) the early passage of information about the nature 
and scope of their project; (iii) the building of trust; (iv) the creation of a 
mechanism by which community responses can be captured and incorporated 
into project planning and implementation; and (v) explaining how the benefits of 
the project will be shared and potentially adverse impacts modified. These 
responsibilities are in addition to the fiduciary responsibilities that the companies 
have to their shareholders and could be used, by the companies, as strategies for 
community engagement. 
2. The CBOs active within the region have been more effective in raising awareness 
in the wider society than in bringing about local community development 
desires. However, there may be a role for a different type of organisation to play 
in raising awareness of and in representing all community values (not just the 
anti-mining values) across the whole Scenic Rim. 
3. The general social contract between society, government and business must be 
modified to include recognition of local values relating to the preservation of 
both a rural lifestyle and agricultural production and the protection of limited 
groundwater and surface water resources. 
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4. Existing theories of the firm have limited utility in explaining the reasons for the 
existence of corporations exploring for coal or CSG within the Scenic Rim, their 
structure or the reasons that they behave the way that they do. 
 
6.2. Objective of the chapter 
 
The objective of the chapter is to summarize the findings of the research behind this 
thesis. These findings are discussed, in detail, in Chapter 7. 
 
6.3. Structure of the chapter 
 
The findings of the research are extensive and are presented as follows: 
 Section 6.1. gives an introduction to the contents of this chapter; 
 Section 6.2. introduces the objectives of the chapter; 
 Section 6.3. describes the structure of the chapter; 
 Sections 6.4. summarises a response to the research question; 
 Section 6.5. identifies the sources of the conflict between communities and 
companies exploring for coal and CSG within the Scenic Rim; 
 Sections 6.6. and 6.7. cover the values and development intentions of the 
communities within the Scenic Rim and of the companies exploring for coal, 
CSG and other minerals within the region; 
 Section 6.8. briefly outlines the role of community based organisations in this 
conflict; 
 Sections 6.9.and 6.10. identify the nature of the social contract that might exist 
between the communities and the companies and suggest a possible model for 
community/company engagement that might more equitably distribute both the 
benefits and disadvantages of mining between the communities and the 
companies; 
 Sections 6.11. presents a model for evaluating the utility of theories of the firm 
and draws implications from the conflict between the communities and the 
companies for the continued evolution of such theories; and 
 Section 6.12. Identifies the implications of the findings for the theory of the firm. 
 
101 
 
6.4. A response to the Research Question 
 
This section of the thesis summarizes material discussed in Section 8.4. 
 
The fiduciary responsibility of Australian company directors and officers towards the 
primary internal stakeholders (shareholders) in their company is clearly identified in 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Parliament of Australia 2001).  Whilst this Act is silent 
on any responsibility towards external stakeholders (such as communities), there is 
nothing in it that specifically excludes consideration of the needs of these groups. 
This silence could be fortuitous as it allows recognition of (and actions in accord 
with) the proposition that well managed stakeholder relationships can confer a 
competitive advantage on a company. Such a consideration would enable recognition 
of changes in the social contract between society, government and corporations that 
are taking place in areas such as the Scenic Rim and promote awareness of the 
implications of these changes for the longevity of the firm. Such changes do not try 
to set aside the fiduciary responsibility of company directors and officers but seek to 
expand this responsibility to include the needs of all stakeholders. These additional 
responsibilities would include: (i) the establishment of effective communication 
between the company and the communities; (ii) the early passage of information 
about the scope of the intended project; (iii) the building of trust between 
communities and the company; (iv) extending the understanding of (and respect for) 
the rights, working operations and existing development intentions of landowners by 
company officers and contractors; (v) the creation of a model by which community 
responses can be incorporated into company decision; and (vi) explanation as to how 
benefits of the project will be shared and potentially adverse impacts modified.  
These responsibilities are those that the communities would like to see honoured. 
From a company point of view, they could be seen as strategies on which 
negotiations for a SLTO could be based. The implementation of such strategies 
might turn communities from opponents of a project into (at least) modest supporters 
and so contribute to the long term sustainability of the project, the environment and 
the company.  
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6.5. The origins of conflict 
 
As in many mining areas, the conflict between communities and companies 
exploring for coal and CSG within the Scenic Rim has its origin in three areas: viz 
 the companies, individual residents and the communities hold legal rights to the 
occupation and use of the same land for purposes that could be mutually 
exclusive; 
 the values and development desires of the communities and individual residents 
are often quite different from the values and development intentions of the 
companies; and 
 various Queensland political parties have made promises regarding resolution of 
the conflict but, once in office, have not delivered against those promises. 
 
These sources of conflict are first identified in Section 5.6 and characteristics of a 
model for an organisation that might contribute to their resolution are proposed in 
Section 7.9. 
 
6.6. The values and development desires of the communities 
 
This section of the thesis summarizes material discussed in Section 7.5 and 
Appendix 3). 
 
The values and development desires of the communities within the Scenic Rim are 
identified in Appendix 3. They include values based on the environment, settlement 
of the region (including both Indigenous and non-Indigenous occupation), farming 
and tourism backgrounds of the communities and do not include mining. The 
communities are strongly of the view that agriculture and planned industrial 
development (such as the proposed Bromelton Industrial Estate) can lead to a 
sustainable future and that mining is an inappropriate use of land that could 
otherwise be directed towards these ends (see Section 7.5). 
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6.7. The values and development intentions of the companies 
 
This section summarizes material discussed in Section 7.4 and Table 3.3. 
 
Most of the companies exploring for coal and CSG within the Scenic Rim are private 
companies and are not required to lodge any public documents with the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission. As a result, little information on their 
values is available. However, whilst the public companies exploring for coal are 
required to annually lodge statements on conformation with ASX ethical standards, 
such statements seldom provide any data about corporate values. 
 
The values of companies exploring for CSG can be deduced from the public 
documents of their parent companies and are presented in Table 3.3. Similarly, their 
development intentions can be deduced from Exploration Permit Public Enquiry 
Reports lodged with the Queensland Government – the most informative of these 
deductions is that the companies do not have to reveal their future development 
intentions until 2017. The reports provided by companies exploring for coal are 
treated as ‘commercial in confidence’ and are not accessible. However, some 
information on parent company intentions can be obtained from their publically 
available annual reports. Three examples, taken from company annual report for 
2013-14, are: 
 Allegiance Coal Limited – Discussions were held with a potential joint venture 
partner regarding the Mt Marrow deposit (EPC 2374) and with the State 
Government regarding the surrender of Mintovale (MDL 138). 
 Coalbank Limited – A drilling program on EPC 2239 (Esk-Harlin) was 
completed. Some coal seams were identified and further drilling is being 
planned. 
 New Hope Corporation Limited – Drilling associated with a possible expansion 
of the Jeebropilly Mine continued. 
 
6.8. The role of community based organisations 
 
This section of the thesis summarizes material discussed in Section 7.7. 
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Thirteen currently active CBOs that have played some role in representing 
community values and development desires to mining companies and to a wider 
society are recognised in Section 3.4.2. Five of these CBOs were created specifically 
to focus community actions against coal exploration proposals. Whilst it could be 
claimed that some CBOs have achieved the outcome for which they were created 
(the abandonment of mining proposals), such a claim cannot be generalized and the 
organisations have been more successful in raising wider community awareness of 
the potential impacts of mining within the Scenic Rim. 
 
6.9. The nature of the social contract between the communities 
and the companies 
 
This section of the thesis summarizes material discussed in Section 7.8. 
 
The nature of the implicit social contract between society, government and business 
is constantly evolving (Section 3.5). Much of this evolution is driven by a belief that 
any community must be free to specify ‘appropriate ethical norms’ that apply to 
developments in its area (Johnsen 2009, p. 792).  Values espoused by Scenic Rim 
communities include protection of the environment, preservation of a rural lifestyle 
and a future based on farming (see Section 7.5 for discussion on the value of 
agricultural production within the Scenic Rim). There is a fear that limited surface 
and groundwater supplies could be damaged by mining and that this local value is 
not respected by exploration companies. Because the value of exploration permits 
held within the Scenic Rim is not yet proven, it may be that the companies holding 
these permits are not yet willing to apply themselves to the lengthy and expensive 
process of negotiating a local social contract and of obtaining an SLTO from the 
relatively new concept of shared value (Porter & Kramer 2011). 
 
6.10. Characteristics of a  model for conflict resolution 
 
This section of the thesis summarizes material discussed in Section 7.9. 
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The characteristics of an organisation that might assist the solution of the conflict 
outlined in Section 6.5 are identified in Sections 7.9.2 and 7.9.3. They include that: 
 the organisation should be seen to be local; 
 the organisation should be focussed on an agreed objective; 
 all community members who wish to participate should be able to do so; 
 the organisation must be adequately staffed  and sustainable over the longer term; 
 the organisation must be willing to form strategic partnerships; and 
 the organisation must be effective in keeping communities informed and in 
meeting key performance objectives. 
 
6.11. A model for evaluating the utility of theories of the firm 
 
This section of the thesis summarizes material discussed in Section 7.10. 
 
Although several references to models for evaluating the validity and reliability of 
TOTF have been found (such as Crossan          ), no references to models for 
evaluating the utility of TOTF have been located. Such a  model (the Maddox 
Model) is proposed in Section 3.9.2 and applied to twelve groups of such theories in 
Appendix 5.  
 
The Maddox Model asks the following questions: 
1. Does the theory explain reasons for existence of the firm? 
2. Does the theory explain what drives enterprise strategy? 
3. Does the theory explain what generates productivity and profitability? 
4. Does the theory explain what shapes the business organisation? 
5. Does the theory explain what motivates firm behaviour? 
6. Does the theory explain the firm’s moral posture? 
7. What tests are available to support the validity of the theory? 
 
A five point Likert scale is applied in the model and the results are summarised in 
Table 7.4. Although a ranking of the utility of the theories is identified, none of them 
meets all criteria and all, except one, fail to suggest tests by which their validity 
might be tested. The most useful theory is Transaction Cost theory and that is 
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followed by Contract theory, Natural Resource based theory, Resource based theory, 
Stakeholder theory and the Neo-classical TOTF described in Figure 3.1. 
 
6.12. Implications for an evolving theory of the firm 
 
The failure of existing theories of the firm to provide an adequate base for an 
understanding of the reasons for existence of companies exploring for coal or CSG 
within the Scenic Rim has two foundations as follows: 
 each individual theory is limited in its application and only addresses a narrow 
range of the characteristics examined; and 
 the public data that is readily available about each corporation is limited in 
coverage (mainly because it only supports analysis of a consolidated entity) and 
does not support the more detailed cost/revenue analysis that the Neo-classical, 
Transaction Cost and Contract theories would require. 
 
Although the theory of the evolutionary firm developed by Frederick (2004) suggests 
five core functions from which an analysis of the moral behaviour of firm might be 
undertaken, it does not address the shortcomings above. What is needed now is an 
evolutionary theory of the firm that draws on the strengths of existing neo-classical, 
resource based and stakeholder theories (as does Corporate Sustainability theory 
(Section 3.9.3.13)) and that provides a base for inclusion of a changing social 
contract. Most importantly, such a theory must include tests for its validity, utility 
and applicability that can be replicated by others. Such a theory must be applicable 
to all companies and its development will be undertaken as part of a PhD program 
that will extend the research behind this thesis. 
 
6.13. Summary of the chapter 
 
This chapter summarizes the findings of the research that underlies this thesis. 
Particularly, Section 6.4 outlines a response to the Research Question proposed in 
Section 1.4, while Section 6.9 identifies changes to the local social contract between 
communities and exploration companies within the Scenic Rim.  Section 6.10 
develops the characteristics of a model for community and mining company 
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interaction that might more equitably distribute the benefits and disadvantages of 
mining between companies and their external stakeholders. These characteristics 
now need to be tested and further developed by future research. Section 6.11 
suggests a model for evaluating the utility of theories of the firm and Section 6.12 
draws implications for the development of an evolutionary theory of the firm that 
could be addressed in future research. 
 
 
7. DISCUSSION 
 
The findings of the research behind this thesis have already been summarized in 
Chapter 6. This chapter discusses those findings in some depth. 
 
7.1. Introduction to this chapter 
 
This discussion initially concentrates on two major issues that emerge from the 
research question as follows:  (i) Are the exploration permits that companies hold 
within the Scenic Rim sufficiently valuable to warrant the angst that the companies 
are already experiencing?; and (ii) Is the agricultural base of the region sufficiently 
valuable for the communities to be able to turn their back on the wealth that mining 
might bring to the region? From these issues, the discussion focusses of whether the 
conflict that now exists can be resolved and the role that various actors have played. 
This then leads to the social contract that might form the base for conflict resolution 
and to the theories of the firm that might explain why the companies are pursuing the 
actions that they are. The discussion concludes with a summary of the characteristics 
that might help form a better model for negotiations between communities and 
mining companies and with suggestions as to how an evolutionary theory of the firm 
might be created. 
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7.2. Objectives of the chapter 
  
The objectives of the chapter are: 
 to explore whether or not the ATPs held within the Scenic Rim potentially have a 
commercial value; 
 to explore whether or not the communities within the Scenic Rim might have a 
sustainable future without carbon based mineral development; 
 to explore whether or not the conflict between the communities and companies 
might be able to be resolved and if there is a role for a CBO in this resolution; 
 to recognise the issues that might be regarded as local input to a social contract 
between the communities and mining companies; 
 to identify and evaluate the utility of present TOTF; and 
 to draw implications for an evolutionary TOTF that might be developed by 
further research. 
 
7.3. Structure of the chapter 
  
This chapter is structured as follows: 
 Section 7.1 introduces the chapter; 
 Section 7.2 outlines the objectives of the chapter; 
 Section 7.3 details the structure of the chapter; 
 Section 7.4 explores the value of exploration permits held within the Scenic Rim 
to the companies holding them; 
 Section 7.5 examines the possible contribution of coal and CSG, industry and 
agriculture to a sustainable future within the Scenic Rim; 
 Section 7.6 explores whether or not resolution of the conflict between 
communities within the Scenic Rim and the exploration companies is possible; 
 Section 7.7 explores a possible role for CBOs; 
 Section 7.8 recognises possible additional content for a social contract between 
communities and mineral exploration companies within the Scenic Rim; 
 Section 7.9 develops possible characteristics for a model for conflict resolution; 
 Section 7.10 evaluates existing TOTF; 
 Section 7.11 applies existing TOTF to mining exploration within the Scenic Rim; 
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 Section 7.12 draws implications for an evolutionary TOTF: and 
 Section 7.14 contains a summary of the chapter. 
 
7.4. Are the exploration permits held within the Scenic Rim    
valuable? 
 
The potential coal resource within the region lies within the Walloon Coal Measures 
(WCM) of the Clarence-Moreton and Ipswich Basins. The coal of the WCM is 
described as being ‘slightly higher in rank’ than that of the Surat Basin and is highly 
volatile (Rassam et al. 2014, Section 1.1.3.4). The WCM generally lie between 100 
and 300 metres from the surface and are uniform in neither depth nor thickness (The 
coal within the previous Ebenezer mine workings near Amberley was described as 
being ‘approximately 50 separate Walloon coal seams – some only 10 cm thick.’ 
(Murray 2010, p. 356). By 1995–6,  there were three open cut coal mines working 
within the Scenic Rim (Ebenezer, Jeebropilly and New Oakleigh) and, in that year, 
they produced approximately 3 200 000 tonnes of thermal coal (Murray 2010, p. 
367). Ebenezer and New Oakleigh have now ceased production and output from 
Jeebropilly decreased from 1.1 million tonnes of steaming coal in 2012–13 to only 
870 000 tonnes in 2013–14 (NHC September 2014, p. 4). 
 
Mineral Development Lease (MDL) 172 (Bremer View and Mt Mort) and Mineral 
Lease (ML) 4712 (the Ebenezer mine) are presently owned by a small, private, 
company (Zedemar Holdings Pty Ltd) - but the owner is seeking to sell the leases. In 
2012, a potential buyer (OGL  - a Malaysian based timber company) announced that 
it proposed to develop the combined leases to produce 3 000 000 tonnes of thermal 
coal per year within five years (OGL 31 October 2012). The coal was to be 
transported to the Port of Brisbane via road and through an existing rail loading loop 
owned by the Queensland Government. The planned purchase collapsed when OGL 
was not able to raise the required capital (OGL 1 April 2014). A second purchase 
arrangement, between Zedemar Holdings and Coalbank Ltd, has also fallen through 
and, on 26 June 2015, the RDPO announced that neither Zedemar nor Coalbank had 
ever had a social licence to operate the mine (Foley 26 June 2015).  
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Immediately to the south east of ML 4712 is Exploration Permit Coal (EPC) 2127 - 
held by Cuesta Coal Ltd and containing an inferred resource of 5.1 million tonnes of 
export quality thermal coal (Cuesta Coal Limited 2012). Most other coal exploration 
permit areas within the Scenic Rim have not been examined to the same extent but 
exploration is still being undertaken in some areas and Coalbank Limited completed 
five exploratory drill holes on EPC 2239, between Esk and Toogoolawah, between 
February and March 2014 (Barry, D 27 February 2014). However, MDL 138 (near 
Mintovale) was surrendered in 2014 on the grounds that it was too small to be 
commercially viable (Allegiance Coal Limited 30 June 2014). Several other EPCs 
(notably EPC 910 near Rathdowney) have been sold by their initial permit holder 
within the last eighteen months’ The terms of such sales sometimes place great 
uncertainty on any value that might be ascribed to exploration permits. Four 
greenfield exploration sites (including EPC 910) and several other development 
projects were sold by Linc Energy for A$1.00 (Linc Energy Limited 16 February 
2015). 
 
The companies that hold EPCs within the Scenic Rim have mineral rights that give 
them a strategic advantage in three forms viz: (i) the steaming quality of the coal is 
well established and recognised (Smith 1999); (ii) the existing permits/licences are 
exclusive and no competitors can gain entry to the region without buying a lease 
from an existing holder; and (iii) the transport distance from the mine sites to the 
export Port of Brisbane is much less than the distance from mines in the Surat and 
Dawson Basins to potential ports (OGL 31 October 2012, p. 9).  
 
However, the export market into which coal from the Scenic Rim could be sold is 
changing rapidly. The average international price for Australian thermal coal has 
fallen from US$140 per tonne in January 2011 to US$55.86 per tonne in March 2016 
(Index mundi 17 April 2016) and China (the second largest purchaser of Australian 
thermal coal) has announced its intention to reduce its reliance on imported coal and 
to set quality parameters for the coal that it will import (Robins & Ker 17 September 
2014). Not all projections about the international market for coal are gloomy and a 
previous Queensland Minister for Mines reiterated an International Energy Agency 
projection that the global demand for coal would increase by 15% by 2030 and that 
prices would again rise (McBryde 2015). Such occurrences would be fortuitous for 
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any coal mines developed within the Scenic Rim as their transition from an 
exploration prospect to a working mine could easily take another ten years. The 
existing EPC/MDL holders within the Scenic Rim might, therefore, hold rights that 
could be developed to give them a competitive advantage that is worth protecting. 
 
However, not all permit areas might be able to be developed – even if they are 
proven to contain commercially viable deposits of coal. EPC 910 was once held by 
Linc Energy Limited and the extraction technology then being developed by Linc 
was that of underground coal gasification (UGC). UGC is an as yet unproven 
technology and, following years of agitation by community groups in the Chinchilla 
area, the Queensland Government is now pursuing Linc Energy, through the District 
Court, over (allegedly) ‘the biggest pollution event probably in Queensland’s 
history’ (Queensland Government 18 April 2016) – (as outlined above, Linc Energy 
sold EPC 910 in 2015 for less than $1.00). The company is now in voluntary 
administration (Queensland Government 18 April 2016) and its technology may 
never be commercially developed. Another EPC (1109), on the far western edge of 
the SRRC area, is held by Carbon Energy (Operations) Pty Ltd and its parent 
company (Carbon Energy Limited) is also developing UGC technology. The 
Queensland Government (18 April 2016) now proposes to ban the use of UGC in 
Queensland completely and EPC 1109 may have no value – unless it is able to be 
developed by another technology. 
 
The situation in regard to CSG is different in that: (i) exploration for CSG is now 
taking place only in the SRRC area; (ii) the two private companies (Arrow CSG 
(Australia) Pty Ltd and BNG Pty Ltd) exploring for CSG have a common 
intermediate owner in Arrow Energy Holdings Pty Ltd; (iii) the base resource (the 
WCM) has not previously been extensively explored for deposits of CSG 
(Geoscience Australia n.d.b); (iv) the potential gas field is small in size (by 
comparison with gas fields now being developed by Arrow Energy in the Surat – 
Bowen Basin and that have proven and probable reserves greater than 8 900 
Petajoules (DNRM January 2014, p. 2); and (v) there is no existing transport 
mechanism between the potential location of a gas field (around Beaudesert and 
Boonah) and any possible market. 
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Arrow Energy’s subsidiary companies initially held three EPPs (641, 644 and 791) 
that covered most of the SRRC area and that extended into parts of the LCC, ICC 
and LVRC areas and into the Warwick - Millmerran area to the west of the Great 
Dividing Range. More than 20 exploratory gas wells were drilled and all but five of 
these have now been plugged and abandoned (ABC n.d.). The remaining wells are 
located in the Swanbank, Silverdale and Mt Lindsay areas. EPP 791(around Boonah) 
was surrendered in 2012 after Arrow Energy announced that it would relinquish ‘… 
those properties under which there are insufficient gas resources, to give landowners 
certainty’ (Kennedy 18 September 2012) and parts of EPP 644 have also been 
surrendered in compliance with Queensland Government licence conditions. Arrow 
Energy is currently considering the commercial potential of its Scenic Rim 
petroleum permit areas and has until 2017 to make a decision about further 
investment (DNRM 5 November 2014). 
 
The future market demand for CSG is also uncertain. Although CSG is seen as a fuel 
that may help meet global energy demand during the transition from solid fuels (such 
as coal) to renewable energy (such as solar, wind or nuclear), there are also signs that 
the demand in markets such as China may be peaking. Australian CSG may, in the 
near future, face increasing competition from gas produced in central Asia or from 
massive shale deposits in the USA. Against this background, the intentions of Royal 
Dutch Shell plc (one of the two ultimate owners of Arrow Energy) are of great 
interest. Shell has made a successful takeover bid for the gas interests of British Gas 
- the ultimate owner of QGC (which has a major interest in CSG in the Surat – 
Dawson Basin and in one of the three LNG export terminals nearing completion in 
Central Queensland). QGC is believed to have insufficient CSG supplies to meet the 
production capacity of its Curtis Island plant and it is possible that Shell might see its 
Arrow Energy CSG as input to the QGC plant. This approach would be acceptable to 
PetroChina (the other 50% owner of Arrow Energy) as that company announced in 
February 2015 that it would consider ‘… an outright sale of its Arrow gas, a gas 
tolling arrangement whereby Arrow gas was processed through an existing LNG 
project or any other arrangement, provided it offered value for PetroChina’ 
(Macdonald-Smith 26 February 2015). As with the holders of coal exploration 
permits within the Scenic Rim, Arrow Energy may hold mineral rights that give it a 
competitive advantage and that are worth protecting. 
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7.5. Black gold, industry or agriculture: Which way to a  
sustainable future? 
 
The values and development desires of the communities within the Scenic Rim 
outlined in Appendix 3 show that agriculture plays a strong role in both their present 
and foreseeable futures. It is very hard to obtain current data on agricultural 
production within the region but Table 7.1 gives an indication of what it has been. 
 
TABLE 7.1: Selected agricultural production within the Scenic Rim 
1992-93 
LGA PREVIOUS 
NAME 
TOTAL 
AREA 
(‘000ha) 
AGRIC 
ESTAB. 
(Number) 
AREA 
(‘000ha) 
MEAT 
CATTLE 
(Number) 
DAIRY 
CATTLE 
(Number) 
VEG 
(‘000 
ha) 
FRUIT 
NUTS 
(‘000ha) 
SRRC Beaudesert 
Boonah 
286 
148 
438 
272 
141 
81 
79 514 
38 115 
21 777 
6 307 
0.1 
1.8 
0.3 
NA 
LCC Logan City 24 38 NA 24 188 NA NA 
ICC Ipswich 
Moreton 
12 
181 
5 
263 
NA 
64 
118 
27 600 
NA 
10 276 
NA 
0.4 
NA 
NA 
LVRC Laidley 
Gatton 
69 
158 
228 
294 
34 
52 
10 495 
17 959 
2 640 
2 545 
3.5 
4.5 
NA 
0.3 
SRC Esk 385 350 220 84 958 6 130 1.9 0.1 
Source: ABS Agricultural Statistics Selected Small Area Data Queensland 1992-93 Tables 1 & 3 
 
Table 7.1 gives a reasonable view of the broad picture: within the SRRC area, 
agricultural production uses about fifty one percent of the available land, within the 
LVRC area thirty six percent of available land is devoted to agricultural activities 
and within the SRC area the figure is fifty seven percent. Some thirty five percent of 
the rural land within the ICC area is used for agriculture but no data on agricultural 
land use is available for the LCC. The SRRC area contains the largest herd of cattle 
and the LVRC contains the largest area devoted to vegetable production. 
 
Data on the value of agricultural production is also difficult to obtain. The ABS 
undertakes its agricultural census infrequently and the most recent survey for which 
comprehensive data is available is that of 2005–06. Two sets of data from this 
collection are presented. Table 7.2 gives summary data on the value of agricultural 
production, by type of production, by LGA and Table 7.3 gives a more complete 
outline of production by crop type for the Lockyer and Fassifern Valleys (NB: the 
Fassifern Valley approximately equates to the previous Boonah Shire within the 
SRRC area). It should be noted that there was a redistribution of LGA areas in 2008 
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(Parliament of Queensland 2007) and that while the previous LGA areas are 
presented in Table 7.2 against the present areas, the match is only approximate and 
this leads to an inconsistent matching of data sets. The data presented in the two 
tables is, therefore, indicative rather than definitive. 
 
TABLE 7.2: Value (A$’000) of agricultural production within the 
Scenic Rim 2005-06 
ITEM SRRC LCC ICC LVRC  SRC TOTAL 
Beaudesert Boonah Logan Ipswich Laidley Gatton    Esk  
Hay 3 744 5 560 0 1 166 3 257 3 704 5 382 22 813 
Other crops 66 400 24 408 8 277 5 529 44 200 86 968 55 088 290 870 
TOTAL 
CROPS 
70 144 29 968 8 277 6 695 47 457 90 672 60 470 313 683 
Veg 28 320 22 573 3 625 2 930 40 347 73 075 40 441 211 311 
Fruit 2 016 33 201 45 726 3 451 1 717 8 189 
Livestock 
(slaughter) 
69 553 31 286 15 344 12 762 8 612 36 069 40 691 214 317 
Livestock 
Products 
24 097 8 487 0 3 131 2 862 1 155 6 890 46 622 
TOTAL 
AGRIC. 
194 130 92 347 27 447 25 563 100 004 204 
422 
150 
209 
794 123 
Source: Office of Economic and Statistical Research: Value of Agricultural Commodities: Small Area 
Data 2005-06                                                       
 
 
TABLE 7.3: Selected horticultural production: Lockyer and 
Fassifern Valleys 2005-06 
Commodity Lockyer 
Valley 
(tonnes) 
Fassifern 
Valley 
(tonnes) 
Queensland 
(tonnes) 
Lockyer as 
% Qld 
Fassifern as 
% Qld 
Beetroot 27 634 2 465 31 475 87.8 7.8 
Cabbage 12 691 79 20 373 62.2 0.4 
Carrot 7 400 13 358 22 148 33.4 60.3 
Cauliflower 8 332 33 15 072 55.3 0.2 
Lettuce 37 058 173 53 152 69.7 0.3 
Onion 14 084 4 433 27 410 51.4 16.2 
Potato 21 436 744 93 589 22.9 0.8 
Pumpkin 9 620 2 116 47 161 20.4 4.5 
Sweet corn 8 546 495 28 014 30.5 1.8 
Tomato 5 073 58 108 672 4.7 0.05 
Other 20 668 4 182 224 632 9.2 1.9 
Total production 
(tonnes) 
172 542 28 136 671 698 25.7 4.2 
Source: Mainstream Economics 2013, p. 26 
 
A summary of the key points contained in the Mainstream (2013) report to Regional 
Development Australia Ipswich and West Moreton shows that the opportunities and 
challenges facing increased horticultural crop production in the region include: 
 the region currently produces about forty percent of South East Queensland’s 
annual consumption of fresh vegetables; 
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 based on projected population growth up to 2031, even to maintain the current 
market share would require a thirty to thirty five percent increase in production; 
 the processed fruit and vegetable sector in Australia has declined dramatically 
because of rising input costs, cheap imports and from a growing tendency of 
major supermarket chains to establish private labels (mostly based on imports); 
 the (Australian) horticultural sector is constrained, in the international market, by 
a strong dollar, high production costs and well established competition; 
 availability of more land for horticultural crops is not a constraint; 
 the volume and reliability of rain is a significant constraint and expansion of the 
sector will require supplemented water sources; 
 almost all available surface water within the region is already allocated and this 
is a major constraint on expansion; 
 the availability of surface water is relatively unreliable – making long term 
planning and investment decisions commercially risky; 
 while there is underutilized capacity (both through underemployment and 
unemployment) in the local labour force, there is a limited availability of 
technical and trades workers and machine operators; and 
 most workers in relevant key occupational groups already earn above average 
weekly earnings. 
 
Given the already major contribution of the region to Queensland’s horticultural 
production, the unreliability of (current and future projected) rainfall and the almost 
complete lack of water (both surface and underground) for additional development, it 
is no wonder that many residents fear adverse impacts from coal and CSG activities 
on existing water supplies. While it may be possible to case CSG wells and prevent 
the loss of water from alluvial aquifers, it would be less likely that adverse impacts 
from open cut coal mines (which would cut through the alluvial aquifers on their 
way to the deeper WCM) could be avoided. 
 
The two CSG ATPs that still exist within the Scenic Rim cover much of the good 
quality agricultural land within the Logan River and Warrill Creek valleys. It could 
be that the ‘waste water’ brought to the surface by CSG extraction could be treated 
and made suitable for agricultural use in these areas (as has water being recovered  in 
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the Surat Basin (QGC 2014)) and this might help alleviate the water shortage 
identified by Mainstream Economics (2013). However, Chen and Randall (2013) 
have warned that, given the potentially cumulative costs of extracting huge volumes 
of water from the Great Artesian Basin, the economic and environmental costs of 
treating the water and of disposing of the sludge and the ultimate costs of disturbing 
aquifers and subsurface geosystems, it may be that the long term economic benefits 
of agriculture exceed those from either CSG only or any CSG-agriculture 
coexistence case. 
 
Considering the size of the cattle herd in the Scenic Rim (Table 7.2), the work that 
NHC is undertaking to demonstrate that its rehabilitated mine site at Acland is 
comparable to unmined land in turning off quality beef cattle (NHC 17 April 2015) 
should be of interest to graziers within the region. However, rehabilitation of any 
mines that were developed within the Scenic Rim would only occur some years after 
the alluvial aquifers had been cut through and there might still be a substantial final 
void after mining has been completed. 
 
There is also the potential for significant industrial development within the region as 
both the SRRC and the ICC have plans for the development of major industrial 
estates to attract large scale industry. The proposal to create the Bromelton State 
Development Area is an example of what is proposed for the SRRC area. In 2008, 
the Queensland Government announced its intention to create the Bromelton State 
Development Area – a 15 000 hectare site about six kilometres west of Beaudesert 
(DSDIP 16 November 2012). The site is adjacent to the Sydney to Brisbane standard 
gauge railway and is expected to attract freight and logistics operations, medium and 
large scale manufacturing enterprises, warehousing activities and industry support 
activities such as transport servicing depots. This development is expected to create 
18 000 jobs by 2026 (SRRC 15 October 2008). 
 
It would appear that the residents of the Scenic Rim have alternative paths to the 
future and that they might not need carbon based mineral developments to bring 
about that future. 
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7.6. Is resolution of the conflict between the communities and the  
mining companies possible? 
 
The term ‘community’ is defined in Section 3.4.1  and that description fits well with 
the definition proposed by the DITR (2006, p. 48) – ‘In mining industry terms, 
community is generally applied to the inhabitants of immediate and surrounding 
areas who are affected by the company’s activities.’. DITR then describes 
community engagement as: 
 
A good engagement process typically involves identifying and prioritising 
stakeholders, conducting a dialogue with them to understand their interest in an 
issue and any concerns they may have and exploring with them ways to address 
these issues and providing feedback … At a more complex level, engagement is a 
means of negotiating agreed outcomes over issues of concern or mutual interest 
(DITR 2006, p. 48).  
 
The reasons that companies should want to engage with local communities are that, 
unless a company is able to negotiate an SLTO with the relevant community, that 
community: (i) may seek to delay or block any development; (ii) the project may 
face ongoing legal challenges that could, potentially, stop it (even after regulatory 
approvals have been granted); and (iii) prospective employees may seek to work for 
a company that is a better corporate citizen (DITR 2006, p. 2).  
 
Although none of the companies exploring for coal within the Scenic Rim has yet 
sought to engage with the communities of the region (and Arrow Energy has only 
engaged in low level presentations about its CSG activities), the communities are not 
of a mind to initiate engagement with the companies. As suggested in Section 6.6, 
the communities generally regard coal and CSG developments as an inappropriate 
use of the land and this view is supported by both the formal leaders (the elected 
councillors) and informal leaders (the officers of CBOs) within the communities. 
As shown in Appendix 1, four companies (the Arrow Energy group, Coalbank Ltd, 
Mineral and Coal Investments Pty Ltd and XMC Australia Pty Ltd) have exploration 
permits that cover more than one LGA area and so include communities that may 
hold different values and approaches. This could lead to major difficulties in that the 
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companies would not be able to negotiate with just one group to arrange an SLTO 
for their permit areas. 
 
The Queensland Government has developed several regulations (e.g. the Land 
Access Code (DEEDI November 2010) and the Code of Practice for the construction 
and abandonment of CSG wells and associated bores (DNRM 2013) by which it has 
sought to bring order to the relationship between residents and companies. However, 
such arrangements do not address the basic issue that the landowners wish to have 
the final say over how ‘their’ land is managed and are not prepared to let this 
decision rest with government. This landowner desire is the rationale behind the 
Lock the Gate Alliance and its advice to landowners that they should lock their 
boundary gates and not permit representatives of mining companies to enter onto 
their land. It would appear that, until this basic issue is addressed, the conflict 
between communities within the Scenic Rim and companies exploring for coal and 
CSG within the region will not be easily resolved. This observation fits well with 
Bridge’s (2004) finding that conflict often arose over the ability of citizens to 
determine the appropriateness of mining as an acceptable land use. 
 
As identified in Section 3.5.2, many landowners are concerned about the potential 
impact of deep CSG wells on their shallow alluvial aquifers. The Queensland 
Government recognised this fear in 2013 when it implemented both horizontal and 
vertical ‘setbacks’ for fracture activities associated with CSG development. The 
horizontal setback between a CSG well and a groundwater well was set at 2 000 
metres and the vertical setback between the bottom of an existing groundwater well 
and any fracking activity in a CSG well was set at 200 metres (Department of 
Environment and Heritage Protection 2013). This setback allowance could assuage 
the fears of some landowners and also decrease the likelihood of CSG development 
in a large section of the SRRC area. 
 
Because of a lack of shared values and low levels of consultation and engagement, it 
does not appear that the existing conflict between communities and companies 
exploring for coal and CSG within the Scenic Rim could be easily resolved. 
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7.7. Do community based organisations have a role to play? 
 
Walton, McCrea, Leonard and Williams (2013, pp. 20-21) concluded that CBOs 
could play a role in providing informal leadership within resilient communities. 
However, they also established that, mainly because these groups were often 
dependent on the interests, time and effort of volunteers, the role that they could play 
may be limited and that there was a need for collaboration between them and other 
agencies. The communities of the Scenic Rim appear to have no doubt as to the 
usefulness of such groups and, of recent years, have formed five organisations to 
help represent their views about the inappropriateness of mining activities within the 
region (Section 3.4.2). 
 
The Queensland Government, however, has been ambivalent about the value of such 
groups (at least in participation in legal proceedings relating to the grant of mining 
leases) and, on 9 September 2014, enacted a law that restricted the right of 
Queenslanders to object to proposed mining projects. The Mineral and Energy 
Resources (Common Provisions) Act 2014 provided that only affected persons, such 
as landholders and members of the community who had genuine concerns with the 
proposed mining activity, would have the opportunity to object, to the Land Court, 
during the lease application process (Australian Associated Press 10 September 
2014). The ‘affected persons’ included neighbours and councils but not ‘green’ 
groups that might launch ‘vexatious and frivolous’ objections. A successive 
Queensland Government was of a different view and, in July 2015, moved to 
overturn the ban (Australian Mining 16 July 2015). 
 
Rather than becoming a participant in the conflict between the communities of the 
Scenic Rim and companies exploring for coal and CSG within the region, there 
could be a role for a CBO as an ‘honest broker’ of information.  There has been no 
open discussion on the pros and cons of mining within the region and it is possible 
that neither the potential benefits nor the disadvantages of mining are widely 
understood. Thomas (2015, pp. 1-2) suggested that the net economic benefits of CSG 
development (which included increases in employment, output, consumption and 
government revenue and that could contribute to reversing rural decline) would be 
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positive but that such developments were not without risk. Many of these gains and 
risks would be unevenly distributed between regions, towns and households but 
there has been no public discussion of these matters within the Scenic Rim. The 
organisation of such discussion and debate is a role that an unbiased CBO could 
fulfil. 
 
Given the depth of community feeling against mining at present, it would take a 
strong leader and a very representative organisation to venture into the public realm 
in this way. 
 
7.8.  Additional content for a social contract within the Scenic Rim 
 
Thomas (2015) suggested that a social licence for CSG development ‘needs to hold 
for the entire industry, with high expectations upheld by companies and contractors 
alike’. This status (if achievable at all) would be relatively easy to accommodate 
within the Scenic Rim as there is only one company group (Arrow Energy) exploring 
for CSG in the region. Such a social licence would need to be specific to the Scenic 
Rim however, as, from the discussion in Sections 3.7, it does not appear that any 
social licence granted to Arrow Energy in the Surat Basin would be transferable. 
Similarly, the Australian Coal Association (Australian Coal Association n.d., Home 
page, Social Licence to Operate) suggests that the coal industry, as a whole, has a 
social licence granted by Australian society. These views ignore the basic tenet 
proposed by Freeman (1984, p. 46) that a stakeholder was anyone who could be 
affected by a project and so ignore the communities of the Scenic Rim. Similarly, 
neither of the views fits with the contention by Kuch et al. (2013, p. 6) that any 
dialogue about a social licence would ‘include the joint (emphasis added) 
development of a narrative’ about the diverse social and economic contributions of a 
project - or the proposal by Wu (2012, p. 160) that an enterprise should 
‘acknowledge its multiple stakeholders and collaborate (emphasis added) with them 
to generate value …’.  
 
A base for the negotiation of any social contract within the Scenic Rim must include 
the contention by Johnsen (2009, p. 792) that all communities ‘are free to specify 
appropriate ethical norms … as the product of a microsocial contract based on 
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constructive consent’. This approach would require companies to recognise the 
values and development desires outlined in Appendix 3 (specifically the role of 
agriculture and the need to sustain rural industry) and strengthened by the actions of 
LGAs as outlined in Section 3.4.1. The base should also include specific recognition 
of the priority agricultural areas, strategic cropping areas and priority living areas 
proposed in the Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Parliament of Queensland 
2014b sec 8-11). These inclusions would cover the macro systems (belief systems, 
lifestyles and material resources) as well as part of the exo system (neighbourhood 
and community contexts) proposed by Bronfenbrenner (1994, pp. 39-40). 
As the lifecycle (from exploration to the completion of rehabilitation) of any coal or 
CSG development could extend for thirty to fifty years, any social contract would 
need to include the concept of time and of the inputs and negotiations that would be 
needed at each stage. Such an implicit contract would also need to recognise and 
differentiate between the roles of vested (individual residents, land owners and 
communities) and non-vested (community groups such as KTSRS) stakeholders and 
clearly establish how the input of non-vested stakeholders would be recognised. This 
approach would also achieve the strategic stakeholder engagement model proposed 
by Sarker (2011) and overcome his observation that ‘a severe lack of stakeholder 
engagement is a major failing of the Australian mining industry especially when it 
comes to coal seam gas projects’.  
 
Because of the geographic extent of the Scenic Rim, the relatively large number of 
communities that it contains and the diversity of community members (including 
Indigenous persons and values, local landowners and people who live within the 
region but work outside it), it may be necessary to appoint an independent ‘leader’ to 
confirm the values and development desires of community members and to initiate 
discussion with the companies exploring for coal or CSG. The base for a social 
contract would also need to include the ladder of stakeholder engagement proposed 
by Friedman and Miles (2006, p. 162) and to ensure that the forms of engagement 
offered advanced rapidly from data transfer to involvement in the decision making 
process and to community members having (at least) some degree of power over the 
whole project (Table 3.5). 
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Because the value of exploration permits within the Scenic Rim is not yet proven, 
the companies that hold these permits may not be willing to commit themselves to 
the lengthy (and expensive) process of engaging with the communities and preparing 
the base for an SLTO. However Thomas (2015) suggested that such negotiations 
should commence as early as possible. 
 
This approach to the formulation of a social contract would make use of the five 
principles (communication, integrity and transparency, follow through, 
understanding and awareness and respect) proposed by the QRC (QRC 2014, p. 8) 
and would involve community members in genuine engagement and decision 
making (Thomas 2015, p. 2). 
 
7.9. Characteristics of a model for conflict resolution 
 
As described in Section 1.6, the second objective of the research behind this thesis is 
the development of a model for interaction between the communities of the Scenic 
Rim and the companies exploring for carbon based minerals within the region that 
would more equitably distribute the benefits and disadvantages of mining between 
the companies and their external stakeholders. There are already thirteen CBOs 
(Section 3.4.2) that have been formed to represent community values and 
development desires. These organisations are not all regionally based but they do all 
exhibit the defects that: (i) they are based on volunteers with limited time and 
interest; and (ii) they do not represent the strategic stakeholder engagement model 
suggested by Sarker (2011). The purpose of this section of the thesis is to recognise 
the characteristics of an appropriate model for community engagement. 
 
7.9.1. Should conflict resolution be left to governments? 
 
After a review of the socioeconomic impacts of CSG development in Queensland, 
Thomas (2015) concluded that governments did have a role to play in supporting 
coexistence between communities and companies exploring for CSG (Perhaps this 
role could also be extended to include companies exploring for coal?). This role 
included ensuring that the landowner’s agreement for access to their land was 
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sought, that landowners were fairly compensated and that prime agricultural land and 
water resources were not compromised by development activity. It is important to 
note that the conclusion was that there was a role for government and not that 
government was wholly responsible for resolving all differences. 
 
One of the more challenging aspects of the government’s role in resolving a 
disagreement over land access is illustrated in Section 51 of the Mineral and Energy 
Resources (Common Provisions) Act (2014) - if the landholder does not reach 
agreement with a resource authority holder (e.g. the holder of an ATP) over land 
access within twenty days, then either the landowner or the resource authority holder 
can apply to the Land Court to decide the matter (Queensland Parliament 2014 Sec 
51). The Act does not allow the landowner to simply refuse to negotiate with the 
resource authority holder. 
 
As recognised in Section 5.7, one of the reasons for conflict between communities 
and companies can be found in the promises of political parties – particularly if there 
is no clear link between when the promises are made and when they are (or might 
be) implemented. During the lead up to the 2012 Queensland state election, the 
Liberal National Party Coalition promised that they would protect the Scenic Rim by 
fast tracking stronger land use planning for the region and that the revised land use 
plan would ‘rule out mining and coal seam gas extraction in areas deemed to be 
inappropriate’ (Liberal National Party Queensland n.d.). Those who relied on this 
fast tracking promise might feel disappointed in that it has taken three years (and 
another change of government) to introduce changes that offered some protection 
(but not the total exclusion of mining) to priority agricultural areas, strategic 
cropping lands and priority living areas (Parliament of Queensland 2014b secs 8-11).  
 
Perhaps more for the reason that governments would have a conflict of interest in 
trying to represent regional landowner interests in objecting to mining, in providing 
legal means for conflict resolution (e.g. the Land Court) and in promoting mining for 
the royalties and taxes that a successful mine could contribute, governments also 
could not represent Sarker’s (2011) strategic stakeholder engagement model. 
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7.9.2 Characteristics of a stakeholder engagement model 
 
Some of the characteristics of a strategic stakeholder engagement model that can be 
deduced from the literature reviewed for this thesis are: 
 there is the need to gain the support of people who live and work in the area of 
impact of any project (On Common Ground Consultants Inc and Robert Boutilier 
and Associates 2012, p. 1); 
 all interested community members should be allowed and encouraged to take 
part in the  process (Herz, Vina & Sohn 2007, pp. 12-15); 
 within any community, there will be many stakeholder groups – often each with 
a different leader and different interests and it may be difficult for companies to 
recognise with whom they should negotiate (Wilburn & Wilburn 2011, p. 4); 
 all stakeholders, based on mutual trust, should disclose their ‘utility functions’ to 
each other and work together to develop activities for their mutual advantage 
(Harrison et al. 2010); 
 the organisation should acknowledge the needs of its multiple stakeholders and 
work with them to generate value (Wu 2012, p. 160); 
 leaders should exhibit a shared vision and good communication skills (Lee n.d.); 
 resilience requires commitment and the building of meaningful relationships 
(Walton et al. 2013, Abstract); 
 there is a need for collaboration between groups (Walton et al. 2013, pp. 20-21); 
 any such organisation should enable members to co-exist with other stakeholders 
so as to generate long-term economic benefit (APPEA n.d.); 
 there may be a need for assisted negotiation (Schellenberg 1996, pp. 173-192); 
 the concept of an SLTO is evolving and may, in future, be centred more on non-
traditional partnerships, dialogue and participation (Lacey et al. 2012, p. 15); 
 the role of CBOs is often limited because they depend on the interest, time and 
effort of volunteers (Walton et al. 2013, pp. 20-21); and 
 the measures of organisational effectiveness could include (i) the extent to which 
collective action could express the values of participants; (ii) the extent to which 
decision makers could be influenced by collective action; and (iii) the extent to 
which collective action could build opposition to a proposal (Hornsey et al. 2006, 
pp. 10-11). 
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7.9.3. Characteristics of an effective model for conflict resolution  
           
Based on the material in Section 7.9.2 and on feedback from a  limited sample of 
community members within the SRRC (undertaken as field testing of questions now 
to be revised and submitted to the USQ Ethics Committee), the following are 
proposed as the characteristics of an organisation that could form the base for 
Sarker’s (2011) strategic stakeholder engagement model: 
 the organisation should be focussed on an agreed objective; 
 the organisation must be seen to be ‘local’; 
 the organisation should represent all of the Scenic Rim; 
 all community members who wish to participate should be encouraged to do so; 
 the organisation must be independent of any external agency; 
 the organisation should be accessible to members of all communities (by some 
mix of personal contact, telephone, the internet and social media); 
 the organisation must be sustainable over the long term (i.e. not just with an 
expected life of one or two years); 
 the organisation must be adequately staffed by people with a sound knowledge 
base; 
 the organisation should be widely networked; 
 the organisation must be willing to form strategic partnerships aimed at 
achieving its agreed objectives; 
 the organisation must be a trustworthy partner; 
 the organisation’s database must always be current; and 
 the organisation must be effective in keeping communities informed and in 
meeting agreed key performance indicators. 
As part of a later research program, these characteristics will be discussed with a 
wide range of community members within the Scenic Rim, a specific organisational 
model will be proposed and that concept tested for its acceptability (see Section 10). 
 
 
 
7.10. Evaluation of existing theories of the firm 
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Thirteen groups of TOTF are recognised in Section 3.9 and Appendix 5 contains an 
evaluation of the utility of twelve of these theory sets for understanding the reasons 
for the existence of firms, their nature, the reasons that they are structured the way 
that they are and the reasons that they operate the way that they do. It is possible to 
reduce this evaluation to a numerical base by applying a Likert scale analysis with 
the values: 
0 No contribution to an understanding; 
1 A limited contribution to an understanding; 
2 A reasonable contribution to an understanding; 
3 A significant contribution to an understanding; and 
4 A major contribution to an understanding. 
 
The total of the individual ratings for each theory will then give a score that could 
allow a ranking of the utility of each theory against other theories. The resultant 
scoring is detailed in Table 7.4. 
 
The horizontal scale in Table 7.4 corresponds with the evaluation criteria in the 
tables in Appendix 5 and is structured as follows: 
1. Does the theory explain reasons for existence of the firm? 
2. Does the theory explain what drives enterprise strategy? 
3. Does the theory explain what generates productivity and profitability? 
4. Does the theory explain what shapes the business organisation? 
5. Does the theory explain what motivates firm behaviour? 
6. Does the theory explain the firm’s moral posture? 
7. What tests are available to support the validity of the theory?  
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TABLE 7.4: An evaluation of the theories of the firm 
 
THEORY EVALUATION CRITERIA TOTAL 
SCORE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Neoclassical 4 4 4 1 4 0 0 17 
 Corporate entity 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Managerial 3 2 1 0 4 0 0 10 
Transaction cost 4 4 4 4 4 3 0 23 
Contract 0 4 4 4 4 3 0 19 
Principal/agency 0 4 2 3 3 3 0 15 
Resource based 4 1 4 0 4 4 0 17 
Natural resource 
based 
4 3 3 1 4 4 0 19 
Behavioural 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 6 
Stakeholder 4 4 0 1 4 1 3 17 
Evolutionary 0 4 0 4 4 4 0 16 
Corporate 
sustainability 
0 4 0 4 4 4 0 16 
 
Based on Table 7.4, the ranking of the utility of the TOTF (from most useful 
descending to least useful) is as follows: 
1. Transaction Cost theory; 
2. Contract theory and Natural Resource Based theory; 
3. Resource Based theory, Stakeholder theory and Neoclassical theory; 
4. Evolutionary theory and Corporate Sustainability theory; 
5. Principal/Agency theory; 
6. Managerial theory; 
7. Corporate Entity theory; and  
8. Behavioural theory. 
 
No theory meets all criteria, and only Stakeholder Theory readily suggests any 
means of testing its validity. All of the theories explain the obligations of the firm to 
its stakeholders (or what drives firm strategy) but five (Contract, Principal/Agency, 
Behavioural, Evolutionary and Corporate Sustainability) do not suggest reasons that 
a firm may come into existence (or remain so). Similarly, four of the theories 
(Corporate Entity, Managerial, Resource Based and Behavioural) do not explain 
what shapes the organisation. None of the theories suggests any means by which the 
utility of the theory might be evaluated. 
 
In Section 7.11, the above analysis of the TOTF is used to attempt to understand the 
companies that are exploring for coal and CSG within the Scenic Rim. 
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7.11. The theories of the firm and mining exploration within the 
Scenic Rim 
 
Based on the analysis in Table 7.4, the six TOTF that  appear to be the more useful 
are: (i) transaction cost theory; (ii) contract theory; (iii) natural resource based 
theory; (iv) resource based theory; (v) stakeholder theory; and (vi) neoclassical 
theory. It is worthy of note that all of these theories reflect the understanding of 
Milton Friedman (1962) that the role of the firm (corporation) is to maximize profits 
to shareholders. These theories are now used to obtain an understanding of the 
reasons for the existence and operations of the corporations identified in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 7.5 summarises the ownership (both primary and ultimate) of exploration and 
other permits held within the Scenic Rim by company type. 
 
TABLE 7.5: Summary of the ownership of exploration and other   
permits held within the Scenic Rim by company type    
 
MINERAL PRIMARY PERMIT 
HOLDER 
ULTIMATE PERMIT HOLDER 
Pty Ltd 
company 
Ltd 
company 
Pty Ltd 
company 
Australian Ltd 
company 
International Ltd 
company 
CSG 2 Nil Nil Nil 2 
Coal 13 3 3 9 3 
Source: Appendix 1 
 
The numbers in Table 7.5 are not a simple summary of the data in Appendix 1. The 
reasons for the discrepancy are: 
 the two private companies exploring for CSG are owned by another private 
company – but that company is ultimately owned by two international public 
companies; 
 several of the private companies exploring for coal (e.g. Downforce Mining and 
United Queensland Resources) are ultimately owned by other Australian private 
companies; 
 one public company (Coalbank Ltd) holds exploration permits in its own name 
and through a wholly owned subsidiary); and 
 Jindal Steel and Power Pty Ltd, Shenhuo International Group Pty Ltd and XMC 
Australia Pty Ltd are owned by international companies not listed on the ASX. 
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Only one of the private companies identified as exploration (or other) permit holders 
within the Scenic Rim (Jeebropilly Collieries Pty Ltd) (Appendix 1) trades in any 
commodity or service and all such companies except three (Arrow CSG Australia 
Pty Ltd, Downforce Mining Pty Ltd and Jeebropilly Collieries Pty Ltd) have a paid 
up capital less than $1 500 (Appendix 2). This extremely limited capital base and the 
lack of trading activity make it impossible to analyse either their reason for existence 
or operations by any TOTF that depends on the profit maximization approaches of 
Milton Friedman (1962). Given the low capital base of most of the companies (and 
hence their inability to fund exploration and development activities from internal 
funds), it is also difficult to apply transaction cost theory (by which corporations 
exist because the internal cost of carrying out activities is less expensive than any 
alternative means) to them. 
 
However, the reason for the existence of these private companies can be explained 
by Corporate Entity theory and they all meet the requirements of the Real Entity 
theory identified in Section 3.9.3.3. Although this theory explains how the 
companies have come into being (in accord with the Corporations Act 2001), it does 
not explain what keeps them functioning as private companies. This explanation can, 
however, be drawn from the Corporations Act 2001 (Baxt 2002, p. 3) section that 
separates the responsibility of the shareholders of the companies from the legal 
responsibility of the companies for their actions. All of the private companies are 
wholly owned subsidiaries of other companies and their legal structure therefore 
separates their ultimate owners from the financial (and, mostly, legal) responsibility 
for the actions of the private companies. For example, if the (primary permit holder) 
private companies do not have the financial resources to prepare and lodge the 
annual returns required by their exploration permits or to pay for exploration 
activities (e.g. the drilling of exploration wells) carried out on their behalf, then, 
without guarantees being issued by the ultimate permit holder, the primary permit 
holding company could be liquidated without any recourse to their parent company. 
 
Both Transaction Cost and Contract theory are based on an ability to determine 
whether or not the cost of activities undertaken internally is less than those costs 
would be if they were undertaken by external contract. It is not possible to undertake 
this comparison for the public companies exploring for (or exploiting) coal or CSG 
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within the Scenic Rim (Appendix 2) because their annual reports contain only 
consolidated data for both holding and subsidiary companies and it is not possible to 
divide this data into individual product (e.g. coal sold) revenues and costs. 
 
One company that provides some data in its annual reports is NHC and a summary 
of relevant data for the years 2010-11 to 2014-15 is provided in Table 7.6.  However, 
each annual report of the company shows that its principal activities include coal 
mining, exploration, development, production, associated transport infrastructure and 
ancillary activities. The transport infrastructure includes the activities of Queensland 
Bulk Handling in facilitating the export of 6–8 million tonnes of coal per annum and 
ancillary activities include pastoral activities on the Acland mine site (NHC 2013). 
 
TABLE 7.6: New Hope Corporation Limited: Summary product 
and financial data for the years 2010/11 to 2014/15  
 
Company Item 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 
New Hope 
Corporation 
Limited 
Mt tonnes coal 
produced   
Mt tonnes coal sold 
5.7 
5.8 
5.6 
6.0 
5.8 
6.0 
6.29 
6.25 
5.64 
5.65 
Total  revenue 
($’000) 
Profit after tax from 
continuing activities 
($’000) 
Shareholder funds 
($’000) 
Dividends paid 
($’000) 
505 781 
 
 
(21 820) 
 
1 852 625 
78 944 
548 959 
 
 
58 449 
 
1 973 859 
132 928 
652 697 
 
 
74 129 
 
2 016 456 
257 466 
767 152 
 
 
167 125 
 
2 252 916 
215 871 
662 404 
 
 
503 099 
 
2 367 383 
197 180 
Weighted average 
shares on issue 
(‘000) 
Nett tangible asset 
backing per share ($) 
Share price (30 June) 
 
830 999.4 
 
$2.206 
$1.93 
 
830 836.9 
 
$2.346 
$2.68 
 
830 551.1 
 
$2.397 
$3.57 
 
830 335.9 
 
$2.688 
$4.01 
 
830 127.8 
 
$2.786 
$5.00 
Coal loaded through 
Qld Bulk Handling 
(mtpa) 
7.1 7.87 8.73 8.67 6.52 
Sources: New Hope Corporation Limited Annual Reports for the year ended 30 June 2014 and 2015 
Notes:    Mt = million tonnes and mtpa = million tonnes per annum. 
 Qld Bulk Handling loads bulk coal for companies other than NHC and the volume of coal  
handled reflects the decreasing production of these other organisations. 
 
Table 7.6 contains some interesting data about the performance of NHC over the past 
five years. Coal production has been steady in the range of five point six to six point 
two five million tonnes per year and the volume of coal sold has slightly exceeded 
the volume produced each year. This must mean that there has been a slight 
reduction in the stockpile of saleable coal held. However, there has been a significant 
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reduction in total revenue and, although the weighted average number of shares on 
issue has increased by less than nine hundred thousand (one tenth of a percent) over 
the five years, the amount of dividends paid has fallen by almost sixty percent, the 
value of shareholder funds has fallen by almost twenty two percent and the tradeable 
share price has fallen by over sixty percent. All of this has happened over a five year 
period when sales have remained high and the volume of coal handled through the 
company’s multi-customer export terminal has also remained high. The $21 820 000 
loss recorded at the end of 2014/15 is made up of a profit of approx. nine million 
dollars from mining, marketing and logistics activity, a loss of forty two point four 
million dollars from oil operations and a profit of eleven point six million dollars 
from investments (NHC 2015, Annual Report and Financial Statements 2015, p. 3). 
 
With decreasing profits from an approximately even level of sales, it is obvious that 
NHC is not producing at the marginal revenue equals marginal cost assumption in 
the neo-classical theory of the firm (Figure 3.1).Whilst the existence of NHC can be 
explained by Corporate Entity Theory, there is no evidence available within the 
public realm that can be used to examine its performance against Transaction Cost or 
Contract theory. 
 
NHC is a large organisation with a reasonably large number of stockholders  (7 562 
– of whom the twenty larger shareholders hold almost ninety two percent of the 
shares on issue and one of which (Washington H Soul Pattinson Limited) holds 
almost sixty percent of the shares) (NHC 2015, p 74). The company has seven 
directors (including the Managing Director) – of whom only one is a woman (NHC 
2015, inside front cover). The principals of NHC (the shareholders) have appointed 
the Board of Directors and the senior managers as their agents and, given the 
performance of NHC over recent years, it could be expected that the principals 
would have held their agents accountable for the performance of the company and 
for their considerable loss of value. However, this has not been the case. The 
chairman of NHC has been in that position for the five years reviewed in Table 7.6 
(as have two of the five non-executive directors) and the present Managing Director 
was only appointed in 2014. The Board was increased from five to seven members in 
2012/13 and the two new members still retain their appointments. Perhaps this 
continuation of service can be understood when it is realised that the Chairman of 
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NHC is also Chairman of Washington H Soul Pattinson Limited (Washington H 
Soul Pattinson 2015, p.1) – the majority shareholder in NHC. 
 
The other public companies identified in Appendix 2 also produce consolidated 
reports and it is similarly impossible to disaggregate the data to focus on their coal 
based activities. One of the more diverse companies is the Hudson Investment Group 
Limited (HGL). The company’s Annual Report for 2015 gives its principal activities 
as ‘Investment and development of properties in Australia’ (HGL December 2015, p. 
7). The consolidated report covers sixteen controlled entities – one of which 
(Bundaberg Coal Pty Ltd) holds a coal exploration permit within the Scenic Rim. 
This is the only mention of any interest in coal in the entire report. (N.B. The 
controlled entities were transferred to the Hudson Pacific Group during the year 
(HGL December 2015, p. 60)). 
 
The above discussion about the existence and operation of private and public 
companies can be used to illustrate (and, perhaps, to partially refute) the 
shortcomings of Stakeholder Theory proposed by Weiss (n.d., pp. 1–7). Weiss 
proposed that the theory contained conceptual confounds and that its general 
applicability was suspect – both because it concentrated on large corporations and 
did not adequately deal with the combined ownership and control represented by sole 
trader enterprises. The separation of ownership and control is well represented in the 
operations of NHC and HGL but not in most of the single shareholder, single 
director/manager structure of most of the private companies identified in Appendix 
2. In most of those companies, the single shareholder representative (usually a 
member of the Board of the holding company) is also the sole director and manager 
of the subsidiary company. Although this structure only represents the interests of 
the sole internal stakeholder, it is no more of a barrier to the involvement of external 
stakeholders (suppliers, environmental groups, governments and communities) than 
is the usual governance structure of most publically listed companies. In both extent 
and composition, the external stakeholders of private and public companies are 
exactly the same. 
  
Freeman (n.d) has suggested that there may need to be changes to corporate 
legislation so as to ensure that the rights of all stakeholders are recognised and 
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protected. He suggested that such changes could be based on the following 
principles: (i) the stakeholder enabling principle; (ii) the principle of director 
responsibility; and (iii) the principle of stakeholder recourse (see Section 3.9.3.11). 
When the Commonwealth Parliament set out to review director responsibility 
towards stakeholders (other than shareholders) in 2005, the recommendations in its 
report agreed with industry submissions that the Corporations Act 2001 already 
permitted directors to have regard to the interests of stakeholders other than 
shareholders and that no changes to law were required (Parliament of Australia June 
2006).  
 
The Corporate Entity theory (on which all companies exploring for coal or CSG 
within the Scenic Rim can be based) rests on both private and public companies 
having a foundation in law. The Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 adequately 
provides this base in Australia. 
 
Of the more relevant TOTF identified in Section 3.9.3, only the two resource based 
views remain to be discussed and this part of the thesis applies the concepts 
contained within the two theories to the companies recognised in Appendix 1. 
 
Resource Based theory suggests that a corporation is a collection of productive 
resources that are innate to the corporation and that are either (i) tangible (plant, 
equipment, natural resources, finished goods and waste products; or (ii) human 
(skilled and unskilled labour, financial, technical and managerial staff) – intangible 
resources such as team skills and capabilities are also applicable (Lozano et al. 2015, 
p. 435). The bases of this view are that one corporation can produce goods or offer 
services better than can another, that the emphasis is on reducing costs and that the 
company needs to develop its internal resources (including the transfer of knowledge 
between individuals) in order to create a competitive advantage. This resource based 
view considers the social and time dimensions of resource development but, in its 
original concept, did not consider environmental impacts. The discussion in Section 
3.9.3.7 adequately covers the application of this theory to the companies recognized 
in Appendix 1 and is not continued here. 
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The initial competitive advantage of the companies that hold coal exploration 
permits (a natural resource base) within the Scenic Rim is founded on the following 
premises: 
 the natural resource has a proven potential for generating electricity; 
 the existing, government granted, permits are exclusive and, while the companies 
hold onto their permits, no competitor can enter the market place; and 
 transport distances from the potential West Moreton mine sites to (a) an existing 
coal export port or (b) domestic users are much less than are those in other 
potential Queensland and New South Wales natural resource sites (OGL 31 
October 2012, p. 9). 
 
The resources of a company that may lead to competitive survival can be described 
as being (a) valuable; (b) rare; (c) inimitable; and (d) non-substitutable (Lozano et al. 
2015, p. 435). It is hard to use these adjectives to describe the coal and CSG 
resources of companies exploring within the Scenic Rim (particularly as those 
resources are not rare, their value is, as yet, unproven and they may, even in the 
intermediate term, be subject to substitution by other energy types). 
 
The extension of any initial competitive advantage into sustained competitive 
advantage will require that mining firms working within the Scenic Rim recognize 
and work very hard to implement a proposition advanced by Hart: sustainable 
development is dependent upon a firm’s capability in pollution prevention and 
product stewardship (Hart 1995, p 1006). A track record in either pollution 
prevention or product stewardship would be impossible to demonstrate within the 
Scenic Rim (given that all existing permits are merely for resource exploration) and 
the firms may have to demonstrate that their mining activities in other areas (other 
parts of Queensland, in other states or internationally) meet these criteria. 
 
7.12. Implications for the development of an evolutionary theory of 
the firm 
Appendix 5 identifies twelve groups of TOTF that could be used to understand the 
reasons for the existence, nature and operations of companies.  These theories are 
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then rated for their utility in understanding the activities of the companies recognised 
in Appendix 1 (Table 7.4) and the six more useful theories identified. The 
applicability of these six theories to the companies exploring for coal and CSG 
within the Scenic Rim is examined in Chapter 7. This discussion clearly establishes 
that none of the individual theories completely explains the reasons for existence of 
the companies, their nature or their operations. 
 
The principal reasons for this failure are: 
 each individual theory is limited in its application and only addresses a narrow 
range of the characteristics of the firms examined; and 
 the public data that is readily available about the individual firms is very limited 
in coverage (mainly because it only supports analysis of consolidated entities) 
and does not support the more detailed cost/revenue analysis that the Neo-
classical, Transaction Cost and Contract theories would require. 
 
These failures call for either an enhancement of existing TOTF, so as to provide a 
better understanding of the companies recognised in Appendix 1, or the development 
of a completely new theory and such further work is outlined in Section 10. 
 
7.13.  Summary of the chapter 
 
The material presented in this chapter has established that: (i) some of the mineral 
deposits being explored within the Scenic Rim could lead to commercial 
developments; (ii) that the communities of the region could have a sustainable future 
without the development of these deposits; and (iii) that none of the CBOs active 
within the region demonstrates the characteristics needed to play a role in resolving 
conflict between the communities and the companies. None of the mineral 
exploration companies has set out to actively engage with the communities and their 
actions, except for the legal base to their existence, cannot be satisfactorily explained 
by existing theories of the firm. The discussion at the end of the chapter draws 
implications for the development of an evolutionary theory of the firm that might 
overcome this deficit. It also provides a base for the response to the Research 
Question (posed in Section 1.4) given in Chapter 8. 
136 
 
8. A RESPONSE TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
8.1. Introduction to this chapter 
 
A response to the Research Question posed in Section 1.4 requires an understanding 
of both the social contract that communities within the Scenic Rim would like to see 
in place and the intent of the companies to engage with those communities. The 
discussion in Section 7.8 helps develop an understanding of what the communities 
would like to see take place and the material in Section 3.6.2 indicates how the 
companies view their external stakeholders. The response to the Research Question 
given in Section 8.4 suggests that there are simple steps that the companies could 
take to meet the requirements of the communities. 
 
8.2. Objective of the chapter 
 
The objective of this chapter is to summarise the discussion in Chapter 7 so as to 
provide a response to the Research Question posed in Section 1.4. 
 
8.3. Structure of the chapter 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: 
 Section 8.1 provides an introduction to the chapter; 
 Section 8.2 sets out the objective of the chapter; 
 Section 8.3 details the structure of the chapter; 
 Section 8.4 details the response to the Research Question in Section 1.4; and 
 Section 8.5 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
8.4. A response to the Research Question 
 
The research question posed in Section 1.4 is What responsibilities do companies 
exploring for coal and CSG within the Scenic Rim have to the communities of the 
area that are in addition to their responsibilities to their shareholders? A review of 
the neoclassical TOTF (corporate entity theory, managerial theory, transaction cost 
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theory, contract theory, principal/agency theory and evolutionary theory (see 
Appendix 5)) would suggest that the answer to the question is ‘None’. However, 
such an answer ignores many of the more recent developments in 
managerial/organisational theory and leaves a company open to actions against it by 
communities that hold a different view of the social contract on which the 
community/company relationship is based. It is, however, in line with individual 
corporation and industry association responses to parliamentary enquiries into 
whether or not the Australian Corporations Act 2001 should be changed to force 
companies to have greater regard of the needs of their external stakeholders 
(Parliament of Australia June 2006). 
 
The QRC believes that bases for corporate behaviour that would generate acceptance 
and trust between communities and companies are: (i) communication; (ii) integrity 
and transparency; (iii) follow through; (iv) understanding and awareness; and (v) 
respect (QRC 2014, p. 8). Similarly, Royal Dutch Shell plc (one of the two part 
owners of the companies exploring for CSG within the Scenic Rim) states its core 
values as being: (i) honesty; (ii) integrity; and (iii) respect for people, that its code of 
conduct covers sustainable development and communications and that its 
subsidiaries have a responsibility ‘to conduct business as a responsible corporate 
member of society’ (see Table 3.3). The code of conduct promulgated by the APPEA 
(of which Arrow Energy is a member) also requires members to ‘use open and 
effective communication with communities, regulators, government and other 
affected parties’ (APPEA n.d.). These values would suggest that associated 
companies exploring within the Scenic Rim would: 
 endeavour to become aware of community values and development desires; 
 communicate company values and development intentions to community 
members openly and honestly;  
 maintain ongoing communication with communities within the region; and 
 require their employees and contractors to respect the rights and property of 
landholders and their representatives. 
 
Herz et al. (2010, p.126) argued that the information given to stakeholders should 
include basic data such as the purpose, nature, size and reversibility of a project, 
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preliminary assessments of the likely economic, social, cultural and environmental 
impacts of the project, details of personnel likely to be involved in the project and of 
potential benefit sharing. It could be said that the preparation and presentation of this 
data would be an onerous burden on the companies and that, until the value of a 
permit area was proven by exploration, much of the data suggested should be 
‘commercial in confidence’. However, much of this data is now required as part of 
the lodgement of an application for an exploration permit (Queensland Government 
Business and Industry portal n.d.) and later becomes public knowledge during the 
preparation of an environmental impact statement. It may be that there is a timing 
issue associated with release of the data but any such reservation could be explained 
as part of an ongoing communication process. None of the above suggests that a 
company faces any requirement to develop or implement a CSR program during the 
exploratory phase of mining development but the context for and timing of such a 
program might also be disclosed during an ongoing community consultation and 
engagement process.  
 
How companies and communities manage this ongoing information exchange and 
involvement process would need to be identified very early in the engagement 
process as community members could very easily become convinced that they were 
being treated as mere data recipients when they expected to have a role in decision 
making and some power over the overall project (see Friedman and Miles 2006, p. 
163 for an explanation of their ladder of stakeholder engagement). 
 
Even if the fiduciary duty of company directors and the appointed officers is to their 
principal internal stakeholders (the shareholders), part of that duty requires them to 
preserve the long term sustainability of the company and one way to achieve this is 
to ensure that the external stakeholders (e.g. communities) are onside and are 
committed to the achievement of company objectives. To ensure that this 
commitment is made and sustained, those directors and officers will need to act in 
accord with the values identified in Appendix 3, disclose the information suggested 
by Herz et al. (2010, p. 126) and involve their external stakeholders as suggested by 
the upper levels of Friedman and Miles (2006, p. 163) ladder of stakeholder 
engagement.  
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These, then, are the responsibilities that company directors and officers have to their 
external stakeholders that are in addition to those that they have towards their 
shareholders. 
 
8.5. Summary of the chapter 
The Australian Corporations Act 2001 clearly establishes the fiduciary 
responsibilities that companies have towards their shareholders but, because it is 
silent on the matter, it neither prescribes responsibilities towards other stakeholders 
nor proscribes them. If the mineral exploration companies active within the Scenic 
Rim wish to engage with the communities of the region, they will need to: (i) 
demonstrate that they understand and respect the values and development desires of 
the communities; (ii) disclose information that at least outlines their own values and 
development intentions; and (iii) involve the communities in their decision making 
process in a meaningful way. 
 
 
9.  LIMITATIONS TO THE RESEARCH 
 
There are four major limitations to the research behind this thesis. The first limitation 
is that most of the companies exploring for coal or CSG within the Scenic Rim are 
proprietary limited companies and so do not have the disclosure and reporting 
requirements of public companies listed on the ASX.  This has limited the 
availability of information on which the discussion could be based. The second 
limitation is that the recognition of companies exploring for coal and CSG within the 
Scenic Rim (Appendix 1) is based on Queensland Government reports and these 
reports may not be fully up to date. Some of the companies included in the research 
might, therefore, no longer hold ATPs within the Scenic Rim. The third limitation is 
that the analysis of theories of the firm given in Appendix 5 is, necessarily, limited 
by the need to keep this thesis to a reasonable length and so makes a number of 
contractions (such as combining Shareholder Theory and Stakeholder Theory in the 
one analysis) that some researchers may not concede as desirable. The final 
limitation is that much of the analysis and interpretation is based on the author’s 
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experience as a manager and may, therefore, differ from the views of others whose 
work includes interviews with many similarly experienced managers. 
 
 
10.  FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The analysis of the values, nature and operations of companies exploring for coal or 
CSG within the Scenic Rim is based on data contained in their published documents, 
This data may be out of date or incomplete and will need to be verified by 
discussions with company officers and then cross referenced with material available 
from other sources – such as newspapers and community groups. Draft 
questionnaires have been developed for this purpose and their usefulness assessed by 
a limited range of interviews. These questionnaires are being upgraded and will then 
be submitted to the USQ Ethics Committee before being applied to a larger sample 
of companies and community groups as part of a PhD research program. The ability 
to reach many of the companies may be limited by the location of their corporate 
offices in other states or overseas.  
 
The research behind this thesis has established that the existing theories of the firm 
are of limited value in determining the reasons for the existence, structure, nature 
and operation of most of the companies exploring for coal or CSG within the Scenic 
Rim. An enhancement of these theories (or the development of a new theory) to 
better describe these companies (and all other companies) is a field worthy of future 
research.  
 
Section 6.10 of this thesis describes the characteristics of a model for community/ 
company interaction that might more equitably distribute both the benefits and 
disadvantages of mining between companies and their external stakeholders. These 
characteristics will be further examined as part of a PhD research program and, from 
community feedback, a detailed model proposed. 
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11.  CONCLUSION 
 
The implicit social contract between society, government and business is changing 
(Section 7.8) and it is no longer enough for mining companies to expect that the 
taxes and royalties that they pay and the employment that they provide is sufficient 
for local communities to welcome them as good corporate citizens. Within the 
Scenic Rim of South East Queensland, local communities are demanding that their 
environmental, residential, farming and tourism values (Appendix 3) be respected 
and that the water resources and good quality agricultural lands on which they 
depend (Section 7.5) be protected from the damage that mining could bring. These 
new requirements form part of the answer to the Research Question posed in Section 
1.4 and are enlarged upon in Section 7.8. To date, none of the companies exploring 
for coal or CSG within the region (Appendix 1) has sought to discuss the local 
additions to the general social contract that the communities want included and then 
to negotiate a social licence to operate (Section 3.7). External stakeholders (Section 
3.6) do have a role to play in helping companies develop and maintain a sustainable 
advantage and, if the development desires of the communities within the Scenic Rim 
continue to be ignored, the conflict over mining exploration that has already 
occurred will continue. Such continuing conflict may make it difficult for the 
companies to obtain the finance needed to develop their exploration permits further. 
 
Free, prior and informed consent is one model for conflict resolution (Section 3.8) 
that might be successfully applied within the Scenic Rim but, to date, neither the 
communities nor the companies have shown any willingness to engage and negotiate 
a mutually acceptable outcome. Reasons for this conflict are identified in Section 
5.7. Community values are illustrated in Appendix 3 and the values and development 
intentions of the companies identified in Section 6.7.  
 
Thirteen community based organisations that have played some role in representing 
community values to mining companies are identified in Section 6.8. However, 
many of these organisations have a narrow focus and have become participants in the 
conflict that now exists. There is a need for a different organisation that could help 
both communities and companies to explore and understand what shared value might 
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arise in the future. The characteristics of such an organisation are recognised in 
Section 7.9. How such an organisation could be created will be explored in future 
research as part of a PhD program suggested in Chapter 10. 
 
The role of corporate ethics is outlined in Section 3.6 but none of these standards 
really helps to understand why companies exist in their established form, why they 
act the way that they do or why they espouse the values that they do. To reach this 
understanding requires a more detailed knowledge of TOTF and of their application 
in real life. Thirteen TOTF are recognised in Section 3.9.3 and a model for 
evaluating their utility (the Maddox Model) is developed in Section 3.9.2. Such an 
evaluation is detailed in Appendix 5 and in Section 7.10. None of the theories 
recognised meets all of the criteria contained in the Maddox Model and only one 
theory (Stakeholder theory) suggests any criteria against which its validity and 
reliability might be measured. One of the theories evaluated is Frederick’s (2004) 
theory of the evolutionary firm and this does have some application within the 
Scenic Rim. Particularly, it partially explains the growth of New Hope Corporation 
Limited and its evolution from a coal miner to a diversified coal miner, oil producer, 
coal seam gas explorer, coal to liquids technology proponent and bulk export 
terminal operator. Both Natural Resource Based theory (Section 3.9.3.9) and 
Corporate Sustainability theory (Section 3.9.3.13) come close to explaining why 
corporations might act as they do but they fail the Maddox Model test in other ways. 
 
What is needed is a theory of the firm that encompasses both the birth and growth of 
a firm as well as explaining its response to stakeholder pressures and market forces. 
Such an evolutionary theory would also suggest tests for its own validity and 
reliability. The base for such a theory is outlined in Section 7.10 and its development 
and testing (for application to all firms) is also part of the PhD research program 
suggested in Chapter 10.  
ooOoo  
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APPENDIX 1: The ultimate ownership of coal and CSG                     
                          exploration permits held within the Scenic Rim 
PERMIT 
NUMBER 
APPROX 
LOCATION 
PERMIT HELD BY ULTIMATE OWNER REGISTERED 
OFFICE 
SRRC 
   EPP 641 
   (Part only) 
   EPP 644 
   EPP 791 
 
Boonah 
 
Beaudesert 
Boonah 
 
Arrow CSG (Aust) P/L 
BNG Pty Ltd – 70% 
As above 
As above 
 
Royal Dutch Shell plc 
PetroChina Coy Ltd 
As above 
RELINQUISHED 
 
London 
China 
As above 
- 
SRRC 
   EPC 910 
   EPC 1109 
   EPC 1149 
   EPC 1152  
   EPC 1249 
   EPC 1271 
   (Part only) 
   EPC 1273 
   EPC 1303 
   EPC 1313 
   EPC 1501 
   EPC 1509 
   EPC 1524 
 
   EPC 1643 
 
   EPC 1656 
   EPC 1660 
    (Part only) 
   EPC 1662 
   EPC 2082 
 
   EPC 2120 
   EPC 2127 
   (Part only) 
   EPC 2172 
 
   EPC 2240 
    (Part only) 
  EPC 2242 
 
   EPC 2257 
 
   EPC 2364 
   (Part only) 
   EPC 2374 
   (Part only) 
 
Rathdowney 
Map NA 
Rathdowney 
Warrill View 
Rathdowney  
E of Pilton 
 
N of Boonah 
Beaudesert 
Hillview 
Dugandan 
Map NA 
Rathdowney 
 
Mt Alford 
 
Mt Alford 
Maryvale 
 
Mt Alford 
Aratula 
 
Rathdowney 
Amberley 
 
Rathdowney 
 
Hampton 
 
Boonah 
 
Munbilla 
 
Aratula 
 
Marburg 
 
United Qld Resources P/L 
Carbon Energy (Ops) P/L 
Carabella Resources Ltd 
NA - RELINQUISHED 
Carabella Resources Ltd 
Bundaberg Coal P/L 
 
Bundaberg Coal P/L 
Coalbank Ltd 
Moreton Energy Pty Ltd 
MetroCoal Ltd 
Matilda Coal Pty Ltd 
Coalbank Ltd – 50% 
Moreton Energy P/L - 50% 
Downforce Mining P/L    ) 
                                         ) 
Golden Cross Ops P/L 
XMC Australia Pty Ltd 
 
XMC Australia Pty Ltd 
Golden Cross Ops P/L 
 
Carabella Resources Ltd 
Scorpion Energy Pty Ltd 
 
Jindal Steel and Power 
(Aust) Pty Ltd 
Coalbank Ltd 
 
Downforce Mining P/L    ) 
                                          ) 
Golden Cross Ops P/L 
 
Shenhuo International 
Group Pty Ltd 
Mineral and Coal 
Investments Pty Ltd 
 
United Mining Group P/L 
Carbon Energy Ltd 
Carabella Resources Ltd 
- 
Carabella Resources Ltd 
Hudson Investment Gp Ltd 
 
Hudson Investment Gp Ltd 
RELINQUISHED - MAR 
Treasure Wheel Global Ltd 
MetroCoal Ltd 
Cockatoo Coal Ltd 
Treasure Wheel Global Ltd 
Treasure Wheel Global Ltd 
Longfin Holdings P/L 35% 
HongGuang She – 65% 
Golden Cross Resources L  
Xuzhou Coal Mining 
Group Corporation 
Xuzhou Coal Mining 
Golden Cross Resources 
Ltd  
RELINQUISHED – JUNE 
Cuesta Coal Ltd  
 
Jindal Steel and Power 
 
Treasure Wheel Global Ltd 
 
Longfin Holdings P/L 35% 
HongGuang She (65%) 
Golden Cross Resources 
Ltd 
Henan Shenhuo Group 
Coy Ltd 
Allegiance Coal Ltd 
 
Caringbah 
Brisbane 
Brisbane 
- 
Brisbane 
Sydney 
 
Sydney 
QUARTER 2013 
Virgin Islands 
Brisbane 
Brisbane 
Virgin Islands 
Virgin Islands 
Brisbane 
China 
Sydney 
China 
 
China 
Sydney 
 
QUARTER 2013 
Sydney 
 
Mauritius 
 
Virgin Islands 
 
Brisbane 
China 
Sydney 
 
China 
 
Sydney 
SRRC 
   MDL 138 
SRRC/ICC 
   MDL 172 
 
Mintovale 
 
Bremer View 
 
Moreton Coal Pty Ltd 
 
Zedemar Holdings Pty Ltd 
 
Allegiance Coal Ltd 
 
Zedemar Holdings Pty Ltd 
 
Brisbane 
 
Brisbane 
ICC 
   EPP 641 
   (Part only) 
   EPC 2127 
   (Part only) 
   ML 4712 
   PFL 17 
 
Purga 
 
Amberley 
 
Ebenezer 
Jeebropilly 
 
 
Arrow CSG (Aust) P/L 
BNG Pty Ltd 
Scorpion Energy Pty Ltd 
 
Zedemar Holdings Pty Ltd 
Jeebropilly Collieries P/L 
 
Royal Dutch Shell plc 
PetroChina Coy Ltd 
Cuesta Coal Ltd 
 
Zedemar Holdings Pty Ltd 
New Hope Corp Ltd 
 
London 
China 
Sydney 
 
Brisbane 
Ipswich 
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PERMIT 
NUMBER 
APPROX 
LOCATION 
PERMIT HELD BY ULTIMATE OWNER REGISTERED 
OFFICE 
LVRC 
   EPP 641 
   (Part only) 
   EPC 1145 
   (Part only) 
   EPC 1664 
   EPC 1665 
 
SE Laidley 
 
E Cambooya 
 
Gatton 
Laidley 
 
Arrow CSG (Aust) P/L 
BNG Pty Ltd 
Orpheus Energy (Hodgson 
Vale) Pty Ltd 
XMC Australia Pty Ltd 
XMC Australia Pty Ltd 
 
Royal Dutch Shell plc 
PetroChina Coy Ltd 
Orpheus Energy Ltd 
 
Xuzhou Coal Mining 
Group Corporation 
 
London 
China 
Sydney 
 
China 
SRC 
   EPC 2239 
   EPC 2374 
    (Part only) 
   EPC 2534 
    (Part only) 
 
Esk 
Lowood 
 
NE Nanango 
 
Coalbank Ltd 
Mineral and Coal 
Investments Pty Ltd 
Coalface Resources Pty 
Ltd 
 
Treasure Wheel Global Ltd 
Allegiance Coal Ltd 
 
Moultrie Hire Corporate 
Pty Ltd 
 
Virgin Islands 
Sydney 
 
Brisbane 
SRRC: Scenic Rim Regional Council   ICC: Ipswich City Council 
LVRC: Lockyer Valley Regional Council   SRC: Somerset Regional Council 
 
The permit numbers in the above table are taken from the Department of Natural Resources and 
Mines Local Area Mining Permit Report All Resources for each of the LGAs identified for May 2013 
and May 2014. 
The permit holder names are taken from the Department of Natural Resources and Mines Exploration 
Permit Public Enquiry Report for the relevant permit number. 
The ultimate holder names are taken from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Current and Historical Company Extract for the relevant permit holder name. 
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APPENDIX 2:  The public parent companies of organisations  
                         exploring for coal or CSG within the Scenic Rim and  
                         the composition of their board of directors 
PARENT 
COMPANY 
AND 
SUBSIDIARY 
PERMIT/
LEASE 
NUMBER 
CAPITAL 
30/06/14  
 
$ 
BOARD COMPOSITION HEAD 
OFFICE 
TOTAL MEN WOMEN EXEC 
DIR 
NON 
EXEC 
DIR 
 
Arrow Energy 
Holdings Pty 
Ltd 
 Arrow 
CSG 
(Aust) P/L 
 BNG P/L 
 
 
 
) 
) EPP 641 
) EPP 644 
) 
 
NA 
 
373,391,577 
 
 
60 
 
NA 
 
2  
 
 
2 
 
NA 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
NA 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
NA 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
NA 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
Brisbane 
 
Brisbane 
 
Brisbane 
Carabella 
Resources Ltd 
EPC 1149 
EPC 1249 
66,121,000 
(30/06/13) 
5 5 0 1 4 Brisbane 
Carbon Energy 
Ltd 
 Carbon 
Energy 
(Ops) P/L 
 
 
EPC 1109 
20 800 000 
 
5,200,000 
 
 
6 
 
3 
5 
 
3 
1 
 
0 
1 
 
1 
5 
 
2 
Brisbane 
 
Brisbane 
Coalbank Ltd 
 
 Moreton 
Energy P/L 
EPC 1524 
EPC 2240 
EPC 1313 
EPC 1524 
EPC 1656 
1,683,382 
 
1 
5 
 
2 
5 
 
2 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
5 
 
1 
Brisbane 
 
Brisbane 
Cockatoo Coal 
Ltd 
 Matilda 
Coal P/L 
 
 
EPC 1509 
339,007,450 
 
1 
7 
 
1 
7 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
6 
 
0 
 
Brisbane 
 
Brisbane 
Cuesta  Coal 
Ltd 
 Scorpion 
Energy P/L 
 
 
EPC 2127 
63,600,000 
 
4 
8 
 
2 
7 
 
2 
1 
 
0 
2 
 
1 
6 
 
1 
Brisbane 
 
Brisbane 
 
Golden Cross 
Resources Ltd 
 Golden 
Cross 
Operations 
P/L 
 
 
EPC 2082 
EPC 2257 
57,812,000 
 
 
13 
7 
 
 
3 
6 
 
 
3 
1 
 
 
0 
1 
 
 
1 
6 
 
 
2 
Sydney 
 
 
Sydney 
 
Henan Shenhuo 
Group Coy Ltd 
 Shenhuo 
Internat. 
Group P/L 
 
 
EPC 2364 
NA 
 
100 
NA 
 
3 
NA 
 
3 
NA 
 
0 
NA 
 
1 
NA 
 
2 
China 
 
Brisbane 
 
Hudson 
Investment 
Group Ltd 
 Bundaberg 
Coal P/L 
 
 
 
EPC 1271 
EPC 1273 
EPC 1643  
52,067,000 
 
 
50 
3 
 
 
3 
3 
 
 
3 
0 
 
 
0 
1 
 
 
1 
2  
 
 
2 
Sydney 
 
 
Sydney 
Jindal Steel and 
Power 
(Mauritius) Ltd 
 Jindal Steel 
and Power 
(Aust) P/L 
 
 
 
EPC 2172 
NA 
 
 
2 
NA 
 
 
2 
NA 
 
 
2 
NA 
 
 
0 
NA 
 
 
1 
NA 
 
 
1 
Mauritius 
 
 
Brisbane 
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PARENT 
COMPANY 
AND 
SUBSIDIARY 
PERMIT/
LEASE 
NUMBER 
CAPITAL 
30/06/14  
 
$ 
BOARD COMPOSITION HEAD 
OFFICE 
TOTAL MEN WOMEN EXEC 
DIR 
NON 
EXEC 
DIR 
 
Longfin 
Holdings P/L 
and  
HongGuang 
She 
 Downforce 
Mining P/L 
 
 
 
 
 
EPC 2242  
12 
 
 
NA 
 
4,012 
1 
 
 
NA 
 
1 
1 
 
 
NA 
 
1 
0 
 
 
NA 
 
0 
1 
 
 
NA 
 
1 
0 
 
 
NA 
 
0 
Brisbane 
 
 
NA 
 
Brisbane 
 
Metro Mining 
Ltd 
EPC 1501 
EPC 1660 
NA 5 5 0 1 4 Brisbane 
New Hope 
Corporation Ltd 
 Jeebropilly 
Collieries 
P/L 
 
 
PFL 17 
95,119,000 
 
200,000 
7 
 
3 
6 
 
3 
1 
 
0 
1 
 
1 
6 
 
2 
Ipswich 
(Brookwater) 
Ipswich 
(Brookwater) 
United Mining 
Group P/L 
 United Qld 
Resources 
P/L 
 
 
EPC 910 
1 
 
400 
1 
 
2 
1 
 
2 
0 
 
0 
1 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
Caringbah 
NSW 
Caringbah 
NSW 
Xuzhou Coal 
Mining Group 
Corporation 
 XMC 
Australia 
P/L 
 
 
 
EPC 1662 
EPC 1664 
EPC 1665 
NA 
 
 
5,092,969 
NA 
 
 
4 
NA 
 
 
4 
NA 
 
 
0 
NA 
 
 
1 
NA 
 
 
3 
China 
(Xuzhou) 
 
Brisbane 
(Manly) 
Zedemar 
Holdings P/L 
MDL 172 
ML 4712 
1,200 1 1 0 1 0 Brisbane 
NA: Not available     EPC: Exploration Permit Coal   EPP: Exploration Permit Petroleum  
ML: Mineral Lease 
MDL: Mineral Development Licence 
 
Sources:  Data for the Limited Liability companies was extracted from their Annual Report for 2015. 
Dara for the Pty Ltd companies was obtained from the ASIC Current and Historical  
  Company Extracts 
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APPENDIX 3: The values and development desires of communities  
                          within the Scenic Rim 
ITEM SRRC LCC ICC LVRC SRC 
Year of 
consultation 
2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 
Form of 
consultation 
Post card and 
on-line surveys, 
community 
meetings and 
workshops and 
displays at local 
markets and 
shopping 
centres. 
Community 
values survey, 
focus groups 
and 
interviews. 
Focus groups Steering group, 
website, on-line 
survey, 
workshops and 
postcards. 
Community 
meetings and 
surveys, 
reference group 
meetings and 
individual 
consultations. 
Number of 
participants 
More than        
1 000 people. 
More than        
1 000 young 
people and 80 
plus 
community 
submissions. 
Forty two 
participants 
drawn from an 
open invitation 
to 
stakeholders. 
More than        1 
400 people. 
23 separate 
activities but no 
participation 
levels given. 
Period of 
plan 
2011 – 2026 The LCC did 
produce a plan 
for the period 
to 2026, but, 
further change 
to the Local 
Government 
Act 
disendorsed 
the plan and 
has no other 
similar plan in 
place.  
2011 – 2031 2012 – 2022 2010 – 2020 
Challenges 
and 
development 
desires 
A growing 
population. 
Maintain local 
employment 
and ensure that 
new businesses 
are compatible 
with lifestyle 
and 
environment. 
Protecting the 
environment. 
Sustaining rural 
industry. 
Maintaining 
community 
infrastructure. 
Cost of living. 
In 2026, 
Logan is a city 
of opportunity. 
It is 
strategically 
positioned 
within a 
rapidly 
changing 
region and 
global 
economy. The 
people live in 
a dynamic city 
that sustains 
their quality of 
life. Culture, 
neighbours 
and 
generations 
connect and 
lifestyles are 
in harmony 
with the 
environment. 
Conservation 
of the natural 
environment is 
paramount. 
Strong and 
sustainable 
economy. 
Movement 
towards a 
knowledge 
based 
economy. 
Managing 
population and 
residential 
growth. 
Maintaining 
position as a 
leading 
agricultural 
production zone 
and securing a 
farming future. 
Community and 
council work 
together to make 
good decisions 
for the region. 
Preserving rural 
character and 
lifestyle. 
Creating 
economic 
vibrancy through 
growth and 
diversity. 
Protecting and 
enhancing the 
natural 
environment. 
Providing 
adequate 
community 
services and 
infrastructure. 
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ITEM SRRC LCC ICC LVRC SRC 
What is 
valued? 
Rural and 
natural heritage. 
Protecting the 
environment. 
Sense of 
community. 
Managing 
growth and 
development. 
Diverse and 
resilient 
economy. 
Sustaining 
lifestyle and 
liveability. 
Parks and 
natural 
environment. 
Scenic rural 
landscape 
Consultation 
and 
participation in 
decision 
making. 
 Active and 
healthy living. 
A creative and 
innovative 
community. 
A green and 
sustainable 
community. 
An inclusive 
and vibrant 
community. 
A regionally 
and globally 
connected 
community. 
Great 
appreciation of 
history. 
Culture of 
achievement 
and 
opportunity. 
Dynamic and 
resilient urban 
and rural 
economy. 
Home to a 
range of rural 
industries 
(such as cattle 
grazing, fodder 
production, 
wine and 
hydroponic 
vegetables) as 
well as 
defence, 
manufacturing, 
health and 
education. 
Community 
spirit and 
resilience. 
Cultural heritage 
and history. 
Natural 
environment. 
Lifestyle based 
on small, quiet, 
safe and friendly 
communities. 
Strong links 
between 
agriculture, 
farming and 
business that 
ensure that the 
region becomes 
a food 
destination for 
tourists.  
Cultural heritage 
and rural 
lifestyle. 
Environment and 
natural assets.  
Peaceful and 
scenic landscape. 
Tourism and 
ecotourism 
opportunities. 
Rural industry. 
Community 
identity. 
Economic 
opportunities 
building on 
regional 
environment and 
geography. 
Attitude to 
agriculture 
Agriculture, 
native forests 
and national 
parks are the 
dominant land 
uses. 
Major areas 
along the Logan 
River and on 
Warrill Creek 
are rated as 
good quality 
agricultural 
land. 
Not 
mentioned: 
except that 
backyard 
vegetable 
patches, urban 
community 
gardens and 
local produce 
markets are to 
be 
encouraged. 
See above. 
Environmental 
and 
agricultural 
innovation are 
features of the 
local economy. 
One of the top 
ten most fertile 
farming areas in 
the world. 
23% of region is 
rated as good 
quality 
agricultural land. 
Attitude to 
mining 
Stopping 
activities such 
as coal mines 
that irreversibly 
damage our 
natural 
environment. 
Not 
mentioned. 
Not 
mentioned. 
Not mentioned. Not mentioned. 
 
Sources:  SRRC: Scenic Rim Regional Council 2011 LVRC: Lockyer Valley Regional Council 2011 
 LCC: Logan City Council 2011  SRC: Somerset Regional Council 2011 
 ICC: Ipswich City Council 2011 
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APPENDIX 4: Reporting on ethics and codes of conduct by the  
                          public parent companies of organisations exploring  
                          for coal  and CSG within the Scenic Rim 
PARENT COMPANY REPORTING AGAINST 
ASX PRINCIPLE 3 
AVAILABILITY OF 
CODE OF CONDUCT 
Allegiance Coal Ltd Yes – with an emphasis on the 
functions of the Board of 
Directors. 
A summary of the Code of 
Conduct is available on the 
company’s web site – dealings 
with stakeholders are 
mentioned. 
Carabella Resources Ltd Yes – extensive Corporate 
Governance Statement and a 
summary of policies under 
Principle 3.  
NB: The company was taken 
over by Wealth Mining Pty 
Ltd and delisted from the ASX 
on 19 February 2014. 
No Code of Conduct has been 
found: but the company’s web 
site does contain policies on (i) 
responsibilities towards 
stakeholders and (ii) a charter 
for sustainability. 
Carbon Energy Ltd Yes – contains an extensive 
Corporate Governance 
Statement with a concentration 
on the functions of the Board 
of Directors. 
A summary of the Code of 
Conduct is given on the 
company’s web site. It 
contains a statement of 
company values – including 
meeting the expectation of ‘the 
community’. 
Coalbank Ltd Yes – contains a Corporate 
Governance Statement with a 
summary of performance 
against ASX principles. 
Principle 3 reporting 
concentrates on gender 
diversity. 
NB: In September 2013, a 
(successful) proportional 
takeover bid (75%) was made 
by Treasure Wheel Global Ltd. 
 
No mention of a Code of 
Conduct but there is a mention 
of ‘significant stakeholder 
interests’. 
Cockatoo Coal Ltd Yes`- however, the Corporate 
Governance Statement 
concentrates on: 
       -      access to coy data 
       -      share dealings and    
              disclosure 
- conflict of interest 
- related party dealings 
- board diversity. 
-  
Yes – a formal code of conduct 
exists. 
Cuesta Coal Ltd Yes – the Corporate 
Governance Statement 
concentrates on Board 
Functions.  Only Section 3.1 
of Principle 3 is fully complied 
with (Code of Conduct). 
Yes – a formal Code of 
Conduct (for Directors and 
Key Officers only) can be 
found on the website. Senior 
officers are required to 
consider impacts on the 
environment, health and safety 
and competition when making 
business decisions. 
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PARENT COMPANY REPORTING AGAINST 
ASX PRINCIPLE 3 
AVAILABILITY OF 
CODE OF CONDUCT 
Golden Cross Resources Ltd No – However, the Board has 
adopted policies on ethics and 
the environment (p.54). 
No – but a Code of Ethics, 
Risk Management and 
Environmental Policy can be 
accessed on company’s web 
site. 
Hudson Investment Group 
Ltd 
Yes – the Corporate 
Governance Statement 
contains an extensive report 
against all ASX principles. 
Yes – a formal Code of 
Conduct (for all Directors and 
employees) is on the 
company’s web site. 
MetroCoal Ltd No – the 2013 Annual Report 
contains no response to the 
ASX reporting principles. It 
does contain a section 
‘MetroCoal in the 
Community’ that is about 
social responsibility. 
The company’s web site 
contains an extensive 
Corporate Governance Charter 
(48pp) that contains both a 
statement on Corporate Ethics 
and a Code of Conduct. 
New Hope Corporation Ltd Yes – The existence of ethical 
standards is confirmed. 
Measurable objectives relating 
to culture, pay equity and 
diversity of opportunity exist. 
Yes – a formal code of conduct 
exists. 
NB: The ASX Principle 3 refers to ethical and responsible decision making. 
Sources: The data in Column 2 was taken from the Annual Report 2013-14 (obtained either in hard 
copy or on-line) for the relevant company and the data in Column 3 was extracted from (usually) the 
Corporate Governance section of each company’s web site. 
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APPENDIX 5a: Evaluation of theories of the firm 
EVALUATION 
CRITERIA 
(Maddox 
Model) 
NEOCLASSICAL 
THEORY 
CORPORATE 
ENTITY 
THEORY 
MANAGERIAL 
THEORY 
Does the theory 
develop or 
explain reasons 
for the existence 
of the firm?  
Yes – the firm is a 
more cost effective 
means of production 
than are sole traders 
and other 
unincorporated 
entities. 
Yes – the legal 
base for the 
formation and 
continued 
existence and 
operation (e.g. 
multiple 
shareholders, 
limited liability, 
separation of 
ownership and 
management, 
property rights 
and perpetual 
existence) of 
business 
enterprises is 
explained. 
Yes – in that the 
firm exists as a 
vehicle for the 
maximization of 
benefits to the 
managers. 
Does the theory 
explain the 
obligations of the 
firm to its 
stakeholders? 
(i.e. What drives 
enterprise 
strategy?) 
Yes – in that the 
objective of the firm 
is to maximize profit 
for its shareholders. 
Any obligation to 
other stakeholders or 
the time scale for 
maximizing profit is 
not considered. 
Yes – the 
obligations of the 
firm and its senior 
managers to 
shareholders are 
clear. However, 
present Australian 
corporate law does 
not stop 
consideration of 
obligations to 
other stakeholders. 
In part – the need 
for a profit level 
that is acceptable to 
shareholders is 
recognised, but any 
obligation to other 
stakeholders is 
subservient to 
maximizing 
benefits to 
managers.  
Does the theory 
explain what 
shapes the 
business 
organisation? 
No – matters relevant 
to internal divisions 
within the firm and to 
the use of 
technological 
advances are not 
examined explicitly 
but are subsumed 
within the marginal 
cost/marginal revenue 
debate. 
 
No – Australian 
law allows for 
corporate 
ownership of other 
corporations but 
does not explain 
the reasons that 
such a structure 
might happen. 
No 
Does the theory 
explain what 
motivates firm 
Yes – the sole driver 
is the maximization 
of profit for 
No Yes – in that the 
maximization of 
revenue (rather 
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EVALUATION 
CRITERIA 
(Maddox 
Model) 
NEOCLASSICAL 
THEORY 
CORPORATE 
ENTITY 
THEORY 
MANAGERIAL 
THEORY 
behaviour? shareholders. The 
values and needs of 
other stakeholders are 
not considered as the 
satisfaction of such 
needs would decrease 
the profits available 
for shareholders. 
than profit) is the 
goal and 
expenditure on 
items (such as 
promotion, pricing 
and advertising) 
that will increase 
revenue will 
dominate. 
Does the theory 
explain what 
shapes the firm’s 
moral posture? 
No – the values and 
ethics of the firm are 
not considered. 
No – in that many 
businesses have 
objected (in 
parliamentary 
hearings) to 
proposals to 
introduce 
compulsory 
corporate social 
responsibility and 
sustainability 
reporting (see 
discussion in 
Section 5). 
No 
What tests are 
available to 
support the 
validity of the 
theory? 
Nil - economics is not 
a natural science in 
which laws can be 
proved or disproved. 
The validity and 
reliability of the 
theory rest in that it 
describes the normal 
behaviour of a large 
number of firms. 
Attempts by Hall and 
Hitch (1939), Lester 
(1946), Machlup 
(1967) and Hornby 
(1995) to validate (or 
invalidate) the theory 
by empirical work did 
not provide 
irrefutable evidence. 
Nil Nil – work by 
Hornby (1995), 
Jobber and Hooley 
(1987) and Shipley 
(1981) failed to 
provide conclusive 
evidence to support 
the theory. 
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APPENDIX 5b: Evaluation of theories of the firm 
EVALUATION 
CRITERIA 
(Maddox Model) 
TRANSACTION 
COST THEORY 
CONTRACT  
THEORY 
PRINCIPAL 
AGENCY 
THEORY 
Does the theory 
develop or 
explain reasons 
for the existence 
of the firm?  
Yes – in that firms 
exist because the cost 
of providing internal 
support and services is 
less than that of 
obtaining similar 
services, by contract, 
in the market place. 
No – the theory 
describes how a 
firm might operate 
after it has been 
formed. 
No – the theory 
describes how a 
firm might 
operate after it 
has been 
formed. 
Does the theory 
explain the 
obligations of the 
firm to its 
stakeholders? 
(i.e. What drives 
enterprise 
strategy?) 
Yes – in that it is 
derived from 
neoclassical theory and 
thus obligations to 
shareholders are 
paramount. The costs 
of negotiating, 
fulfilling and/or 
enforcing many 
contracts are avoided 
and profits are 
maximized. 
Yes – in that it is 
derived from 
neoclassical theory 
and thus 
obligations to 
shareholders are 
paramount. The 
costs of 
negotiating, 
fulfilling and/or 
enforcing contracts 
are less than the 
costs of providing 
similar services in 
house and so profits 
are maximized. 
Yes – in that the 
actions of 
managers and 
other staff must 
be designed to 
maximize 
returns to the 
owners (the 
principals) of 
the firm. 
Does the theory 
explain what 
generates 
business 
productivity and 
profitability? 
Yes – in that the cost 
of providing in house 
activity is less that that 
associated with 
obtaining the same 
support in the market 
place. 
Yes - The costs of 
negotiating, 
fulfilling and/or 
enforcing contracts 
are less than the 
costs of providing 
similar services in 
house and profits 
are maximized. 
Only in that by 
appointing 
agents, the 
principals seek 
skills that will 
maximize their 
profits. 
Does the theory 
explain what 
shapes the 
business 
organisation? 
Yes – in that multiple 
divisions will be 
created within the 
enterprise and 
technology adopted 
provided that the costs 
of doing so are lower 
than would be the 
costs of obtaining 
equivalent support in 
the market place. 
Yes – in that 
manufacture and 
supporting services 
will be obtained by 
external contract if 
the costs of doing 
so are less than the 
costs of 
manufacturing and 
providing such 
activities in house. 
Yes – in that it 
is the wishes of 
the principals 
that shape 
product range 
and markets into 
which those 
products might 
be offered. 
Does the theory Yes – in that firms will Yes – in that firms Yes – in that 
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EVALUATION 
CRITERIA 
(Maddox Model) 
TRANSACTION 
COST THEORY 
CONTRACT  
THEORY 
PRINCIPAL 
AGENCY 
THEORY 
explain what 
motivates firm 
behaviour? 
always behave in a 
way that minimizes the 
costs associated with 
any action. (e.g. firms 
would not work with 
external stakeholders if 
the cost of doing so 
was more than the 
costs associated with 
ignoring them). 
operating under this 
theory are profit 
maximizers and the 
behaviour of 
managers and other 
staff will be 
directed towards 
this end. 
objectives are 
set in accord 
with the values 
and ethics of the 
principals and 
these are 
reflected in the 
behaviour of the 
firm. 
Does the theory 
explain what 
shapes the firm’s 
moral posture? 
Yes - in that such firms 
would not adopt a 
more ethical stance 
(e.g. caring for the 
environment or for a 
local community) if 
the cost of doing so 
was more than the cost 
of ignoring such 
issues. 
Yes – to the extent 
that large firms 
operating by 
external contract 
might attempt to 
use their size and 
financial might to 
impose terms that 
are to their 
advantage on their 
contractual 
partners.  
Yes – in that the 
moral posture of 
the firm reflects 
the values and 
ethics of its 
principals. 
What tests are 
available to 
support the 
validity of the 
theory? 
Nil Nil Nil 
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APPENDIX 5c: Evaluation of theories of the firm 
EVALUATION 
ITEM 
(Maddox Model) 
RESOURCE 
BASED 
THEORY 
NATURAL 
RESOURCE 
BASED 
THEORY 
BEHAVIOURAL 
THEORY 
Does the theory 
develop or explain 
reasons for the 
existence of the 
firm?  
Yes – in that the 
firm would not 
come into being 
if its resource 
base did not give 
it a competitive 
advantage. 
Yes – in that the 
firm would not 
come into being 
if its natural 
resource base did 
not minimize its 
product life cycle 
costs and/or give 
it a base for 
sustainable 
development. 
No – firms are said to 
consist of a number of 
decision makers – 
many of whom will 
have different 
objective: but this 
describes what can 
happen after a firm is 
formed and does not 
give a reason for the 
formation. 
Does the theory 
explain the 
obligations of the 
firm to its 
stakeholders? 
(i.e. What drives 
enterprise 
strategy?) 
No – but it does 
suggest that the 
firm would 
develop links 
with its 
stakeholders that 
could improve its 
competitive 
advantage. 
Yes – to the 
extent that the 
firm’s natural 
resources would 
be maintained 
and/or developed 
to improve its 
competitive 
advantage. 
Yes – but only to the 
extent that firms could 
aim for a satisfactory 
level of profit whilst 
pursuing other 
objectives at the same 
time. These other 
objectives would also 
be those of the firm’s 
principals and agents. 
 
Does the theory 
explain what 
generates business 
productivity and 
profitability? 
Yes – diversity 
in the work force 
(and in the 
boardroom) 
could bring a 
wider range of 
experiences that 
could lead to 
improved ways 
of performing 
tasks. 
Yes – in that the 
firm would act so 
as to minimize 
waste and 
pollution. 
No 
Does the theory 
explain what 
shapes the 
business 
organisation? 
No Not particularly. 
Although the firm 
would act to 
reduce waste, 
pollution and 
adverse impact 
on its 
environment, the 
theory does not 
suggest how it 
would do this. 
No 
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EVALUATION 
ITEM 
(Maddox Model) 
RESOURCE 
BASED 
THEORY 
NATURAL 
RESOURCE 
BASED 
THEORY 
BEHAVIOURAL 
THEORY 
Does the theory 
explain what 
motivates firm 
behaviour? 
Yes – in that the 
firm would act so 
as to build and 
retain resources 
that are valuable, 
rare, inimitable 
and non-
substitutable. 
Yes – in that the 
firm would not 
act so as to harm 
its relationship 
with the natural 
environment (and 
so damage its 
competitive 
advantage). 
No 
Does the theory 
explain what 
shapes the firm’s 
moral posture? 
Yes – in that the 
firm would 
exhibit values 
that would build 
and retain links 
with stakeholders 
so as to improve 
its competitive 
advantage. 
Yes – in that the 
firm would act to 
minimize waste, 
pollution and its 
impact on the 
natural 
environment. 
Yes - in that the firm 
would exhibit those 
values that would 
maximize the returns to 
its managers 
What tests are 
available to 
support the 
validity of the 
theory? 
Nil Nil Nil 
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APPENDIX 5d: Evaluation of theories of the firm 
EVALUATION 
ITEM 
(Maddox Model) 
STAKEHOLDER  
(incl shareholder) 
THEORY 
EVOLUTIONARY 
THEORY 
CORPORATE 
SUSTAINABILITY 
THEORY 
Does the theory 
develop or 
explain reasons 
for the existence 
of the firm?  
Yes - to the extent 
that the firm is 
created to meet the 
needs of a coalition 
of stakeholders. 
No – in that the 
theory concentrates 
on how the firm 
changes and grows 
after it has been 
created. 
No – the theory is 
directed at how the 
firm might remain 
in existence rather 
than at how or why 
it was created. 
Does the theory 
explain the 
obligations of the 
firm to its 
stakeholders? 
(i.e. What drives 
enterprise 
strategy?) 
Yes – in that in 
order to succeed 
over time, the firm 
must keep the 
interests of its 
stakeholders 
aligned and going 
in the same 
direction (i.e. the 
firm must consider 
the impact that 
stakeholders could 
have on its 
projects). 
Yes – in that the 
theory suggests that 
the firm might need 
to change so as to 
drive its competitors 
out of business and 
not be driven out of 
business by its 
competitors. By 
remaining in 
business, the firm 
would serve the 
needs of its 
shareholders (at 
least). 
Yes – in that the 
firm would exist to 
‘foster the evolution 
of more sustainable 
societies’. 
Does the theory 
explain what 
generates 
business 
productivity and 
profitability? 
No No No – the theory 
merely states that 
the firm is a profit 
generating entity. 
Does the theory 
explain what 
shapes the 
business 
organisation? 
Only in that the 
theory suggests that 
the nature of the 
organisation might 
need to change so 
as to better meet 
the needs of its 
many stakeholders. 
Yes – in that the 
evolutionary firm is a 
learning organisation 
that is based on 
knowledge 
development, 
processing and 
storage and so will 
adapt its structure and 
strategies to meet 
needs. 
Yes – in that the 
firm is a profit 
generating entity 
and that it must 
comply with laws, 
maintain its 
competitive 
advantage and 
maintain a social 
licence to operate. 
Does the theory 
explain what 
motivates firm 
behaviour? 
Yes – in that the 
firm is a 
framework of 
business ethics and 
organisational 
management that 
addresses moral 
Yes – in that the firm 
is motivated by profit 
but is not considered 
to be a profit 
maximizing entity. 
Yes – in that the 
firm is a profit 
generating entity but 
must also maintain a 
social licence to 
operate and 
contribute to the 
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EVALUATION 
ITEM 
(Maddox Model) 
STAKEHOLDER  
(incl shareholder) 
THEORY 
EVOLUTIONARY 
THEORY 
CORPORATE 
SUSTAINABILITY 
THEORY 
and ethical values 
(that is, those 
values held by its 
stakeholders). 
Freeman’s 
Principle of 
Stakeholder 
Recourse (n.d.) 
suggests that 
stakeholders would 
be able to bring an 
action against the 
directors if they 
failed to perform 
the required duty of 
care. 
evolution of more 
sustainable 
societies. 
Does the theory 
explain what 
shapes the firm’s 
moral posture? 
Only in that the 
firm must address 
moral and ethical 
values in the 
management of its 
business. 
Yes – in that the 
evolutionary firm is a 
learning organisation 
based on knowledge 
development, 
processing and 
storage and so will 
‘learn’ those moral 
and ethical values 
that best help it to 
achieve its goals. 
Yes – in that the 
firm is a network of 
stakeholder 
relationships, that it 
must maintain a 
social licence to 
operate and that it 
must empower its 
stakeholders. 
What tests are 
available to 
support the 
validity of the 
theory? 
The ladder of 
stakeholder 
engagement 
proposed by 
Friedman and 
Miles (2006, p. 
162) could be used 
to assess whether 
or not (and how 
well) the strategies 
being implemented 
by the firm 
recognise and fulfil 
stakeholder 
expectations. 
Nil Nil - the theory is 
relatively new 
(2015) and tests for 
its validity have not 
been proposed as 
yet. 
 
